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Abstract 
 
The two main features of this thesis are (i) an account of contextualized (context indexed) 
counterfactuals, and (ii) a non-vacuist account of counterpossibles. Experience tells us that the truth 
of the counterfactual is contingent on what is meant by the antecedent, which in turn rests on what 
context is assumed to underlie its reading (intended meaning). On most conditional analyses, only the 
world of evaluation and the antecedent determine which worlds are relevant to determining the truth 
of a conditional, and consequently what its truth value is. But that results in the underlying context 
being fixed, when evaluating distinct counterfactuals with the same antecedent on any single 
occasion, even when the context underlying the evaluation of each counterfactual may vary. 
Alternative approaches go some of the way toward resolving this inadequacy by appealing to a 
difference in the consequents associated with counterfactuals with the same antecedent. That is, in 
addition to the world of evaluation and the antecedent, the consequent contributes to the 
counterfactual’s evaluation. But these alternative approaches nevertheless give a single, determinate 
truth value to any single conditional (same antecedent and consequent), despite the possibility that 
this value may vary with context. My reply to these shortcomings (chapter 4) takes the form of an 
analysis of a language that makes appropriate explicit access to the intended context available. That 
is, I give an account of a contextualized counterfactual of the form ‘In context C: If it were the case 
that … , then it would be the case that …’. Although my proposal is largely based on Lewis’ (1973, 
1981) analyses of counterfactuals (the logic VW and its ordering semantics), it does not require that 
any particular logic of counterfactuals should serve as its basis – rather, it is a general prescription 
for contextualizing a conditional language. The advantage of working with ordering semantics stems 
from existing results (which I apply and develop) concerning the properties of ordering frames that 
facilitate fashioning and implementing a notion of contextual information preservation.  
 
Analyses of counterfactuals, such as Lewis’ (1973), that cash out the truth of counterfactuals in terms 
of the corresponding material conditional’s truth at possible worlds result in all counterpossibles 
being evaluated as vacuously true. This is because antecedents of counterpossibles are not true at any 
possible world, by definition. Such vacuist analyses have already been identified and challenged by 
a number of authors. I join this critical front, and drawing on existing proposals, I develop an 
impossible world semantics for a non-vacuist account of counterpossibles (chapter 5), by modifying 
the same system and semantics that serve the basis of the contextualized account offered in chapter 
4, i.e. Lewis’ (1986) ordering semantics for the logic VW. I critically evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of key conditions on the ordering of worlds on the extended domain and show that 
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there is a sense in which all of Lewis’ analysis of mere counterfactuals can be preserved, whilst 
offering an analysis of counterpossibles that meets our intuitions.  
 
The first part of chapter 1 consists of an outline of the usefulness of impossible worlds across 
philosophical analyses and logic. That outline in conjunction with a critical evaluation of Lewis’ 
logical arguments in favour of vacuism in chapter 2, and his marvellous mountain argument against 
impossible worlds in chapter 3, serves to motivate and justify the impossible world semantics for 
counterpossibles proposed in chapter 5. The second part of chapter 1 discusses the limitations that 
various conditional logics face when tasked to give an adequate treatment of the influence of context. 
That introductory discussion in conjunction with an overview of conditional logics and their various 
semantics in chapter 2 – which includes an in-depth exposition of Stalnaker-Lewis similarity 
semantics for counterfactuals – serves as the motivation and conceptual basis for the contextualized 
account of counterfactuals proposed in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The role of Impossible Worlds in Philosophical Analysis, and  
The Problem of Context in the Analysis of Counterfactuals 
 
 
To retain all the new techniques of algebra 
that brought in not only ‘minus’ quantities but 
also their square roots, and to escape the 
‘impossible’ status of the last. 
 
Gerolamo Cardano, De aliza, 1570. 
 
 
And whether two actions are instances of the 
same behavior depends upon how we take 
them; a response to the command, “Do that 
again”, may well be the question: “Do what 
again? Swat another fly or move 
choreographically the same way?” 
 
Goodman (1972) 
 
 
But there may be a relevant difference in the 
occasions of evaluation, even when both the 
antecedent and the consequent of the 
conditional remain the same.  
 
Nute (1980) 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter diagnoses the symptoms of analytic inadequacy evident in various formal 
accounts of counterfactual conditionals concerning two independent aspects – treatment of 
context and of impossible antecedents – and subsequently outlines the corresponding 
remedies. The first part of the chapter motivates impossible world semantics for 
counterpossibles by giving an introductory overview of the idea of impossible worlds and its 
success in applications to philosophical analysis, and the second part contains an introduction 
to the context-related issues that burden the analysis of counterfactuals (and subjunctive 
conditionals in general) and motivates an approach that is developed in the thesis. 
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The introductory overview of impossible worlds begins with intuitive and preliminary 
characterizations (§1.2), by noting their conceptual kinship to possible worlds and presenting 
their standard definitions and classifications. After this general introduction I give a detailed 
survey of a selection of notable applications (§1.3) of impossible worlds in philosophical 
analysis and logic. Throughout this survey emphasis is placed on how the idea and character 
of impossible worlds is a natural generalization of its conceptual and historical predecessor – 
the idea of possible worlds, by demonstrating how impossible worlds fare in their roles of 
aiding and extending possible world semantics whenever it proves inadequate. The selected 
applications, which I present in detail, are impossible world semantics for non-normal modal 
logics (§1.3.1.1) and relevant logics (§1.3.1.2).  
 
After an informal and general overview of possible world semantics for propositional content 
in terms of intensions (§1.3.2.1), I  describe the granularity problem (§1.3.2.2) and how 
impossible worlds aid the analysis of hyperintensions, and counterpossibles (§1.3.2.3). The 
only formal application to hyperintensionality that I present is an impossible world semantics 
for epistemic and doxastic logics that avoids the pitfalls of omniscience and omnidoxasticity, 
and does so by helping to fashion more realistic (non-ideal) models of the corresponding 
propositional attitudes of knowledge and belief (§1.3.3.1). The inadequacy of Lewis’ (1973) 
account of counterpossibles, which treats all counterpossibles as vacuously true, is a direct 
consequence of his rejection of impossible worlds. I give a critical evaluation of his reasons 
for doing so in chapters 2 and 3. This inadequacy is amended in the form of an account of 
counterpossibles and its impossible world semantics, given in chapter 5.   
 
The second part of the chapter (§1.4) is devoted to outlining the notoriously persistent, 
context-related issues that burden the analysis of subjunctive conditionals – in particular, the 
analysis of counterfactuals. I present and discuss (§1.4.1) famous examples from Goodman 
(1954) and Quine (1966) and evaluate the advantages (§1.4.3) and limitations (§1.4.4) of 
Gabbay’s (1972) response, which goes some way to resolving the context related issues that 
the examples illustrate. This evaluation is carried out by comparing Gabbay’s account to 
other notable approaches to counterfactual analysis. To facilitate this comparison, I formalize 
the pertinent and unique features of Gabbay’s account (§1.4.2)  in terms of frames that 
employ Priest’s (2018) notion of imported information. The entire discussion in this second 
part of the chapter serves to motivate the account of contextualized (context relativized) 
counterfactuals proposed in chapter 4, which accommodates and accounts for the changes in 
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a counterfactual’s truth value contingent on the context of its use. I close this discussion and 
the entire chapter (§1.4.5-1.4.6), by indicating how the account given in chapter 4 – whilst 
largely drawing on Lewis’ (1973, 1981) proposals – develops suggestions from Berto (2014, 
2017) and Nolan (1997).  
 
1.2  Preliminaries 
1.2.1   What are impossible worlds? 
Most of us will agree that the world may have turned out in ways other than it actually has. 
Some facts may not have been the case, while some other states of affairs may have, contrary 
to fact, come to be the case.1 Reference to such ways is ubiquitous in everyday language, e.g. 
“What would have been the consequences if the NASA Curiosity rover had, contrary to fact, 
found evidence of life on Mars during its mission?” Perhaps even the fundamental laws of 
nature may have turned out other than they actually are. Similarly, it seems right to say that 
the world could not just have turned out any old way. That is, most would also agree that 
there are ways in which the world just could not have turned out. But more pertinently, what 
are the criteria for ways that the world couldn’t have turned out? Insofar as we can aid our 
talk and understanding of ‘the ways that the world may have otherwise turned out’ with the 
idea of possible worlds, it seems natural to aid our talk and understanding of ‘the ways that 
the world couldn’t have turned out’ with the idea of impossible worlds.2 Or in short, just as 
we think of possible worlds as representing ways in which the world could be, we can think 
of impossible worlds as ways in which the world cannot be. But before such an idea can 
adequately serve as a means to aid our understanding, we should say what we mean by 
impossible and impossible world.  
 
1.2.2   Logical impossibility 
Impossible worlds then can serve as a paraphrase of the ways the world could not have turned 
out, much in the same way as possible worlds serve as a paraphrase of the ways that the 
                                               
1 Note that no ontological (metaphysical) qualification of any kind is assumed of ‘ways’, and I shall not make any 
commitments in that regard throughout the thesis.  
2 This is an extended version of an argument given by Lewis (1973, p.84). The original argument has been coined 
the argument from ‘ways’, or from ‘admissible paraphrase’. The extended version of the argument from ways, 
i.e. in support of impossible worlds (which can also be read as a reductio argument against them), was first 
formulated by (Naylor 1986, p.29). See (Yagisawa 1988, p.183) for a modal realist account, (Vander Laan 1997, 
p.598) for an abstractionist account, and (Berto 2009, p.3) for a hybrid account, whereby “possible worlds are 
taken as concrete Lewisian worlds, and impossibilities are represented as set-theoretic constructions out of 
them”. 
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world could have turned out. The criterion for impossibility however requires clarification. 
After all, there are different kinds of impossibility – historical, deontic, physical, epistemic, 
logical, mathematical, and metaphysical. The following thesis, for most part, focuses on 
logical impossibility, and accordingly – logically impossible worlds. Focus on logical 
impossibility narrows down the meaning of ‘impossible world’ substantially, but that 
refinement still has a number of meanings in the literature. For example, a ‘logically 
impossible world’ may either mean, a world where (i) the logically impossible happens, or 
merely that (ii) the laws of logic are different. The two are not the same – (ii) doesn’t entail 
(i), because even if the laws were different, they need not manifest themselves. Consider 
Priest’s (2008, p.172) intuitive analogy illustrating this point: 
 
Note that one might take ‘logically impossible world’ to mean something other 
than ‘world where the laws of logic are different’. One might equally take it to 
mean ‘world where the logically impossible happens’. This need not be the same 
thing. If this is not clear, just consider physically impossible worlds. The fact that 
the laws of physics are different does not necessarily mean that physically 
impossible things happen there (though the converse is true). For example, even 
if the laws of physics were to permit things to accelerate past the speed of light, 
it does not follow that anything actually would. Things at that world might be 
accelerating very slowly, and the world might not last long enough for any of 
them to reach super-luminal speeds. 
 
1.2.3   Logically impossible worlds 
Let us spell out the various characterizations of logically impossible worlds that an overview 
of the existing relevant literature reveals. I will proceed from the most specific to most 
general characterizations. Perhaps the most obvious, and quite restrictive characterization of 
an impossible world, is one which allows explicitly contradictory states of affairs, i.e. an 
impossible world is one where pairs of contradictory sentences of the form 𝐴 and ~𝐴 hold 
(Lycan 1994). Such a characterization would certainly apply if we are considering classical 
logic, since contradictory pairs are not satisfied by any classical interpretation.3 Thus, such a 
world is classically logically impossible. Continuing in this manner, a more general definition 
                                               
3 This is an introductory overview, where finer distinctions of what contradictions are, is omitted. For there may 
be worlds, and reasoning systems, tolerant of contradictory states of affairs, e.g. whereby some A holds and ~A 
holds the conjunction of A and ~A holding. For an explicit non-adjunctive account see Varzi (1997), and for 
schematic nonstandard worlds that display that property see Rescher and Brandom (1980). 
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of a (classically) logically impossible world would be achieved by lifting the restriction from 
pairs of sentences, to including inconsistent sets of sentences, i.e. sets of sentences containing 
contradictory pairs. That is, a (classically) logically impossible world would be one whose set 
of things holding at it is not satisfied by any (classical) interpretation (Priest 1997). 
Moreover, worlds may be logically impossible not merely by virtue of certain things holding 
at them, but also of certain things failing to hold at them that nevertheless hold for all 
classical interpretations – just consider some world where 𝐴 ∨ ~𝐴 fails to hold for some 
sentence 𝐴.4  
 
But obviously failure of things holding at a world to be satisfied by any (classical) 
interpretation need not imply that it is not satisfied by any non-classical interpretation. That 
is, a logically impossible world may be one governed by a logic other than classical logic. 
Then we would say that it is a world where the laws of logic are different. A natural way to 
generalize such a characterization of logically impossible worlds is to refrain from assuming 
some particular logic to be true (correct), and instead relativize logical impossibility to 
arbitrary logic L.5 Then by analogy to classically impossible worlds, an L-impossible world 
would just be one where the set of things that hold at it do not hold for any L-interpretation. 
We may for instance deem some paraconsistent logic L as the correct logic – then worlds 
where the laws of L fail would be logically impossible from the perspective of L. We look at 
such worlds in the context of relevant logics, in §1.3.1.2. Finally, we may consider worlds 
that fail to satisfy any logical closures.  
 
1.2.4 Closed worlds: deductive closure, closure under entailment 
Priest (1997, 2005) refers to the classes of worlds just described as logically impossible 
worlds – just as we can think of physically impossible worlds as those where the laws of 
logic are different from the ones in the actual world, we think of logically impossible worlds 
as those worlds where the logical laws are different than those that actually obtain.6 In this 
sense ‘logically impossible worlds’ is taken to mean ‘worlds where the laws of logic are other 
than those of the logic that is thought to govern the actual world’. Another way of 
                                               
4 Cresswell (1970, p.354) describes such worlds, dubbing them ‘non-classical’. There, the author employs such 
worlds in giving a semantics for a family of hyperintensional logics, which he calls ‘weakly intensional’ logics. 
5 A logical pluralist may even refrain from that assumption, i.e. there needn’t be any single correct logic. 
6 For an overview of logically impossible worlds see Priest (1997, pp.401-2), Priest (2001, Ch. 9), and Priest 
(2005, Ch.1). Also see the latter for more on the open/closed world distinction. See Nolan (1997, p.542) for his 
unrestricted comprehension principle for impossible worlds. 
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characterizing such worlds, is to say that such worlds are closed under entailment. Informally, 
this would mean that if a sentence 𝜑 (or any formula expressing some proposition) holds at 
some world 𝑤 and 𝜑 logically entails 𝜓 (for some logic L) then 𝜓 also holds at 𝑤. Since such 
worlds are closed under entailment, Priest (2005) has coined this class closed worlds.7  
 
1.2.5 Open worlds 
There is another broad class of impossible worlds that violate any kind of closure, save for 
identity (trivial consequence), i.e. save for the principle: if 𝐴 holds at world 𝑤, then 𝐴 holds at 
world 𝑤. I follow Priest’s (2005) terminology and refer to them as open worlds.8 
Specification of truth of open worlds is analogous to that of logically impossible (closed) 
worlds. Whereas, at logically impossible, closed worlds, modal (intensional) formulae are 
treated as atomic in terms of truth value assignment in any given model, at open worlds all 
formulae are treated this way. This means that at open worlds even the truth values of 
extensional formulae, i.e. containing only extensional connectives, do not respect recursive 
specification. For example, given some open world where 𝑝 ∧ 𝑞 is true, 𝑝 need not be true 
there, or ¬¬𝑝 may be true without 𝑝 being true. Even 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ∧ 𝐴 need not have the same 
values at open worlds. This is how Priest motivates open worlds in the context of 
intensionality: 
 
Just as there are worlds that realize the way that things are conceived to be when 
that conception is logically possible, and worlds that realize how things are 
conceived to be when that conception is logically impossible, so there must be 
worlds that realize how things are conceived to be for the contents of arbitrary 
intentional states. Since such states are not closed under entailment, neither are 
these worlds. We are therefore led to posit a class of unclosed, or open, worlds. 
(Priest, 2005, pp.21-2) 
 
A way of characterizing a class of worlds that would include open worlds, is to place no 
restriction on the reading of the phrase ‘ways things could not have been’. A notable example 
of such a general characterization of impossible worlds is due to Nolan: 
 
                                               
7 Deductive closure of a set of sentences is to be understood as closure under logical consequence when the 
rules of deduction in question are logical. 
8 Some authors 
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I think the most plausible comprehension principle for impossible worlds is that 
for every proposition which cannot be true, there is an impossible world where 
that proposition is true. This comprehension principle, while natural, will be 
inconsistent with most accounts of impossible worlds, according to which 
impossible worlds obey some constraints, but not as many as possible worlds. [It] 
is at least a good working hypothesis […] we do not, it seems to me, require that 
the specifications of ways things cannot happen meet any particular requirement, 
except that they not be ways things could happen. (Nolan 1997, p.542) 
 
That his comprehension principle includes open worlds Nolan makes explicit in the model 
theory, by lifting any constrains on truth-value assignments to formulae at impossible 
worlds.9  
 
As I say on p. 542, I think that a very generous comprehension principle for 
impossibilities is called for: and I model this by not putting any constraints on 
assignment of truth values to propositions at impossible worlds. (Ibid, p.562) 
 
Such a characterization includes all impossible worlds conceivable – historical, nomical 
(physical), metaphysical, mathematical or logical kind, and any that I have not mentioned 
here. It’s an open-ended definition, pertaining to any ways that just could not be, and as such 
is useful to delineate what we mean when we speak of impossible worlds.  
 
Open worlds have proved to be helpful in in the analysis of intensionality, e.g. fashioning 
epistemic and doxastic logics that avoid counterintuitive consequences such as omniscience 
and omnidoxasticity. Historically, this particular context of application was also where the 
characterization of open worlds first appears. 10 (I attend to those issues in more detail in 
§1.3.2 and to how open worlds akin to open worlds resolve them in §1.3.4.1). 
 
1.3 Why impossible worlds? 
Impossible worlds possess a proudly robust track record of successfully extending the role 
                                               
9 To see that Nolan’s (1997) comprehension principle – modelled in this manner – includes open worlds, let us 
just consider any closure principle (valid inference form) C: if all premises 𝐴1, 𝐴2, … are true, then the conclusion 
𝐵 is true. Nolan’s model theory – which I take to be an attempt to make his comprehension principle formally 
precise – permits the existence of a world where all of 𝐴1, 𝐴1, … are true but 𝐵 is not true. Now since C was an 
arbitrary closure principle, Nolan’s comprehension principle includes open worlds. 
10 Priest (2005) relies on open worlds in support of the formal aspects of his general proposal for the logic and 
metaphysics of intentionality.  
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that possible worlds had played in aiding analyses across a variety of contexts, such as 
modality, intentionality, counterfactuals, and relevance. In particular, impossible worlds 
appear to be the natural candidates in at least two important contexts that are yet to see a 
thorough and adequate treatment. The first of those being the development of an adequate 
(non-vacuous) theory of counterpossible reasoning, and the second being an account of 
propositional content and an adequate analysis of hyperintensional phenomena.  
 
One of the major intellectual breakthroughs in early second half of 20th century analytic 
philosophy that fed off the widespread and fervent shift to analyses of intensionality at the 
time, was the pioneering work done in possible worlds semantics. This revolutionary shift 
received a significant impetus by Saul Kripke (1959), who gave a very intuitive interpretation 
of C.I. Lewis’ axiomatic systems S4 and S5. The Kripke, relational semantics approach, had 
soon found a number of generalizations and applications. Notable, pioneering contributors to 
this revolution were Dana Scott (1970) and Richard Montague (1970) who jointly developed 
neighborhood semantics; Robert Stalnaker (1968) and David Lewis (1973) who extended this 
approach to pioneer and develop a semantics for conditional logics based on world similarity 
modelled as nearness within stratified neighborhood frames, commonly known as similarity 
spheres; building on the pioneering insights of H.G. von Wright, Jaakko Hintikka’s (1962) 
interpretation of doxastic and epistemic operators on structures that bear a strong resemblance 
to Kripke models, consisting of possible states of affairs and an agent’s doxastic/epistemic 
alternatives. 
 
Possible world analysis, along Kripkean lines, had soon found its limits posed by the 
challenge of giving a semantics for of C.I. Lewis’ axiomatic systems weaker than S4. That is, 
systems where the Axiom of Necessitation fails, which expressed in English states that ‘all 
theorems of logic are necessary’, i.e. if ⊢ 𝐴 then ⊢ □𝐴. The corresponding semantic principle, 
sometimes called the Rule of Necessitation can be stated, as: if ⊨ 𝐴 then ⊨ □𝐴. 11  In order to 
widen the scope of applicability in the same vein, Kripke (1965) introduced impossible 
worlds (coining them non-normal) to his format of analysis. This pioneering technical ‘trick’ 
sufficed to give a (sound and complete) semantics with respect to C.I. Lewis’ systems weaker 
than S4, i.e. notably S3 and S2. Kripke’s motivation for delivering a semantics for those 
weaker logics may not have been entirely independent of the fact that C.I. Lewis endorsed S2 
                                               
11 Priest (2008, p.68). 
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as giving the correct account of logical necessity.12  
   
1.3.1 Applications of closed worlds: modal logic and relevant logic 
1.3.1.1     Kripke semantics for S2 and S3. 
Below I give a quick revision of Kripke model theory, which includes possible/impossible 
world semantics for normal and non-normal systems . It can be skipped by those familiar 
with the material. First let us start with the basic ingredients for our language ℒ i.e. a set of 
propositional variables 𝑃𝑉 = {𝑝𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ ℕ} the elements of which shall be denoted with 
lowercase Roman letters (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, … ) or subscripted lowercase Roman 𝑝’s (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑘 , … ), or 
lowercase Greek letters (𝜑, 𝜓, 𝜒, … ); unary connectives: ~ (negation), □ (necessity), ◊ 
(possibility); and binary connectives: ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), ⊃ (material 
conditional). For the metalanguage, upper case letters (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, … ) shall be used as variables 
ranging over complex formulae and propositional variables. 
 
Definition 1.0: Define the basic modal language, denoted ℒ, to be the set: {~, □,.◊, .∧, .∨, ⊃}. 
 
Definition 1.0.1: Let 𝐹𝑜𝑟 be the smallest set closed under the following well-formed formula 
formation rules: 
 
B:      All propositional variables are wffs, i.e. 𝑃𝑉 ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
R1: If 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 then {~𝐴, □𝐴,.◊𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
R2: If {𝐴, 𝐵} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 then {𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵, 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐵} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
 
Definition 1.1: A Kripke frame is a pair (𝑊, 𝑅), where 𝑊 is a set, and 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝑊.13 
Formally, 𝑊 is an arbitrary set of objects. On the intended interpretation, relevant to the 
semantics under consideration, its elements are possible worlds. 𝑅 is called the accessibility 
relation.14 So 𝑎𝑅𝑏 is read as ‘𝑏 is accessible from 𝑎’, or ‘𝑎 accesses 𝑏’. 
 
                                               
12 (Ibid, p.65). 
13 Various constraints on R, e.g. reflexivity, symmetry, or transitivity yield a variety of different conceptions of 
logical necessity. However, I shall not focus here on that category of constraints, and treat R in the most general 
sense, as not to distract from the focus of the discussion, which is the influence of admitting non-normal worlds 
on Kripke models. 
14 In general, W is any set, and its elements, depending on the context of application, have various names, e.g. 
points, states, nodes, scenarios, worlds. 
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Definition 1.2: A Kripke model is a triple (𝑊, 𝑅, 𝜈), where (𝑊, 𝑅) is a Kripke frame, and for 
each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜈𝑤: 𝑃𝑉 ⟶ {0,1} is the function assigning at each world 𝑤 either a 0 or 1 to each 
propositional variable p. Informally we think of 𝜈𝑤(𝑝) = 1 as 𝑝 being true at w in the model 
and 𝜈𝑤(𝑝) = 0 as 𝑝 being false at w in the model.  
 
Truth in a model is defined in terms the satisfiability relation ⊩  ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟. We read 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 
as ‘𝐴 is true at 𝑤’. Given a Kripke model (𝑊, 𝑅, 𝑉) and any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, define ⊩ as follows: 
 
   (1) 𝑤 ⊩ 𝑝    iff    𝜈𝑤(𝑝) = 1  
   (2) 𝑤 ⊩ ~𝐴 iff    not  𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 
   (3) 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  iff    𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴  and  𝑤 ⊩ 𝐵 
   (4) 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵  iff    𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴  or  𝑤 ⊩ 𝐵 
   (5) 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵  iff    𝑤 ⊩ ~𝐴  or  𝑤 ⊩ 𝐵15 
   (6) 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴  iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. 
   (7) 𝑤 ⊩ ◊𝐴 iff    ∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. 
 
When we want to explicitly refer to truth at a world in a particular model 𝔄, we shall employ 
the following notation: 𝔄, 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴.  
 
Definition 1.3: K-validity  
Let ⊨𝐾 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝐾 𝐴 iff for all Kripke models (𝑊, 𝑅, 𝑉), and all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, 
if 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴. That is, valid inference is defined as truth preservation at 
all worlds in all Kripke models. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐾 𝐴. 
Now that we’ve defined Kripke models, and K-validity we can easily define Kripke frames 
and models that admit non-normal worlds, and the resulting logic. In non-normal models, 
modal formulae are assigned fixed values at non-normal worlds. All box-prefixed formulae 
are assigned the value corresponding to falsity in the interpretation, and all the diamond-
prefixed formulae are assigned the value corresponding to truth in the interpretation. The 
truth conditions for the remaining formulae at non-normal worlds remain unchanged, in 
particular, propositional tautologies remain true at all worlds. 
 
Definition 1.4: A Kripke non-normal frame is a triple (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝑅), where 𝑊 and 𝑅 are as 
before, but now 𝑁 ⊆ 𝑊 is the distinguished set of normal (possible) worlds and 𝑊\𝑁 is 
interpreted as the set of non-normal (impossible worlds).  
                                               
15 Note that 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 iff 𝑤 ⊩ ~𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊. 
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Definition 1.5: A Kripke non-normal model is a quadruple (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝑅, 𝜈), where (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝑅) is a 
Kripke (non-normal worlds) frame, and 𝜈 is as on normal Kripke models, with the exception 
of non-normal worlds, where all formulae with □ or ◊ as their main operator (i.e. □-formulae, 
and ◊-formulae), are assigned values directly, i.e. for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊\𝑁, and all 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 
 
   (N6) 𝜈𝑤(□𝐴) = 0  
   (N7) 𝜈𝑤(◊𝐴) = 1 
 
The only change to validity condition is that formula validity and valid inference are defined 
as truth at all normal worlds in all models and truth preservation at all normal worlds in all 
models, respectively. The motivation for this definition of logical truth and validity is 
justified if we characterize impossible worlds to be those where the laws of logic are different 
or where the laws of logic fail. Then when we define validity and valid inference, i.e. the 
laws and rules of logic, we should not consider worlds where the laws of logic are different or 
where they fail. 
 
Definition 1.6: N-validity  
Let ⊨𝑁 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝑁 𝐴 iff for all Kripke models (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝑅, 𝜈), and all 𝑤 ∈
𝑁, if 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝑁 𝐴. 
 
Such extended truth conditions and validity conditions suffice to provide a counterexample to 
the Rule of Necessitation, thereby yielding a semantics for logics weaker than S4. To see this, 
consider the countermodel: let 𝔑 = (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝑅, 𝜈), 𝑊 = {𝑤, 𝑖}, 𝑁 = {𝑤}, 𝑅 = {(𝑤, 𝑤), (𝑤, 𝑖)}, and 
𝜈𝑤(𝑝) = 𝜈𝑖(𝑝) = 1. Now, the tautology 𝑝 ∨ ~𝑝 is true at all worlds, so in particular it is true at 
all worlds accessible to 𝑤. Hence 𝑤 ⊩ □(𝑝 ∨ ~𝑝), and consequently ⊨ □(𝑝 ∨ ~𝑝). However, it 
is not the case that ⊨ □□(𝑝 ∨ ~𝑝). To see this, note that 𝑤 ⊮ □□(𝑝 ∨ ~𝑝) since it’s not the case 
that at all worlds accessible from 𝑤 the formula □(𝑝 ∨ ~𝑝) is true, since we have 𝑖 ⊮
□(𝑝 ∨ ~𝑝) by (N6). Hence ⊭ □□(𝑝 ∨ ~𝑝), as required.16 
 
                                               
16 A similar result, of invalidating the rule of necessitation, could be achieved by models very similar to the non-
normal models just discussed, with the simplification of conditions (N6) and (N7) in a way that the valuation 
(interpretation) function instead of assigning to all □-formulae and ◊-formulae a fixed value at non-normal 
worlds, assigns arbitrary values (call it condition (N8)). This approach has been implemented by Cresswell (1966) 
in a semantics for Lemmon’s (1957) modal system S0.5 (Priest 2008, §4.4a; Berto & Jago 2019, §4.2). Note that 
models that satisfy (N6) and (N7) are subsets of the models satisfying the weaker condition (N8). I highlight this 
method, because we will encounter similar ones, later in this chapter and in chapter 5. 
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1.3.1.2    Relevant Logics  
Another area of logic where impossible worlds have found a natural application is relevant 
logic. The central idea of relevant logic is that the conclusion must be relevant to the 
premises in a valid inference. So the development of such logic has been motivated by giving 
a more intuitive characterization of deductive inference with the defining feature that forces 
the premises of an argument to be really used in deriving the conclusion.17 Among well-
known relevance-violating inference patterns are the following, commonly referred to as 
paradoxes of strict implication, where strict implication ⥽ is defined as 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 ∶= □(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵).18 
 
      (P.1) □𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 
      (P.2) ~◊𝐴 ⊨ 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 
 
In general, relevant logics aim to avoid any irrelevant inference patterns 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 (or valid 
implications 𝐴 → 𝐵), i.e. where 𝐴 and 𝐵 do not have any propositional variables in common. 
One way of capturing the relevant connection between the antecedent and consequent is as 
follows:  
 
Definition 1.7: (Priest 2008, §9.7.8) A propositional logic is relevant iff whenever 𝐴 → 𝐵 
(where → denotes the conditional, i.e. logical implication) is logically valid, 𝐴 and 𝐵 have a 
propositional variable in common.  
 
Clearly both (P.1) and (P.2) fail to satisfy this condition, since in (P.1) the consequent can be 
any formula and in (P.2) the antecedent can be any formula, i.e. 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 is valid if either 𝐴 is 
necessarily false or 𝐵 is necessarily true. For example, we have the following special cases: 
 
     (P.1.1) ⊨ 𝐴 ⥽ (𝐵 ∨ ~𝐵) 
     (P.2.1) ⊨ (𝐴 ∧ ~𝐴) ⥽ 𝐵 
 
It is easy to show that the above are valid even on the weakest non-normal Kripke systems 
corresponding to weakest modal logics S2 and S3, which we have discussed in the previous 
section.19 By way of example, I will discuss a relevant logic 𝑁4 presented by Priest (2008, 
                                               
17 Mares (2004, p.3). 
18 Those are just the modal counterparts of analogous inference patterns characteristic of the classical logic 
material conditional (paradoxes of the material conditional): 𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 and ~𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵. 
19 First let’s prove (P.1). Let 𝔑 = (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝑅, 𝜈) be any Kripke non-normal model, and 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐵 for some 𝑤 ∈ 𝑁. 
This means that 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢. But that means that 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 
𝑤𝑅𝑢, by definition of ⊃. Hence 𝑤 ⊩ □(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵), by definition of □. Hence 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 by definition of ⥽, as 
required. Now to prove (P.2). Let 𝔑 = (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝑅, 𝜈) be any Kripke non-normal model, and 𝑤 ⊩ ~◊𝐴 for some 
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§9.4), in order to illustrate how impossible worlds can aid invalidating any relevance 
violating inference or conditional.20 The impossible worlds that we’ll encounter in this case 
are various classically impossible (truth value glut or gap admitting) closed worlds, and 
worlds where the laws of logic are different (logically impossible worlds), based on a similar 
idea to the ones fashioned by Cresswell (1966).21 However, here the focus of analysis is not 
the modal notions of possibility and necessity, but relevant implication.  
 
I will start by outlining the underlying paraconsistent (basis) of 𝑁4, which is the logic called 
First Degree Entailment (FDE) – first formulated by Nuel Benlap in his doctoral 
dissertation.22 The language of FDE is the propositional part of the modal language given in 
Definition 1.0, i.e. ℒ𝐹𝐷𝐸 = {~, .∧, .∨, ⊃}, where 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 is defined as ~𝐴 ∨ 𝐵. I give Dunn’s 
relational semantics.23 
 
Definition 1.8: An FDE interpretation 𝜌 is a binary relation between the set of propositional 
variables 𝑃𝑉 and truth values, i.e. 𝜌 ⊆ 𝑃𝑉 × {0,1} is a relation between 𝑃𝑉 and {0,1}. We read 
𝑝𝜌1 as ‘𝑝 relates to 1’ and 𝑝𝜌0 as ‘𝑝 relates to 0’. Also, I will employ the notation (𝑝, 𝑥) ∈ 𝜌 
and (𝑝, 𝑥) ∉ 𝜌 for ‘𝑝𝜌𝑥’ and ‘it’s not the case that 𝑝𝜌𝑥’, for 𝑥 ∈ {0,1}. We extend 𝜌 to the 
entire set of well-formed formulae 𝐹𝑜𝑟 as follows: 
 
 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵𝜌1  iff 𝐴𝜌1 and 𝐵𝜌1 
 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵𝜌0 iff 𝐴𝜌0 or 𝐵𝜌0 
 
 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵𝜌1 iff 𝐴𝜌1 or 𝐵𝜌1 
 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵𝜌0 iff 𝐴𝜌0 and 𝐵𝜌0 
 
 ~𝐴𝜌1  iff 𝐴𝜌0 
 ~𝐴𝜌0  iff 𝐴𝜌1  
 
                                               
𝑤 ∈ 𝑁. This means that there is no 𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢 and 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴, i.e. for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝑊 such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ⊮ 𝐴, 
i.e. 𝑢 ⊩ ~𝐴. But this means that 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, by definition of ⊃. Hence 𝑤 ⊩
□(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵), by definition of □. Hence 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 by definition of ⥽, as required.  
20 The logics 𝐾4 and 𝑁4 given by Priest (2008, §8, §9), and discussed in this section are not to be found in any 
earlier literature. They serve as a satisfactory illustration of impossible world semantics for relevant logics. 𝑁4 
should not be confused with Wansing’s (2001) logic of constructible negation, by the same name. 
21 See footnote 16.  
22 For a history of FDE see (Omori & Wansing 2017). I base this presentation of FDE and the definition of 𝑁4 on 
Priest (2008, §8, §9). Note that relevant logics are paraconsistent, since the classically valid rule of inference 
known as ex contradictione quodlibet : 𝐴 ∧ ~𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 is demonstrably relevance violating. 
23 Other notable semantics for FDE are many-valued semantics, and the Routley star, where negation is treated 
as an intensional operator (Priest 2008, §8). 
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Note that there are no restrictions on 𝜌 in place such that (𝑝, 1) ∉ 𝜌 wold imply (𝑝, 0) ∈ 𝜌. Nor 
does (𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌 imply (𝑝, 0) ∉ 𝜌. Call a formula 𝐴 a truth value glut whenever it relates to both 
1 and 0 on some interpretation 𝜌, i.e. 𝐴𝜌1 and 𝐴𝜌0 (equivalently, (𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌 and (𝑝, 0) ∈ 𝜌), 
and call a formula 𝐴 a truth value gap whenever it relates to neither 1 nor 0 on some 
interpretation 𝜌, i.e. neither 𝐴𝜌1 nor 𝐴𝜌0 (equivalently, (𝑝, 1) ∉ 𝜌 and (𝑝, 0) ∉ 𝜌).24 Validity 
and valid inference are defined as truth for all interpretations and truth preservation for all 
interpretations, respectively. 
 
Definition 1.9: FDE-validity  
Let ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝐴 iff for FDE interpretations 𝜌: if 𝐵𝜌1 for all 
𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝐴𝜌1. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝐴. 
 
It should be noted that both 𝑝 ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞 ∨ ~𝑞 and 𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝 ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞 fail in FDE. Perhaps this 
should be obvious for two reasons – because both LEM and LNC are invalid in FDE (since 
truth value gaps and truth value gluts are allowed), and the formulae in the above inference 
patterns are independent.25 Also note that 𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝 ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞 is closely related to ECQ, the failure 
of which makes FDE a paraconsistent logic.26 
 
Proposition 1.0: 𝑝 ⊭𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞 ∨ ~𝑞, 𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝 ⊭𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞 
Proof : First for the counterexample to 𝑝 ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞 ∨ ~𝑞, let 𝜌 be an FDE interpretation such 
that (𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌, (𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌 and (𝑞, 0) ∉ 𝜌, i.e. 𝑞 is a truth value gap. It follows that (~𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌 
and (~𝑞, 0) ∉ 𝜌, i.e. ~𝑞 is also a truth value gap. It follows that (𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌 and (~𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌. 
Therefore, (𝑞 ∨ ~𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌, as required.           □ 
 
Now for a counterexample to 𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝 ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞, let 𝜌 be an FDE interpretation such that (𝑞, 1) ∉
𝜌, (𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌 and (𝑝, 0) ∈ 𝜌, i.e. 𝑝 is a truth value glut. It follows that (~𝑝, 0) ∈ 𝜌 and (~𝑝, 1) ∈
𝜌, i.e. ~𝑝 is also a truth value glut. It follows that (𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌 and (~𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌. Therefore, 
                                               
24 FDE is a sub-logic of classical logic and a number of other notable 3-valued logics, like Priest’s logic of paradox 
LP and Kleene’s 3-valued logic 𝐾3. It’s easy to show that FDE interpretations of the propositional language, that 
don’t admit truth value gaps are just LP interpretations, and those that don’t admit truth value gluts are just 𝐾3 
interpretations. FDE interpretations that don’t admit either truth value gluts or gaps are just classical 
interpretations. See (Priest 2008, §7, §8). 
25 LEM and LNC are acronyms of the laws of classical logic: the law of excluded middle ⊨ 𝐴 ∨ ~𝐴 and the law of 
non-contradiction ⊨ ~(𝐴 ∧ ~𝐴). 
26 I am saying ‘related’, because the standard form of ECQ (i.e. ex contradictione quodlibet) is from contradictory 
premises, i.e. 𝑝, ~𝑝 ⊨ 𝑞. But conjunction simplification, i.e. 𝑝 ∧ 𝑞 ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑝 and 𝑝 ∧ 𝑞 ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞 is valid in FDE, 
hence 𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝 ⊭𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞 implies 𝑝, ~𝑝 ⊭𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝑞. Hence ECQ is invalid in FDE. See (Ibid). 
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(𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌, as required.             □ 
 
We can now define a modal logic that models a counterpart to strict implication – one that 
inherits the relevant features of the base logic FDE. Informally speaking, the idea is to define 
a new (object language) intensional connective → and endow it with the same properties as 
the metalinguistic relation ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸, i.e. have 𝐴 → 𝐵 modeled with 𝐴 ⊨𝐹𝐷𝐸 𝐵. For a formal 
treatment we require a proper model theory. The system I’ll describe is what Priest (2008, 
§9.2-9.3) calls 𝐾4.
27 
 
The language of 𝐾4 is just the propositional language expanded by intensional connective →, 
intended to represent the relevant conditional, i.e. ℒ𝐾4 = {~, .∧, .∨, ⊃, →}. 
 
Definition 1.10: A 𝐾4 model is a pair 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝜌) where 𝑊 is a non-empty set, regarded as a 
set of possible worlds, and 𝜌 = {𝜌𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊} is a set of world-indexed relations 𝜌𝑖 ⊆ 𝑃𝑉 × {0,1}, 
such that each 𝜌𝑖 is an FDE interpretation.
28 The truth and falsity conditions for the 
propositional part of ℒ𝐾4 , i.e. extensional connectives, are as given in Definition 1.8, only 
they’re relativized to worlds, e.g. 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵𝜌𝑖1 iff 𝐴𝜌𝑖1 and 𝐵𝜌𝑖1. Each 𝜌𝑖 is extended to account 
for the intensional connective → are as follows: 
 
𝐴 → 𝐵𝜌𝑖1  iff 𝐵𝜌𝑗1 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊 such that 𝐵𝜌𝑗1 
𝐴 → 𝐵𝜌𝑖0 iff 𝐴𝜌𝑗1 and 𝐵𝜌𝑗0 for some 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊 
 
Call a world 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊 gappy if it contains any formulae that are truth value gaps, and glutty if it 
contains any formulae that are truth value gluts. Validity and valid inference are defined as 
truth at all worlds in all models and truth preservation at all worlds in all models, 
respectively. 
 
 
                                               
27 The name is an abbreviation for 𝐾𝜐4 where ‘𝐾’ indicates its Kripke structure and ‘𝜐’ (upsilon) indicates that 
the accessibility relation is an equivalence relation, much like in the Kripke system corresponding to S5 (Priest 
2008, §3.5). The subscript ‘4’ indicates that we’re dealing with a 4-valued logic. That becomes explicit on many-
valued semantics for FDE, but on our Dunn-approach it should be noted that there are 4 ways that truth values 
can be related to a propositional variable. Denote the image of some 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 under 𝜌 with 𝜌[𝑝] ≔
{𝑥 ∈ {0,1}: 𝑝𝜌𝑥}. Then 𝜌[𝑝] could be any of the following four images: {0}, {1}, {0,1}, ∅, i.e. false and false only, 
true and true only, true and false (a truth value glut), and nether true nor false (a truth value gap). 
28 Since the accessibility relation is universal, i.e. 𝑅 = 𝑊 × 𝑊, it can be accounted for – as implicit – in the truth 
and falsity conditions for the intensional connective →. 
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Definition 1.11: 𝐾4-validity 
Let ⊨𝐾4 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝐾4 𝐴 iff for every 𝐾4 model 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝜌), and all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: 
if 𝐵𝜌𝑖1 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝐴𝜌𝑖1. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐾4 𝐴. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly → counterparts of (P.1.1) and (P.2.1) fail in 𝐾4, as required. That is: 
Corollary 1.1: ⊭𝐾4 𝑝 → (𝑞 ∨ ~𝑞), ⊭𝐾4 (𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝) → 𝑞 
Proof : First a countermodel to ⊨𝐾4 𝑝 → (𝑞 ∨ ~𝑞). It is really a corollary of Proposition 1.0, 
which proves the existence of an FDE interpretation 𝜌 such that (𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌 and (𝑞 ∨ ~𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌. 
Denote that interpretation with 𝜌∗. Now let (𝑊, 𝜌) be a 𝐾4 model such that 𝑊 = {𝑖} and 𝜌𝑖 =
𝜌∗. Then (𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌𝑖 and (𝑞 ∨ ~𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌𝑖. Hence (𝑝 → (𝑞 ∨ ~𝑞), 1) ∉ 𝜌𝑖, as required.     □ 
 
Now for a countermodel to ⊨𝐾4 (𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝) → 𝑞. Similarly, we use the FDE interpretation 𝜌 
from the proof of Proposition 1.0 such that (𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌 and (𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌. Denote that 
interpretation with 𝜌†. Now let (𝑊, 𝜌) be a 𝐾4 model such that 𝑊 = {𝑖} and 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌
†. Then 
(𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌𝑖 and (𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌𝑖. Hence ((𝑝 ∧ ~𝑝) → 𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌𝑖, as required.       □ 
 
Let us briefly examine the class of worlds just defined and see how they fit the classifications 
of impossible worlds outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Note that among 𝐾4 worlds are 
classically impossible worlds, since LNC and LEM fail at them, as we’ve seen directly in the 
proofs of Proposition 1.0 and Corollary 1.1. In fact, such worlds are impossible for any logic 
among whose logical laws are LNC and LEM.  However, each 𝐾4-world is not only closed by 
definition (i.e. 𝐾4-closed) but also closed in a variety of other interesting ways if we consider 
the propositional part of ℒ𝐾4 . It can be easily shown that non-gappy worlds are LP-closed and 
non-glutty-worlds are 𝐾3-closed, and worlds that admit nether truth value gaps or gluts are 
classically-closed.29 
 
As we have shown, 𝐾4 does go a fair way toward giving an account of a relevant conditional, 
but some problems remain. Note that if ⊨𝐾4 𝐴 then ⊨𝐾4 𝐵 → 𝐴. This is clear, since if (𝐴, 1) ∈
𝜌𝑖 for all  𝐾4 models (𝑊, 𝜌) and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, then in particular (𝐴, 1) ∈ 𝜌𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊 such that 
(𝐵, 1) ∈ 𝜌𝑗. In particular, given that ⊨𝐾4 𝑝 → 𝑝, it follows that ⊨𝐾4 𝑞 → (𝑝 → 𝑝), which is 
                                               
29 LP denotes Priest’s paraconsistent logic (logic of paradox) and 𝐾3 denotes Kleene’s 3-valued logic. It suffices 
to observe that the propositional part of ℒ𝐾4  is FDE-closed at each 𝐾4-world, by definition. For the rest of the 
argument see footnote 25. 
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demonstrably a relevance-violating formula. Therefore, despite invalidating a number of 
relevance violating formulae, 𝐾4 is not a relevant logic, by Definition 1.7. 
To avoid such commitments, we can introduce worlds where 𝐾4-valid formulae fail to be 
true. That is if we take → as expressing the laws of logic, we need worlds where those laws 
can fail. That is, we need to consider worlds where formulae of the form 𝐴 → 𝐵 can take 
values other than they take in 𝐾4.
 30 This can be achieved by a similar method as employed by 
Kripke, that is, by assigning truth values directly to □-formulae, and ◊-formulae (formulae 
with a modal operator as the main connective) at non-normal worlds. However, for our 
purposes we will adopt the method employed by Cresswell (1966) of directly assigning 
arbitrary truth values to such formulae, since we do not wish to presuppose how different the 
logical laws are at non-normal worlds, just that they are different.   
 
Definition 1.12: An 𝑁4 model is a triple 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝜌) where 𝑊 is a non-empty set, regarded 
as a set of worlds, 𝑁 ⊆ 𝑊 is the set of normal (possible) worlds and 𝑊\𝑁 is interpreted as the 
set of non-normal (impossible worlds), and for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝜌𝑖 is a set of world-indexed 
relations of the form 𝜌𝑖 ⊆ 𝑃𝑉 × {0,1}, i.e. just like on on 𝐾4 models. The only modification to 
𝜌 (of 𝐾4 models) is the additional condition for non-normal worlds. That is, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊\𝑁, 
𝜌𝑖 is a set of world-indexed relations of the form 𝜌𝑖 ⊆ {𝐴 → 𝐵: 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟} × {0,1}. 
 
Truth conditions for all the ℒ𝐾4  connectives are exactly the same as for 𝐾4 models, with the 
exception – evident in the definition of {𝜌𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊\𝑁} – that truth values of → formulae are not 
determined recursively, but rather directly by 𝜌. Validity and valid inference are defined as 
truth at all worlds in all models and truth preservation at all normal worlds in all models, 
respectively. The thought here is that after all we are interested in what follows from what at 
worlds where logic is not different.31 The non-normal worlds defined in 𝑁4 models, above, 
are those that Priest (2008, §9.7.2) calls logically impossible worlds.32  
 
Definition 1.13: 𝑁4-validity 
Let ⊨𝑁4 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝑁 𝐴 iff for every 𝑁4 model 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝜌), and all 𝑖 ∈
𝑁: if 𝐵𝜌𝑖1 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝐴𝜌𝑖1. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐾4 𝐴. 
                                               
30 Priest (2008, §9.4.4, §9.4.5). 
31 Ibid (§9.4.9). 
32 Such worlds would be suitable to evaluate counterpossible conditionals, and indeed a very similar 
construction is used for an account of counterpossibles that I give in chapter 5, albeit where the base logic is 
classical. 
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Proposition 1.2: ⊭𝑁4 𝑝 → (𝑞 → 𝑞) 
Proof : Let (𝑊, 𝑁, 𝜌) be an 𝑁4 model where 𝑊 = {𝑖, 𝑗}, 𝑁 = {𝑖}, and let 𝜌 be such that (𝑝, 1) ∈
𝜌𝑗 and (𝑞 → 𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌𝑗. Hence (𝑝 → (𝑞 → 𝑞), 1) ∉ 𝜌𝑖, as required.        □ 
 
It is relatively easy to show that 𝑁4 is in fact a relevant logic, according to Definition 1.7.
33 
This concludes our overview of closed, impossible worlds semantics for modal and relevant 
logics. 
 
1.3.2 Wider applications of impossible worlds 
1.3.2.1     Content as intension, via possible worlds 
Because this thesis focuses on the analysis of counterfactuals and counterpossibles, I will not 
give the full characterization of models for intensions and hyperintensions, but merely 
highlight the demarcation lines where possible worlds fall short of supplying an adequate 
analysis of these linguistic phenomena.  In order to appreciate the vast scope of applicability 
of impossible worlds, it will be helpful to give an overview of the role that possible worlds 
have played in aiding philosophical analysis. Also, it will be instructive to give an intuitive 
outline of those key insights that underpin possible world analysis of intensionality. By doing 
so, the method’s limits will be emphasized.  
 
The general character of such analyses can be traced back to Carnap’s (1947) account of 
content-as-intension via possible worlds.34 Carnap’s ideas were developed independently by 
Montague, Tichý, and Bressan, who all relied on some form of Kripke or Hintikka semantics 
(Fitting 2015, p.12). The key, underlying idea was to treat intensions as functions on worlds. 
More precisely, intensions were treated as functions from elements of the analyzed language 
and worlds, to worlds.35 So if 𝐴 is a singular term, its intension ℐ𝐴 is the function 
ℐ𝐴: (𝐴 × 𝑊) ⟶ 𝐷 that picks out, for each possible world 𝑤, an element ℐ𝐴(𝑤) of 𝑤’s domain 
𝐷𝑤 corresponding to 𝐴’s referent at 𝑤. For example, the intension of the singular term ‘the 
first man on the Moon’ would be the function that picks out the individual at each possible 
world that happened to be the first man on the Moon. The intension would pick out Neil 
Armstrong in the actual world, and possibly other Apollo 11 mission crew members at other 
                                               
33 For the proof, see (Ibid, §9.7.9). 
34 To be precise, Carnap spoke of state descriptions, which were maximally consistent sets of atomic sentences 
and their negations Fitting (2015). 
35 I give a characterization that aims to get across the general idea in a precise way yet without being technically 
overbearing. Whenever more technical precision will be required, it will be explicitly called upon. 
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possible worlds. It just so happens that the singular terms ‘Neil Armstrong’ and ‘the first 
person on the Moon’ are co-referential, since their referents coincide at the actual world. At 
worlds where humans never go to the moon, or worlds where there are no humans the 
intension will point to nothing. This approach to content analysis has the additional appeal of 
being in alignment with the intuition that to understand such an expression doesn’t require 
knowledge of its actual referent, e.g. ‘the tallest tree’.36  
 
The general idea is that if 𝐴 is a meaningful expression, its intension is the function 
ℐ𝐴: (𝐴 × 𝑊) ⟶ 𝑓(𝐷) that pics out 𝐴’s extension at each possible world—namely the class of 
objects at each world of which the expression is true. So if 𝐴 is a predicate, then for each 
possible world 𝑤, ℐ𝐴(𝑤)  is a subset of 𝐷𝑤 consisting of objects that have the property 
expressed by 𝐴 at 𝑤. This naturally generalizes to relations on the elements of the domain. 
So, if 𝐴 is an n-place relation, ℐ𝐴(𝑤) is a subset of 𝐷𝑤
𝑛 , i.e. its intension picks out, for each 
possible world 𝑤, a set of n-tuples of elements of 𝑤’s domain that stand in the relation 
expressed by 𝐴.37   
 
Finally, if 𝐴 is a sentence, then for each possible world 𝑤, ℐ𝐴 maps to the extension of 𝐴‘s 
truth predicate, namely the set of possible worlds where 𝐴 is true, i.e. ℐ𝐴: (𝑊) ⟶
{𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒}. For the propositional language we can employ Kripke models to give a more 
precise characterization of ℐ𝐴.
38 Namely, given a Kripke model 𝔄, let ℐ𝐴(𝑤) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 if and 
only if 𝔄, 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴, for each 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. Then for each model 𝔄, the proposition expressed by 𝐴 
can be identified with the set of possible worlds where 𝐴 is true in that model, or 
equivalently, the set of possible worlds at which ℐ𝐴 maps 𝐴 to truth, i.e. 𝐴’s intension is the 
set {𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ∶ ℐ𝐴(𝑤) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒} whose characteristic function is ℐ𝐴. Effectively, this method has 
an overall extensional character to content analysis. 
 
Intensions deal equally well in drawing distinctions between contingently coextensive 
predicates. Consider the example from Quine (1951, p.21): although it may just so happen 
that the property of ‘being a creature with a kidney’ is coextensive with ‘being a creature with 
a heart’, nevertheless these two properties mean something else – it is physically (or at least 
                                               
36 Speaks (2014, §2.1.5). 
37 The intension/extension distinction can be traced back to Frege’s sense/reference distinction, where  
intension corresponds to the expressions’ meaning, and extension to the things the expression designates 
(Fitting, 2015). 
38 This formulation can be traced back to Carnap’s (1947) early work on intensionality. 
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logically) possible for there to be creatures with hearts, but no kidneys, and the intensions of 
the two predicates would simply come apart at other possible worlds (as desired). A 
sentence’s intension, understood as the proposition it expresses, points to that sentence’s truth 
value at each world. The intended interpretation of the set {𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ∶ ℐ𝐴(𝑤) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒} is the 
proposition expressed by A. Possible world semantics for propositional content as intension, 
conceived this way, had an enormous impact on philosophical analysis in the second half of 
the 20th century, before its general limitations began to appear. 
 
1.3.2.2     General limitations: “The Granularity Problem” 
However, this approach falls short of giving an adequate analysis of contexts containing 
hyperintensional phenomena, i.e. contexts where intensional equivalence is insufficient for 
identity, or contexts that do not respect logical equivalence (Cresswell, 1975, p.25), or more 
broadly, contexts that do not respect necessary equivalence (Nolan, 2013, p.366).39 Before 
demonstrating how intensions fall short of delivering hyperintensional distinctions, I will 
briefly discuss the analogous phenomenon, of the inadequacy that extensions display in 
drawing intensional distinctions. This will place the following discussion in a broader 
context. Consider the following example. ‘Canberra is the capital of Australia’ – the referent 
of ‘Canberra’ and ‘The capital of Australia’ is the city of Canberra.40 Now, despite its 
apparent innocuity, the counterfactual ‘If Brisbane were the capital of Australia, then 
Brisbane would be the capital of Australia’ gives rise to an intensional context41, where 
substitutivity of co-extensive expressions (and co-referential expressions in particular) isn’t 
guaranteed to be truth preserving. Consider an instance of substituting the co-referring 
singular terms, in this case ‘Canberra’ for ‘the capital of Australia’ in the consequent of (2). 
 
1. If Brisbane were the capital of Australia, then Brisbane would be the capital of 
Australia. 
2. If Brisbane were the capital of Australia, then Brisbane would be Canberra. 
 
Although the first counterfactual is an instance of counterfactual identity, the truth of the 
                                               
39 Nolan’s generalizes the definition by lifting the restriction to logical equivalence – necessity need not be just 
logical, e.g. it may also be metaphysical, which need not be the same as logical necessity: ‘A position in a 
sentence is said to be sensitive to hyperintensional differences, if the truth value of the sentence can be altered 
by replacing the expressions in that position with one that necessarily applies to the same things’ (Nolan, 2013, 
p.366). 
40 In this example I am treating co-referential terms as a special case of co-extensive predicates, where being the 
capital of some country is thought of as having that property. 
41 It is a shift of context, from the actual to the possible in general. 
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second one is context dependent. In particular there are contexts where it is false, e.g. when 
we intend (in the hypothetical scenario) both cities to remain where they actually are. 
Brisbane being the capital of Australia, and both cities remaining where they actually are is a 
perfectly possible scenario, which the reading of (2) doesn’t rule out. The general point I 
wish to stress is that just as co-reference (extensional equivalence) is inadequate for drawing 
intensional distinctions (‘Canberra’ doesn’t mean ‘the capital of Australia’), so intensional 
equivalence falls short of drawing hyperintensional distinctions. Consequently, just as 
extensional equivalence is inadequate for identity conditions that guarantee substitutivity 
salva veritate on intensional contexts, intensional equivalence is inadequate for identity 
conditions that guarantee substitutivity salva veritate on hyperintensional contexts. That is, 
the approach fails to distinguish sentences that are either necessarily true, or necessarily false 
– the former are identified with the set of all possible worlds, since necessity is modelled as 
truth at all possible worlds, and the latter with the empty set since necessary falsehoods are 
not true at any possible world.42 Let us denote the proposition expressed by sentence 𝐴 with 
[𝐴]. That is let us adopt the notation [𝐴] ≔ {𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ∶ ℐ𝐴(𝑤) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒} for the reminder of our 
discussion, to distinguish [𝐴] from the sentence that expresses it. To illustrate this more 
formally, in terms of the Kripke models this would mean that for any two sentences 𝐴 and 𝐵 
that express a necessary truth, the following identity holds for all models (𝑊, 𝑅, 𝑉), [𝐴] =
[𝐵] = 𝑊, and likewise, for any two sentences 𝐴 and 𝐵 that express a necessary falsehood, the 
following identity holds for all models [𝐴] = [𝐵] = ∅ for all models. 
  
Consequently, propositional content modelled as intension leads to cointensive expressions 
being analyzed as meaning the same thing, which is strongly counterintuitive. Consider the 
following pairs of sentences, which on the just described possible world, meaning-as-
intension, analysis are analyzed as expressing the same proposition: 
 
1. There are no married bachelors. 
2. There are infinitely many primes. 
 
3. Some bachelors are married. 
4. There are finitely many primes. 
 
                                               
42 There is no general consensus regarding what kind of necessity represents absolute necessity, but there is a 
tendency of taking logical, mathematical, and metaphysical necessity as close approximations. The issue which 
of these necessities is more fundamental is also controversial (Berto & Jago, 2019, §1.2). In this thesis I will not 
make any assumptions in this regard. 
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Each sentence in the first pair expresses some necessary truth, so each is true in all possible 
worlds. So, their intensions are identical, and consequently both sentences are analyzed as 
having the same content, i.e. expressing the same proposition. This doesn’t seem right, since 
they appear to be saying different things – (2) says nothing about marriage or bachelorhood. 
The latter pair of sentences suffers from the same inadequacy of distinguishing their meaning 
due to the pair being cointensive. This fundamental shortcoming is inherited in the analysis of 
propositional attitudes that give rise to hyperintensional contexts, where substitutions of 
necessary equivalent terms in a sentence need not be truth preserving. Take the following 
pairs of necessarily true sentences: 
 
1. The axioms of Peano Arithmetic are true. 
2. [Any sentence that expresses a theorem of PA] is true. 
 
3. Water is water. 
4. Water is H2O. 
 
And consider the following substitutions of those sentences in sentences expressing doxastic 
and epistemic propositional attitudes: 
 
5. Giuseppe believes that the axioms of Peano Arithmetic are true. 
6. Giuseppe believes that [any sentence that expresses a theorem of PA] is true. 
 
7. It is known a priori that water is water.  
8. It is known a priori that water is H2O.  
 
It becomes clear that in such contexts, necessary sentences are not expected to be 
substitutable salva veritate. Surely, Giuseppe Peano believed the truth of his own axioms 
(that’s what it means to be an axiom – a truth that is immediately evident), but it doesn’t 
seem true that he believed all sentences, of arbitrarily complexity, that happen to express a 
consequence of those axioms, i.e. all theorems of PA. So, although (5) is (very likely) true, 
sentence (6) should be false. Also, whereas sentence (7) is true (it is probably among the least 
contested a priori truths out there), sentence (8) is false, since knowing that water is H2O 
requires empirical knowledge of the molecular structure of water.  
  
Counterpossible reasoning is another context where hyperintensional phenomena arise. A 
counterpossible conditional is a subjunctive conditional whose antecedent expresses a 
necessary falsehood. By direct analogy with the earlier example involving counterfactuals, 
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which illustrated the inadequacy of appeals to actually co-referring terms (material 
equivalence) in drawing intensional distinctions, it can be shown that appeals to necessarily 
co-referring terms (logical equivalence) are inadequate in drawing hyperintensional 
distinctions. This inadequacy in distinguishing between cointensive impossible expressions 
carries over to accounts of the counterpossible that restrict the analysis to intensions only.43 
All analyses of counterfactuals whose truth is cashed out in terms of the corresponding 
material conditional’s truth at possible worlds will result in all counterpossibles being 
evaluated as vacuously true. This is because antecedents of counterpossibles are not true at 
any possible world, by definition. A notable example of such an approach – one given by 
Lewis (1973, 1986) – meets the same predicament, by treating all counterpossibles as 
logically equivalent (in the case of Lewis, as true). As mentioned earlier, I will discuss 
Lewis’ analysis of counterfactuals and counterpossibles in depth in chapter 2, but for the 
purposes of the present introduction his analysis can be can be given informally: the 
counterfactual ‘if it were the case that …, then it would be the case that …’ is true at a 
possible world w just in case the consequent is true at all the most similar possible worlds to 
w where the antecedent is true. Since sentences expressing a necessary falsehood are true at 
no possible world, and in particular a possible world satisfying some additional similarity 
conditions, each counterpossible is analysed as vacuously true. Consider the following pair of 
counterpossibles. Whereas (1) is clearly true in all contexts, (2) could be false.  
 
1. If Sally were to square the circle, then Sally would have squared the circle. 
2. If Sally squared the circle and I doubled the cube, then I would be Sally.44 
So, on Lewis’ analysis (1) and (2) are logically equivalent (both are true at all possible 
worlds), which seems wrong. For a more emphatic demonstration that counterpossibles do 
                                               
43 Observation: (2) appears more readily read as false than its counterfactual analogue of Australia’s capital(s), 
since the property of being the capital of Australia counterfactually ascribed to Brisbane – which actually 
belongs to Canberra – is unique, whereas in the counterpossible (2) there is explicit talk of two properties, which 
only are identified as meaning the same thing by the underlying (content-as-intension) analysis. Also, 
independently of such reasons for the apparent disparity in readiness with which we would be inclined to read 
(2) and the earlier counterfactual example as false, it seems that we tend to “hold on” to numerical identity 
more than any other properties of objects, i.e. shifts in numerical identity seem to be contextually the most far-
fetched. Of course, there are contexts where (2) and its counterfactual analogue would be true, but they don’t 
seem to be among the first ones that we’re willing to consider. 
44 Squaring the circle refers to constructing a square of the same area as some circle in a finite number of steps. 
This construction is mathematically impossible. Doubling the cube is a related, impossible construction, whereby 
given the edge of a cube one is required to construct the edge of another cube that has twice the volume of the 
first one.  
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give rise to hyperintensional contexts, let us consider (3), where we substitute the consequent 
of (1) with a logically equivalent sentence, and observe that unlike (1), (3) could be false. 
 
3. If Sally were to square the circle, then Mariusz would have doubled the cube. 
As a matter of fact, Lewis’ analysis of the counterpossibles can be viewed as emblematic of 
the inadequacy of intensions in drawing hyperintensional distinctions. This example 
highlights how the matter of non-vacuous counterpossibles and the matter of adequate 
hyperintensional distinctions are closely related – counterpossibles do create hyperintensional 
contexts.  
 
1.3.2.3    Content as hyperintension, via impossible worlds 
A number of philosophers have suggested that one way of meeting the requirements of 
drawing hyperintensional distinctions, is by admitting impossible worlds to accompany 
possible ones in our world-semantics for propositional content, and proceeding much in the 
same general manner as the analysis of intensions on possible worlds.45 In terms of Kripke 
structures that would amount to either reinterpreting 𝑊 as a set of possible and impossible 
worlds, or explicitly adjoining a new set 𝑊∗ to 𝑊 (which retains its original interpretation), 
interpreted as containing impossible worlds, and defining models on the extended domain 
𝑊 ∪ 𝑊∗. This way cointensive expressions would not be represented as coextensive in all 
worlds, since impossible worlds would be precisely where their intensions would come apart, 
e.g. all necessary truths would remain true in all possible worlds, but some could fail to be 
true in some impossible worlds, and similarly for necessary falsehoods, as they all would still 
fail to be true in all possible worlds, but some could be true in some impossible worlds. 
 
Many of the reasons to switch to a possible-worlds framework for linguistic 
meaning also support employing a system with impossible worlds as well. Just 
as a predicate can be coextensive with another without being synonymous, two 
predicates can have matching extensions in every possible situation and yet fail 
to be synonymous. (Nolan 2013, p.366) 
 
The proposed refinement to the analysis is still extensional in character, since propositions 
are identified with subsets of the extended universe 𝑊 ∪ 𝑊∗, where 𝑊 is the same as before, 
                                               
45 E.g. Hintikka (1975), Rantala (1982), Yagisawa (1988), Priest (2005), Nolan (1997, 2013, 2014), Berto (2010, 
2014, 2017), Jago (2009, 2014), Bjerring (2010). 
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and 𝑊∗ is a set of impossible worlds. Let’s look how the analysis of propositional content on 
this extended account offers a way of drawing hyperintensional distinctions. Given a sentence 
𝐴, the function ℋ𝐴: 𝐴 × (𝑊 ∪ 𝑊
∗) ⟶ ℘(𝑊 ∪ 𝑊∗), works much in the same way as 
ℐ𝐴: 𝐴 × 𝑊 ⟶ ℘(𝑊), with the exception of ranging over the extended universe. But the 
underlying idea of a sentence’s hyperintension ℋ𝐴 picking out worlds where that sentence is 
true, remains unchanged, i.e. we identify the hyperintension of 𝐴 with the set 
{𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ∪ 𝑊∗ ∶ ℋ𝐴(𝑤) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒}, denoted ⟦𝐴⟧. 
The hyperintensions ℋ𝐴, ℋ𝐵 of cointensive sentences 𝐴 and 𝐵, still agree on their intensions, 
i.e. ⟦𝐴⟧ ∩ 𝑊 = ⟦𝐵⟧ ∩ 𝑊 = 𝑊, but also offer a way for their truth values to come apart at 
impossible worlds. That is, there may exist an impossible world 𝑤∗ ∈ 𝑊∗ where 𝐴 holds, 
but 𝐵 doesn’t, i.e. 𝑤∗ ∈ ⟦𝐴⟧ but 𝑤∗ ∉ ⟦𝐵⟧, which yields the desired result of a semantic 
distinction between the proposition expressed by 𝐴 and the proposition expressed by 𝐵, i.e. 
⟦𝐴⟧ ≠ ⟦𝐵⟧. Hyperintensional distinctions between necessarily falsehoods 𝐴 and 𝐵  are 
achieved much in the same way. Although [𝐴] = [𝐵] = ∅, it need not be the case that ⟦𝐴⟧ =
⟦𝐵⟧ = ∅, for there may exist an impossible world 𝑤∗ ∈ 𝑊∗ where 𝐴 holds, but 𝐵 does not 
hold, i.e. 𝑤∗ ∈ ⟦𝐴⟧ but 𝑤∗ ∉ ⟦𝐵⟧. 
 
The above general discussion has given a general, and largely informal outline of the idea of 
using impossible worlds in analyzing hyperintensionality. In the next section we look at a 
particular application of open impossible worlds to hyperintensional propositional attitudes. 
 
1.3.3     Applications of open worlds: doxastic logic and epistemic logic 
1.3.3.1     Fine-graining with Rantala worlds 
 
It is well known that it seems possible to have a situation in which there are two 
propositions p and q which are logically equivalent and yet are such that a person 
may believe the one but not the other. If we regard a proposition as a set of 
possible worlds then two logically equivalent propositions will be identical, and 
so if "x believes that' is a genuine sentential functor, the situation described in the 
opening sentence could not arise. I call this the paradox of hyperintensional 
contexts. (Cresswell 1975, p.25) 
 
The following application of impossible worlds involves the analysis of belief and 
knowledge. That is, an analysis of contexts where hyperintensional distinctions arise 
26 
 
 
naturally, and where failing to give an adequate account of such distinctions can lead to very 
bizarre (incorrect) consequences. Exploiting the intuitive analogies between epistemic and 
modal propositional attitudes – knowledge and necessity in particular – had opened the door 
to allowing epistemic (and doxastic) logic enjoy the same intuitive semantics that modal logic 
had.  
 
Hintikka (1962) pioneered an intuitive and successful Kripke-style interpretation of epistemic 
language, one in which epistemic space (set of epistemic alternatives) is identified with 
logical space (possible worlds) and epistemic operators are interpreted in a way analogous to 
modal operators of the modal language. Knowledge for an agent 𝑎 is interpreted as truth at all 
𝑎’s epistemic alternatives, i.e. truth at all worlds epistemically possible for 𝑎. Consequently, 
since only possible worlds are the available epistemic alternatives for any agent, then all 
logical truths are epistemically necessary for any agent on the above interpretation. That is, 
on this interpretation all agents know all logical truths, which is certainly not the case. 
Moreover, since among logical truths there are entailments, any agent will know all the 
logical consequences of what they know. This predicament of logical omniscience is a direct 
outcome of the above interpretation. Belief is analyzed analogously, and is burdened with 
analogous issues.  
 
That is, Hintikka’s (1962) analysis sanctioned the following principles, where 𝑲𝐴 is read as 
‘it is known that 𝐴’ and 𝑩𝐴 is read as ‘it is believed that 𝐴’:46 
 
(C1) If  𝑲𝐴 and 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then 𝑲𝐵   (Closure under entailment) 
If 𝐴 is known, and 𝐴 entails 𝐵, then 𝐵 is known. 
 
If  𝑩𝐴 and 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then 𝑩𝐵 
If 𝐴 is believed, and 𝐴 entails 𝐵, then 𝐵 is believed. 
 
(C2) If  ⊨ 𝐴, then 𝑲𝐴    (Knowledge of all valid formulae) 
If 𝐴 is a necessary truth, then 𝐴 is known. 
 
                                               
46 Hintikka (1962) relativizes knowledge and belief to agents, i.e. 𝐾𝑎𝐴 and 𝐵𝑎𝐴 read as ‘agent 𝑎 knows 𝐴’ and 
‘agent 𝑎 believes 𝐴’, respectively. But we can simplify the discussion by depersonalizing the analysis, since that 
is not where the relevant issues are, i.e. although the epistemic/doxastic accessibility relations 𝑅𝑎may be 
relativized to agents 𝑎, and for any to agents 𝑎 and 𝑏, 𝑅𝑎 ≠ 𝑅𝑏, nevertheless both 𝑅𝑎(𝑤) ⊆ 𝑊 and 𝑅𝑏(𝑤) ⊆
𝑊, where 𝑊 is a set of possible worlds (a model’s domain) and 𝑅𝑥(𝑤) = {𝑢 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑤𝑅𝑥𝑢}, i.e. the image of 𝑤 
under 𝑅𝑥. 
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If  ⊨ 𝐴, then 𝑩𝐴     (Belief in all valid formulae) 
If 𝐴 is a necessary truth, then 𝐴 is believed.47 
 
Both principles do not seem right, as people are neither omniscient, nor do they know all 
logical consequences of what they know. Similarly, people do not believe all necessary truths 
or logical consequences of their beliefs. For example, Giuseppe Peano, surely did not know 
all the theorems of arithmetic (logical consequences of PA axioms), even if he claimed to 
have justified belief for claiming the truth of PA axioms, i.e. the self-evident nature of their 
truth. Similarly, he would not believe all conjectures of arithmetic that would turn out to be 
theorems. The same holds for any other person. 
 
Hintikka’s (1975) key insight was to correctly identify the crux of the problem by observing 
that the theoretical responsibility for logical omniscience was not due to the method of 
possible world analysis per se, but rather the underlying assumption – which he had himself 
previously endorsed – that “every epistemically possible world is logically possible”.48 It had 
been precisely the assumption of such a close analogy between necessity and knowledge that 
gave rise to erroneously burdening epistemic logic with logical omniscience. So, if 
knowledge is not something that is closed under entailment, then perhaps for a more accurate 
world-analysis of epistemic and doxastic propositional attitudes epistemic and doxastic 
spaces should be modelled accordingly, by including worlds that fail to be closed under 
entailment. This is precisely what Hintikka (1975) proposed. Hintikka’s suggestion to get 
around the logical omniscience problem, although retrospectively rather straightforward, 
marked a revolutionary direction in possible world analysis of propositional attitudes. By 
abandoning the problematic assumption that all epistemically possible worlds are logically 
possible, he posited worlds that are not logically possible, i.e. “some epistemically possible 
worlds are not logically possible worlds”. 49 The main motivation for adopting impossible 
worlds as a means to refine the analysis of belief is the now retrospectively obvious 
observation that human beings are not perfectly (ideal) rational agents:  
 
The way to solve the problem of logical omniscience is hence to give up the 
assumption [that every epistemically possible world is logically possible]. This 
means admitting 'impossible possible worlds', that is, worlds which look possible 
                                               
47 Wansing (1990, p.526) Pietarinen (1998, pp.8-9), Berto & Jago (2019, §5.3). 
48 Hintikka (1975, p.476). 
49 Hintikka (1975, p.477). 
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and hence must be admissible as epistemic alternatives but which none the less 
are not logically possible. Admitting them solves our problem for good.   
(Hintikka 1975, p.477)  
 
Within a decade of Kripke’s non-normal semantics for S3 and S2, Hintikka (1975) and 
Rantala (1975) had extended Kripke’s model-theoretic “trick”  employed in non-normal 
models, and had developed a semantics for epistemic and doxastic logics that model non-
ideal agents. Introducing and employing impossible worlds gave a semantics that invalidated 
epistemic and doxastic versions of problematic closures (C1) and (C2), thereby doing away 
with omniscience and omnidoxasticity. On the impossible-world semantics this is done by 
having the valuation function, for each model, assign values directly to formulae at 
impossible worlds. Effectively, this technical move gives the set of impossible worlds the 
capacity to violate any closures, including entailment.  
 
For the doxastic logic we expand the  propositional language by an epistemic operator 
symbol 𝑩, where the intended reading of ‘𝑩𝐴’ is ‘it is believed that 𝐴’. Let the language of 
basic propositional doxastic logic be {~, .∧, .∨, ⊃, 𝑩}. Let 𝑃𝑉 = {𝑝𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ ℕ} be the set of 
propositional variables Finally, let 𝐹𝑜𝑟 be the smallest set closed under the following 
formation rules: 
 
B:      All propositional variables are wffs, i.e. 𝑃𝑉 ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
R1: If 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 then {~𝐴, 𝑩𝐴 } ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
R2: If {𝐴, 𝐵} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 then {𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵, 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
 
I present simplified Rantala models, which suffice to illustrate the role of impossible worlds 
in this context, for the present, introductory purposes. Multimodal systems for multiple 
agents are generally given, where belief is agent-relative and modelled by the corresponding 
accessibility relation, but for the introductory illustration purposes I only use a single 
accessibility relation for simplicity. The idea can be easily generalized to accommodate 
multiple agents.50  
 
Definition 1.14: An Impossible world “Rantala” Model is the triple (𝑊, 𝑊∗, 𝑅, 𝜈), where 𝑊 
and 𝑊∗ are nonempty sets, regarded as the set of possible worlds and the set of impossible 
                                               
50 For a detailed exposition see Rantala (1982a, 1982b), Wansing (1990), Sillari (2008). 
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worlds, respectively, and the binary relation 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑊 ∪ 𝑊∗ × 𝑊 ∪ 𝑊∗ regarded as the 
accessibility relation.  
 
For each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜈𝑤: 𝑃𝑉 ⟶ {0,1} is just as on Kripke models, where the truth conditions for 
extensional connectives at possible worlds are just like on Kripke models, and: 
 
𝜈𝑤(𝑩𝐴)    iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊 ∪ 𝑊
∗: if 𝑤𝑅𝑢, then 𝜈𝑢(𝐴). 
 
However, the truth or falsity of formulas need not be recursively specified at non-normal 
worlds. The only restriction is a semantic version of modus ponens, i.e. for all 𝑤∗ ∈ 𝑊∗, and 
𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 
 
(†) If 𝜈𝑤(𝐴) = 𝜈𝑤(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵) = 1, then 𝜈𝑤(𝐵) = 1. 
 
Note that such a constraint precludes Rantala impossible worlds from being fully fledged 
open worlds. The restriction is in place to validate the K-axiom 𝑩(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵) ⊃ (𝑩𝐴 ⊃ 𝑩𝐵), 
which seems appropriate for knowledge and belief. Without it, Rantala impossible worlds 
would just be open worlds. The main difference between the impossible worlds employed in 
Kripke non-normal models or 𝑁4 models and the ones employed in Rantala models, is that 
whereas the former worlds display non-standard behaviour of intensional operators only at 
impossible worlds – box/diamond and → formulae are assigned values directly – in the latter 
worlds all formulae misbehave this way, which means that even extensional connectives 
behave non-standardly, i.e. they fail to be truth functionally recursive.51  
 
Validity and valid inference are defined as truth at all possible worlds, and truth preservation 
at all possible worlds, respectively. 52  
 
This way doxastic closure under entailment (C1) fails, since although 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴, the 
semantics allows for some impossible world 𝑤∗: 𝜈𝑤∗(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞) = 1, yet 𝜈𝑤∗(𝑝) = 0. To see this, 
suppose that 𝜈𝑤(𝑩(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞)) = 1 at some possible world 𝑤. So, for all worlds 𝑢 ∈ 𝑊 ∪ 𝑊
∗ such 
that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, 𝜈𝑢(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞) = 1. Now suppose 𝑤𝑅𝑤
∗. Hence, we see that 𝜈𝑤(𝑩𝑝) = 0, as required. 
Similarly, such properties of 𝜈 at impossible worlds are sufficient to violate (C2) allowing 
belief in any counterexample to any logical law. For example, given ⊨ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ⊃ 𝐴, the 
                                               
51 So according to Priest’s distinction Priest (2005, §1.5), whereas Kripke non-normal worlds are merely 
intensionally impossible, Rantala non-normal worlds, being extensionally impossible, display a higher degree of 
logical deviancy. 
52 Wansing (1990, pp.526-527). 
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semantics allow for 𝑩((𝑝 ∧ 𝑞) ⊃ 𝑝) to be invalidated, by choosing a possible world 𝑤 and 
impossible world 𝑤∗ such that 𝑤𝑅𝑤∗ and letting 𝜈𝑤∗((𝑝 ∧ 𝑞) ⊃ 𝑝 ) = 0, which implies 
𝜈𝑤(𝑩((𝑝 ∧ 𝑞) ⊃ 𝑝)) = 0. Hence, ⊭ 𝑩((𝑝 ∧ 𝑞) ⊃ 𝑝), as required.
 53 
 
As we can see, on the open-world approach (practically open if we ignore the (†) rule) 
described above, whilst the feat of avoiding omnidoxasticity and omniscience can indeed be 
avoided, it comes at a cost. That is, the proposal goes too far, since it ultimately trivializes 
belief – anything and everything may be believed, and at the same time any logical or 
metaphysical truth may be doubted, if no restrictions are place on the impossible worlds. This 
is a problem. To put it another way, if all open worlds are admitted as legitimate doxastic or 
epistemic alternatives, then any sentence describes a doxastic or epistemic possibility. 
Conversely, no sentence would be safe from skepticism, even those expressing Frege’s 
cognitively insignificant identities (such as ‘water is water’). Surely this isn’t right. When 
distinctions are too fine, we also end up in trouble. The task is to avoid omniscience and 
omnidoxasticity without ruling out truths that would be self-evident to any rational agent. For 
proposals that address this problem see Yagisawa (1985), Hawthorne (2005), Chalmers 
(2010), Jago (2009, 2014), Williamson (2010), and Bjerring (2010, 2012), Berto & Jago 
(2019). 
 
1.4 Modifying Lewis’ account of the counterfactual 
1.4.1 Goodman and Quine’s context sensitivity objections 
Counterfactuals are notoriously context sensitive. Take the well-known example: 
 
1. If Caesar had been in command (in Korea), he would have used the atom bomb. 
2. If Caesar had been in command (in Korea), he would have used catapults.54 
 
Intuitively, the truth of each depends on contextual background assumptions. But how can we 
tell what they are? For (1) to be true, we require contexts where Caesar’s knowledge of 
modern warfare is assumed to be in line with the military knowledge of a modern military 
                                               
53 Examples, and their discussion are borrowed from Pietarinen (1998, p.10), and some definitional layout 
features from Sillari (2008, p.7). 
54 Quine (1960, p.22) bases this example on similar ones given by Goodman (1954). Lewis (1973, pp.66-7; 1986, 
p.251) offers a number of replies to the contention pointed out by Quine, but eventually settles on one whereby 
the uttered counterfactual taken as being asserted, and context is called upon in resolving the vagueness of the 
comparative similarity in favour of the truth of the uttered counterfactual. This solution seems unsatisfactory 
since it is ambiguous what context has been called upon in favour of the counterfactual’s truth. 
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general, whereas for the second to be true, no such contextual background assumption is 
required. 
The problem that conditional analyses face is that the role of context is left syntactically 
ambiguous. That is, at the level of the object language there are no indicators what context 
should underlie the evaluation of a counterfactual, although Gabbay’s (1972) analysis –which 
we will look at in this section – goes some way toward resolving this ambiguity.  
 
Such context dependence is starkly pronounced in the following pair of counteridenticals 
given by Goodman (1954). Here the antecedents are logically equivalent (their formulation 
intends to hint at what the underlying context is), but their consequents are clearly 
incompatible.55 
 
3. If I was Julius Caesar, I wouldn’t be alive in the 21th century. 
4. If Julius Caesar were I, he would be alive in the 21th century.56 
 
It seems that both can be true, or at least they can be heard as true. Indeed, but in different 
contexts, and they would hardly be true in any single context, which precludes inconsistent 
scenarios (possibilities). The truth of the above is contingent on what is meant by the 
antecedent, which in turn rests on what context is assumed to underlie the reading of the 
counterfactual and consequently its evaluation. However, what that context is on any given 
occasion is not determined by the counterfactual itself. (3) would be true in contexts where 
the time when Caesar actually lived is maintained as true in the hypothetical scenario, 
whereas for (4) to be true the fact that I am actually alive in the 21st century is also true in the 
hypothetical scenario. 
 
Chapter 2 gives a detailed overview of the semantics, and critical analysis of the general 
Stalnaker-Lewis similarity account of counterfactual conditionals and how it contrasts with 
the family of ceteris paribus conditionals. For the comparative purposes of this section it will 
suffice to highlight one fundamental feature that these analyses have in common. On these 
analyses, when evaluating the truth of a counterfactual at some possible world 𝑤, only 𝑤 and 
the antecedent determine what set of situations have the features we take to be relevant to our 
deliberations in evaluating the conditional. In other words, it is only 𝑤 and the antecedent 
                                               
55 I borrowed this emphasis from Priest (2017, §2.3). 
56 Goodman (1983, p.6). 
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that determine what context underlies the evaluation of the conditional at 𝑤. This stems from 
the general underlying idea, common to these accounts, of treating the conditional as a 
special kind of expression of relative necessity.  
 
We have said that conditionality can be regarded as a species of relative necessity. 
This idea is bolstered syntactically by redescribing a conditional 𝐴 > 𝐵 as [𝐴]𝐵 – 
so that the antecedent 𝐴 forms a unary operator, the box-like brackets being 
reminiscent of the operator □ of simple necessity. Thus described, conditionality 
assumes the aspect of a sententially indexed modality, in which [𝐴]𝐵 expresses 
the necessity of 𝐵 relative to 𝐴. Chellas (1975, p.138) 
 
1.4.2 Gabbay’s analysis of subjunctive conditionals 
Highlighting that feature of the aforementioned conditional analyses suffices for the task of 
discussing differences with Gabbay’s (1972) analysis of subjunctive conditionals, to which I 
now turn. Gabbay’s analysis follows this general modal idea of analyzing conditionals akin to 
expressions of sententially indexed modality described by Chellas, but instead of modelling a 
conditional 𝐴 > 𝐵 as [𝐴]𝐵 (or equivalently □𝐴𝐵), i.e. where the necessity operator is 
relativized to a single sentential parameter (the antecedent), 𝐴 > 𝐵 is modelled as 
[𝐴, 𝐵](𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵), following the notation suggested by Chellas, or equivalently □𝐴,𝐵(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵).  This 
analysis still uses the same general idea of conditional necessity determining the subset of 
possible worlds to be considered in the evaluation of the conditional, but it takes its content to 
be relativized to both the antecedent and the consequent. 
 
Gabbay recognizes the role of context in determining the worlds relevant to the evaluation of 
the counterfactual, and because – he argues – the consequent carries key contextual 
information, which the antecedent alone fails to capture, its role is indispensable. In other 
words, the set of worlds we consider in evaluating 𝐴 > 𝐵 is determined by both 𝐴 and 𝐵. 
More specifically, the consequent determines which contingent aspects (facts) of the actual 
world are relevant to the evaluation of the conditional, and as such should remain unchanged 
in the hypothetical scenarios.  
 
Generally, whenever a statement 𝐴 > 𝐵 is uttered at a world 𝑡, the speaker has in 
mind a certain set of statements 𝛥(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑡) (concerning the political situation or 
geographic situation, etc.) which is supposed to remain true, and the speaker 
wants to express that in all worlds in which all statements of Δ retain their 
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truth 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 must hold. What is Δ(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑡)? Well, one can perhaps find out what Δ 
is from 𝐴, 𝐵 and the general knowledge and the circumstances at the time of 
utterance in the world of utterance (i.e. 𝑡). The following examples show that Δ 
depends on both 𝐴 and 𝐵. Consider the statements: 
(i)  If I were the Pope, I would have allowed the use of the pill in India. 
(ii)  If I were the Pope, I would have dressed more humbly. 
Clearly, in the first statement, we must assume that India remains overpopulated 
and poor in resources, while in the second example nothing of the sort is required.  
Gabbay (1972, p.98, emphasis added) 
 
I will adopt Priest’s terminology, and refer to whatever carries over invariantly into the 
relevant hypothetical scenarios (worlds) as information imported from the actual world. 
 
Definition 1.15: Priest (2018, §2.1). Let us call the information that is carried over [from the 
world of evaluation] the imported information.  
 
Applying Priest’s terminology to Gabbay’s example above, we would say that in the case of 
(i) we import the information that India is overpopulated, which doesn’t seem like the 
relevant kind of information to import for (ii). 
 
Consider the following pair of counterfactuals, inspired by Goodman, where the contextual 
input of the consequent is made salient, and which Gabbay uses as one of his examples to 
demonstrate that Δ depends on both the antecedent and the consequent:57 
 
5. If New York were in Georgia, then New York would be in the South. 
6. If New York were in Georgia, then Georgia would be in the North. 
 
Gabbay (1972, p.99) points out that at the worlds relevant to the evaluation of (1) and (2) are 
not the same, despite the counterfactuals sharing the same antecedent. In other words, the 
information that gets imported into the antecedent worlds for the truth of (5) is not the same 
as the information imported to the antecedent worlds for the truth of (6). ‘Georgia is in the 
South’ must retain its truth value in (5), whereas ‘New York is in the North’ must retain its 
truth value in (6). 
 
                                               
57 Gabbay (1972, pp.98-99) gives a similar example.  
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We can make Gabbay’s insight more precise, by an appropriate modification of Kripke 
frames. First, we add a third recursive clause to Definition 1.0.1, to expand the set of wffs 𝐹𝑜𝑟 
so it contains expressions 𝐴 > 𝐵 corresponding to counterfactuals:  
 
R3: If 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 then 𝐴 > 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
 
We define a world accessibility relation 𝑅𝐴,𝐵 ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝑊 that depends on both the antecedent 
and consequent. The worlds in the image of 𝑅𝐴,𝐵 are regarded as those that are relevant to the 
evaluation of 𝐴 > 𝐵. To give a precise characterization of 𝑅𝐴,𝐵 in terms of Δ(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑤) let us 
define models that reflect Gabbay’s idea. I am giving an account of Gabbay’s analysis in 
terms of the kind of models (for ceteris paribus conditionals) that appear in the next chapter. 
 
Definition 1.16: A Gabbay frame is a pair (𝑊, {𝑅𝐴,𝐵: (𝐴, 𝐵) ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟}), where 𝑊 ≠ ∅, and 
for each (𝐴, 𝐵) ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, 𝑅𝐴,𝐵 ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝑊 is a reflexive relation satisfying:
58  
 
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑅𝐴,𝐵   iff   𝑦 ⊩ 𝐶 for all 𝐶 ∈ Δ(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑥) 
 
Reflexivity of 𝑅𝐴,𝐵 is naturally motivated, since Δ(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑤) contains information to be 
imported, which is already in place at 𝑤 by definition of imported information.59 
 
Definition 1.16.1: For convenience, define 𝑓𝐴,𝐵(𝑤) ∶= {𝑢 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑤𝑅𝐴,𝐵𝑢}. 
 
Although Gabbay does not endorse a Stalnaker-Lewis kind of similarity approach to possible 
world semantics for conditionals, admitting that he feels “uneasy” about that concept, he still 
allows a similarity-related idiom and calls the worlds in 𝑓𝐴,𝐵(𝑤) Δ-similar.
60 This makes his 
account conceptually closer to the family of ceteris paribus conditionals discussed in the next 
chapter. That is, we can view 𝑓𝐴,𝐵(𝑤) as those worlds that are ceteris paribus the same as 𝑤, 
or at least sharpen the ceteris paribus analysis to include the additional parameter. 
 
                                               
58 What I call G frames are special cases of structures widely known among computer scientists as labelled 
transition systems (𝑊, {𝑅𝑎: 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴}), where 𝑊 ≠ ∅ is a set of states, and 𝐴 ≠ ∅  is a set of labels (Blackburn 
2001, p.3). In the case of Gabbay frames we’re clearly labelling the accessibility relation by ordered pairs of 
elements of For. 
59 Gabbay (1972, p.100) emphasizes the reflexivity of the accessibility relation with that exact point, although he 
doesn’t use the information importation terminology. 
60 Gabbay (1972, pp.99-100). 
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Definition 1.17: A Gabbay model is a triple (𝔉, 𝑉), where 𝔉 is a Gabbay frame, 𝑉: 𝑃𝑉 ⟶
℘(𝑊), is the function that assigns to each propositional variable 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 a subset of 𝑊. 
Informally we think of 𝑉(𝑝) as the set of worlds in the model where is 𝑝 true. 
 
Truth in a model is defined in terms the satisfiability relation ⊩  ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟. We read 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 
as ‘𝐴 is true at 𝑤’. Given a Gabbay model (𝑊, 𝔉, 𝑉) and any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, define ⊩ as follows: 
 
   (1) – (6) are as for Kripke models (see definition 1.2). 
   (7) 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵       iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝐴,𝐵𝑢, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵. 
            That is,  iff 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 is true at all 𝑅𝐴,𝐵-accessible worlds. 
 
Definition 1.17.1: For convenience, define [𝐴] ∶= {𝑤 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴}. 
Equivalently we can express the truth conditions for 𝐴 > 𝐵 more concisely in terms of 
previously defined sets of worlds: 
 
   (7’) 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵       iff    𝑓𝐴,𝐵(𝑤) ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵]. 
            That is,  iff 𝐵 is true at all 𝑅𝐴,𝐵-accessible worlds. 
 
1.4.3 Advantages of Gabbay’s account 
Let us highlight some interesting implications of the differences in the treatment of 
contextual information. From what has already been said, it follows that ceteris paribus and 
Lewis-Stalnaker similarity accounts preclude any context shifts between counterfactuals with 
the same antecedents in any given situation. Broadly speaking, on any given instance of 
utterance for counterfactuals with the same antecedent there’s a single choice of the worlds 
that are considered (as relevant) – the underlying context is ambiguous and fixed.  
 
Given a pair of counterfactuals with the same antecedents (but different consequents), as in 
the examples we have looked at, on Gabbay’s account, an element of the modelled object 
language, i.e. the consequent, allows for a context shift on any single occasion, cashed out in 
terms of considering different sets of worlds when evaluating counterfactuals with different 
consequents. On ceteris paribus and Stalnaker-Lewis similarity accounts there is an 
ambiguity regarding the context which should underlie the evaluation of counterfactuals in 
each pair. The inexplicit influence of context reigns at the (metalinguistic) level of models. 
That is, given any model, a counterfactual’s truth value may vary across worlds, but also, 
crucially, its truth at a single world (say the actual world) varies across models. Gabbay’s 
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analysis provides the additional linguistic parameter in the form of the consequent to decide 
the matter.  
 
Gabbay's analysis of conditionals has one apparent advantage that other analyses 
we’ve examined lack – it offers a semantic counterpart for the fact, which we 
have observed, that the evaluation of two conditionals with the same antecedent 
may require consideration of different sets of situations. (Nute 1980, p.75)  
 
That is, given two conditionals with the same antecedent, Gabbay’s analysis can account for a 
relevant difference in the intended meaning (and evaluation) of the antecedent by appeal to a 
difference in the consequents associated with the same antecedent. This can be best illustrated 
by a pair of counterfactuals whose truth depends on such radical context shifts that they can 
never be jointly true (although they could be both false) on the ceteris paribus or Stalnaker-
Lewis accounts. Let us revisit the earlier example of the pair of counteridenticals with Caesar. 
 
3. If I was Julius Caesar, I wouldn’t be alive in the 21th century. 
4. If Julius Caesar were I, he would be alive in the 21th century. 
 
For analyses whose truth conditions depend on the world of evaluation 𝑤 and the antecedent 
only, as is the case with the ceteris paribus and Stalnaker-Lewis analyses, there will be a 
single set of worlds (the closest antecedent worlds to 𝑤, or antecedent worlds that are ceteris 
paribus the same as 𝑤) that is considered in the evaluation of both counterfactuals. 
Consequently, the two are always evaluated as contraries. They cannot be true together 
because at all those worlds I, Julius Caesar either am or am not alive in the 21st century, in 
which case either (3) or (4) is true. Alternatively, I, Julius Caesar am alive in the 21st century 
at some of those worlds and am not alive in the 21st century at others, in which case both (3) 
and (4) turn out false. There are many more examples of pairs of counterfactuals similar to 
this one, which I discuss in chapter 4, where I also give formal arguments demonstrating their 
(contrary) relationship on ceteris paribus and Stalnaker-Lewis models. 
 
Let us translate (3) as 𝐴 > 𝐵 and (4) as 𝐴 > 𝐶. On Gabbay’s analysis however, both (3) and 
(4) can be simultaneously true, since the sets 𝑓𝐴,𝐵(𝑤) and 𝑓𝐴,𝐶(𝑤) need not be the same, and in 
particular, they could be disjoint, thereby making it possible for both 𝑓𝐴,𝐵(𝑤) ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵] and 
𝑓𝐴,𝐶(𝑤) ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐶] to be satisfied. That is 𝑓𝐴,𝐵(𝑤) ∩ [𝐴] may be the worlds where I (i.e. Julius 
Caesar) am not alive in the 21st century, and 𝑓𝐴,𝐶(𝑤) ∩ [𝐴] may be worlds where Julius Caesar 
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(i.e. me) is alive in the 21st century.  
 
1.4.4 Limitations of Gabbay’s analysis 
Ignoring the fact that Gabbay’s proposed logic invalidates certain very plausible conditional 
inference forms61, there’s a pertinent shortcoming of particular interest to us, regarding how 
the analysis fares with drawing finer contextual distinctions.  
 
The problem is that Gabbay's analysis, just like the other analyses we have 
examined, will give a single, determinate truth value to the conditional, regardless 
of the circumstances under which the conditional is evaluated. The formal 
semantics does not explicitly make provisions for the conditional being accepted 
on one occasion and rejected on another due to the different circumstances of 
those occasions. [But] there may be a relevant difference in the occasions of 
evaluation, […] even when both the antecedent and the consequent of the 
conditional remain the same. (Nute 1980, p.76) 
 
As Nute observes, Gabbay’s semantics fares no better than the aforementioned accounts in 
terms of offering a semantic mechanism that would allow flexibility in reading a conditional 
(and giving a corresponding truth value) in a manner that accounts for distinct circumstances 
(intended contextual considerations). Under some circumstances we may read (2) as true and 
false under others – recall the contextual considerations we discussed earlier. 
 
2. If Caesar had been in command (in Korea), he would have used catapults. 
 
But on the analysis offered by Gabbay, we appear to have run out of syntactic resources 
present in the conditional that could be employed in making such a distinction. It seems 
natural to consider a language that would make such explicit access to intended context 
available, e.g.:  
 
7. In context a: If Caesar had been in command (in Korea), he would have used 
catapults. 
 
If context a assumes Caesar’s actual military knowledge (7) comes out as true, but if context 
a assumes Caesar’s military knowledge to be that of a 20th century military general – whilst 
maintaining his actual traits of a strategic and ruthless genius determined to use the most 
                                               
61 See Nute (1980, pp.75-76). 
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effective means available to him in order to defeat the enemy – then (7) would come out as 
false.  
 
Note that using the enumeration of conditionals in this section, (7) is just ‘in context a: (2)’. 
The object language, defined in chapter 4, offers a corresponding, context-indexed 
connective, so for ‘in context a: (2)’ we would have an expression 𝐴 >𝑎 𝐵 and a different one 
for ‘in context b (2)’, i.e. 𝐴 >𝑏 𝐵, both of which need not be evaluated as having the same 
value. This is the approach that I adopt in the account given in chapter 4. 
 
1.4.5  Berto’s context-indexation suggestion 
It is difficult to say whether the approach I chose – expanding the language by introducing 
additional syntactic parameters – to address those concerns is optimal, but it does appear 
natural. I have found some supporting evidence for this in a recurring suggestion made by 
Berto (2014, 2017). It was in Berto’s work on the analysis of conceivability and imagination 
that I have found a parallel of what I have been considering in counterfactuals. It was the 
manner in which Berto (2014, 2017) chose to analyze ‘representational acts’ underlying our 
conceivability and imagination, and ‘imagination acts’ that initially captured my attention, 
and in particular, his suggestion regarding how one may go about contextualizing those acts. 
Let me outline those features of Berto’s (2017) semantics of imagination that are relevant to 
his suggestion how one may go about contextualizing the object language.62 
 
In Berto’s (2017) analysis of imagination, a basic propositional modal language is expanded 
by the inclusion of a family of sententially indexed modal operators [𝐴], where 𝐴 ranges over  
formulae that express possible acts. Expressions central to the analysis [𝐴]𝐵, are read as ‘It is 
imagined in act 𝐴 that 𝐵 or, more accurately ‘It is imagined in the act whose explicit content 
is 𝐴, that 𝐵’, where 𝐵 is any well-formed formula.63 On Berto’s analysis [𝐴] acts like a 
relative necessity operator, ranging over possible and impossible worlds, and [𝐴]𝐵 receives 
an analysis akin to expressions of sententially indexed modality described by Chellas (1975, 
p.138). Fundamentally Berto’s analysis of [𝐴]𝐵 rests on the same idea as the one employed in 
the analysis of ceteris paribus conditionals such as 𝐴 > 𝐵. 
 
                                               
62 Berto (2014, p.113, f.9) makes the exactly the same suggestion in the context of conceivability. 
63 Berto (2017, §4). 
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This brings conceiving in [sic] the vicinity of ceteris paribus conditionals. The 
explicit content of a representation may play a role similar to a conditional 
antecedent. (Berto 2014, p.8) 
 
The explicit fictional content corresponds to the explicit content of our 
imagined scenarios, and works, in Lewis’ approach, too, like the antecedent of a 
ceteris paribus conditional. (Berto 2017, p.7) 
 
Berto (2014, p.113, f.9; 2017, §5) identifies the same worry in the analysis of intensional 
states like imagination that had been identified by Quine (1960), concerning the contextual 
ambiguity of counterfactuals with the same antecedents. “Is it so that, when one imagines in 
one act [𝐴] that 𝐵 and that 𝐶, one automatically imagines that 𝐵 ∧ 𝐶?” – he asks. On a given 
act of imagination [𝐴] with the same explicit content of Caesar being in command of the US 
troops in Korea, one can imagine Caesar using the atom bomb 𝐵, and one can imagine that he 
uses catapults 𝐶, however it doesn’t follow that one would thereby imagine Caesar using both 
the bomb and catapults. Berto observes that naturally, one could also imagine that, but the 
inference pattern [𝐴]𝐵, [𝐴]𝐶 ⊨ [𝐴](𝐵 ∧ 𝐶), should not be an automatic logical entailment.   
 
The heart of the problem rests in the fact that different acts of imagining the same explicit 
content can give rise to imagining a different scenario in different contexts – in general, the 
imported information that makes [𝐴]𝐵 true is not the same as the imported information that 
makes [𝐴]𝐶 true. That is, it seems clear that different contexts underlie the truth of [𝐴]𝐵 and 
[𝐴]𝐶, and so it is not obvious that [𝐴](𝐵 ∧ 𝐶) should follow, unless we restrict what contexts 
should be at play throughout the inference. This can be done via a modification of the object 
language, by indexing representational acts [𝐴] with contexts, e.g. [𝐴]𝑥, [𝐴]𝑦, which would 
allow for an explicit syntactic restriction of inferences to a single context, for example 
[𝐴]𝑥  𝐵, [𝐴]𝑥  𝐶 ⊨ [𝐴]𝑥  (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶). Below is how Berto expresses this idea. 
 
I think that Adjunction can be maintained by fixing some contextual parameter. 
The formalism may represent this, if wanted, by adding a set of contexts to the 
interpretations and variables ranging on them in the language, and by directly 
indexing representational acts with contexts: [𝐴]𝑥, [𝐴]𝑦, for instance, will stand 
for two distinct acts with the same explicit content, 𝐴, performed in contexts x 
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and y. Once the adjunctive inference is parameterized to same-indexed contents, 
it should work fine. Berto (2017, p.11) 64   
 
Naturally, this solution has its counterpart in the analysis of counterfactuals. Given the 
already noted similarity between the analysis of Berto’s intensional expressions [𝐴]𝐵 and 
ceteris paribus (or Lewisean) conditionals expressed as 𝐴 > 𝐵, the move to introduce a 
family {>𝑥: 𝑥 ∈ 𝒞} of context-indexed conditional connectives that range over a set of context 
indices 𝒞 seems natural, and it is precisely the method I adopt. One could apply an analogous 
restriction to the counterpart inference patterns, i.e. 𝐴 >𝑥 𝐵, 𝐴 >𝑥 𝐶 ⊨ 𝐴 >𝑥 (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶) in order 
to ensure truth preservation. In fact I show, in agreement with Berto, that this and other 
generally accepted inferences65 hold for the contextualized language, whenever all instances 
of the counterfactual appearing in the inference are restricted to a single context index. 
However, I chose to not apply such a restriction in general, which I feel departs from an 
opportunity to make the logic relevance-sensitive in an interesting way (not only single 
context index premise sets).  
 
My proposal allows for premises to range over more than one context index, so in this sense 
the restrictions that are in place are weaker than the one suggested by Berto. However, on top 
of the usual truth (preservation) condition for validity, a contextual information preserving 
condition is introduced. That is, I demand the existence of relevant content connection 
(properly defined and developed in the model theory) between the context indices over which 
the premises range and the conclusion context index. For example, in the case of 
𝐴 >𝑥 𝐵, 𝐴 >𝑦 𝐶 ⊨ 𝐴 >𝑧 (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶) for the inference to be valid, aside from truth preservation at 
all worlds in all models, it is additionally required that the conclusion context index z 
preserves the mutual contextual information of context indices x and y, which make the 
premises true. Clearly, this condition is met trivially with Berto’s restriction in place. 
Naturally, the model theory ensures that all the relevant terms such as context, context index, 
contextual information preservation, and mutual contextual information are properly and 
carefully motivated and defined. So although standard inferences fail to hold in general, when 
we lift Berto’s restriction, all of their instances that are said to preserve contextual 
information (have a suitably contextualized form) do hold.  
                                               
64 My emphasis. By Adjunction Berto means the semantic condition that guarantees the validity of the inference 
pattern [𝐴]𝐵, [𝐴]𝐶 ⊨ [𝐴](𝐵 ∧ 𝐶). I shall refer to it as Adjunction of Consequents. 
65 That is, valid on all weakly centered sphere systems, i.e. those characterizing Lewis’ logic VW. 
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1.4.6 Nolan’s context-relativization suggestion 
A suggestion along similar lines to Berto’s can be found in Nolan (1997). It proposes a 
modification of Stalnaker-Lewis similarity semantics for counterfactuals in a manner that 
emphasizes the role of context in order to account for the interpretation of similarity as 
similarity in relevant respects. Whereas Berto offers advice on addressing the matter 
syntactically, by accounting for contextual differences explicitly in the object language with 
an indication of how an index set should feature in a model, Nolan hints at a corresponding 
modification of similarity assignments that would accommodate such contextual 
disambiguation. The two suggestions are complimentary (in my view) – jointly amounting to 
a rudimentary recipe for an analysis of counterfactuals that explicitly accounts for the 
influence of context.  
 
A more sophisticated approach would be to employ, instead of a function from 
worlds to sets of spheres, a function from worlds and contexts to sets of spheres. 
This may deal better with representing our use of relevant similarity in 
determining the spheres, since what is more relevantly similar than what is often 
(always?) a matter of context. Contexts themselves are not monolithic, of course, 
and there is a potential to develop a quite sophisticated formal mechanism for 
modelling the selection of sets of spheres. (Nolan 1997, n.28) 
 
This will become clearer when I introduce Lewis’ similarity sphere models in the next 
chapter. It will suffice to say at this point that Berto (2017) and Nolan’s (1997) suggestions 
have one thing in common – how to include objects interpreted as contexts into a model 
theory. The account I give in chapter 4, develops and implements these nascent ideas. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Conditional logics and David Lewis’ analysis of counterfactuals. 
 
 
 
‘If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple 
over’ is true (or false, as the case may be) at our 
world, quite without regard to those possible 
worlds where kangaroos walk around on 
crutches, and stay upright that way. Those 
worlds are too far away from ours. What is 
meant by the counterfactual is that, things being 
pretty much as they are – the scarcity of crutches 
for kangaroos being pretty much as it actually is, 
and so on – if kangaroos had no tails they would 
topple over. 
  
  Lewis (1973, pp.8-9) 
 
 
 
 
2.0   Introduction 
In this chapter I give a detailed and critical exposition of Lewis’ similarity semantics for 
counterfactuals in terms of his similarity spheres. In the first part of the chapter I give a brief 
overview of a popular semantics for ceteris paribus conditionals. Then I give an account of 
Lewis’ (1973) critique of the strict conditional and his argument that counterfactuals don’t 
correspond to any strict conditional, but rather a variably strict conditional. In the second, and 
main part of the chapter, I present Lewis’ semantics for the counterfactual in terms of 
similarity sphere systems $ and give an in-depth survey of various conceptions of 
comparative similarity of worlds and the corresponding restrictions on $. This exposition 
includes a critical comparison of Lewis’ semantics with another well-known similarity 
semantics for conditionals due to Stalnaker (1968, 1970). In the latter part of the chapter I 
offer a critical reply to Lewis’ logical arguments in favor of the vacuous account of 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, i.e. counterpossibles, and show them to be either 
inconclusive or unconvincing. This reply to Lewis comprises one of three replies to Lewis’ 
defense of vacuous analysis of counterpossibles. The remaining replies are given in Chapter 
3. Throughout the entire chapter I endorse the system characterized by weakly centered 
systems of similarity spheres, which is the weakest system that validates Modus Ponens, yet 
strong enough to invalidate problematic inferences burdening Lewis’ preferred logic, which 
is characterized by a system satisfying a stronger centering condition. 
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2.1   Conditional logic 
From a Kripke semantics perspective, conditional logics are modal logics, with a multiplicity 
of accessibility relations of a certain kind.66 That is, the semantics for conditional logics 
extends the conceptual mechanism developed by Kripke. This approach has been motivated 
by giving a better account of the conditional – both the indicative and the subjunctive – by 
developing a semantics that invalidates a number of questionable inference forms, such as 
transitivity, antecedent strengthening, and contraposition, which remain valid in classical 
logic, for both the material and strict conditionals. Below are the formal patterns of those 
inferences, accompanied by examples from natural language where they appear to fail. 
 
Transitivity: 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵, 𝐵 ⊃ 𝐶 ⊨ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐶 
If Hoover had been born in Russia, he would have been a communist.  
If Hoover had been a communist, he would have been a traitor.  
∴ Hence, if Hoover had been born in Russia, he would have been a traitor. 
 
Antecedent Strengthening: 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 ⊨ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐶) ⊃ 𝐵 
If I strike a match, the match will light up.  
∴ Therefore, if I submerge myself in the pool and strike a match, the match will light up. 
 
Contraposition: 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 ⊨ ~𝐵 ⊃ ~𝐴 
If I have any coffee, I only have a little.  
∴ So, if I have a lot of coffee, I don’t have any. 
 
2.1.1 The formal language 
Let’s start by describing the formal language, relevant to this chapter, and the corresponding 
set of well-formed formulae over that language. First let us start with the basic ingredients for 
our language, i.e. a set of propositional variables 𝑃𝑉 = {𝑝𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ ℕ} the elements of which shall 
be denoted with lowercase Roman letters (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, … ) or subscripted lowercase Roman 𝑝’s 
(𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑘 , … ), or lowercase Greek letters (𝜑, 𝜓, 𝜒, … ); unary connectives: ~ (negation), □ 
(necessity), ◊ (possibility); and binary connectives: ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), ⊃ 
(material conditional). ⥽ (strict conditional), > (counterfactual conditional). For the 
                                               
66 Priest (2008, p.82). Or rather, treating them as modal logics with such properties of the accessibility relation is 
one of the ways conditionals can be analyzed. Much of the presentation and discussion of conditional logics, 
ceteris paribus conditionals in particular in this chapter, follows Priest (2008, §5). 
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metalanguage, upper case letters (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, … ) shall be used as variables ranging over formulae 
and propositional variables. The recursive formation rules for the set of well-formed formulae 
(𝐹𝑜𝑟) of the formal language are given below. 
 
Definition 2.1: Let 𝐹𝑜𝑟 be the smallest set closed under the following well-formed formula 
formation rules: 
 
B:      All propositional variables are wffs, i.e. 𝑃𝑉 ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
R1: If 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 then {~𝐴, □𝐴,.◊𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
R2: If {𝐴, 𝐵} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 then {𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵, 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵, 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐵} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
 
2.1.2 Strict conditionals 
It’s easy to check that transitivity, antecedent strengthening, and contraposition inference 
forms are valid for the material conditional. They’re also valid for the strict conditional on the 
class of Kripke frames, as I’ll shortly demonstrate. The strict conditional ⥽, is defined in the 
following way 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 ∶= ▭(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵). The key thing to note here is the fact that the accessibility 
relation R remains invariant with respect to the antecedent on Kripke semantics for the strict 
conditional.  Kripke frames and models provide a point of reference to the sphere frames that 
Lewis uses in setting up his argument that the counterfactual is not any strict conditional – an 
argument to the layout of which section §2.2 is devoted. For Kripke semantics for normal 
modal logics – which I will be referring to often throughout the following few sections – see 
definitions 1.0 through 1.3, in §1.3.1, the weakest of which is the system K.67 
 
Extensions of the basic logic K are achieved by placing various constraints on the 
accessibility relation 𝑅, e.g. reflexivity, symmetry, or transitivity. Each such constraint 
defines a class of models (a subclass of all Kripke models) characterizing a different 
conception of necessity corresponding to some normal modal logic. The key thing to note 
here is that if an inference is valid on all Kripke models, then a fortiori it is valid on a subset 
of Kripke models. In particular, by demonstrating that inference forms such as transitivity, 
antecedent strengthening, and contraposition are K-valid for the strict conditional, then they 
are valid for all extensions of K. It should be noted that because on a Kripke model (𝑊, 𝑅, 𝑉) 
                                               
67 I shall not focus here on the constraints on R that may be put in place, and instead focus on the relevant 
distinction here, between a single accessibility relation on Kripke frames and entire families of accessibility 
relations (indexed by formulae) on frames for conditional logics. 
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the truth of the strict conditional 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 at a world 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 reduces to the truth of its material 
counterpart 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 at all worlds accessible from 𝑤, and since the above inferences are valid 
for the material conditional, the validity for the strict conditional follows. I’ll provide a proof 
of the validity of antecedent strengthening, by way of illustration. The remining inference 
forms can also be easily shown to be K-valid. 
 
Proposition 2.1: 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 ⊨𝐾 (𝐴 ∧ 𝐶) ⥽ 𝐵   
Proof : Suppose that 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 ⥽ 𝐵 on some Kripke model (𝑊, 𝑅, 𝑉) and 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊. So, 𝑤 ⊩
□(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵) by definition of ⥽. Hence, ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵, So, ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such 
that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, either 𝑢 ⊩ ~𝐴  or  𝑢 ⊩ 𝐵. If 𝑢 ⊩ ~𝐴, then not 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴, and therefore not 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶, 
for any 𝐶 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. Hence 𝑢 ⊩ ~(𝐴 ∧ 𝐶) for any 𝐶 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. So, 𝑢 ⊩ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐶) ⊃ 𝐵 for any 𝐶 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
Now, if 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐵, then 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐷 ⊃ 𝐵 for any 𝐷 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. In particular 𝑢 ⊩ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐶) ⊃ 𝐵. In conclusion, 
it follows that ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ⊩ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐶) ⊃ 𝐵, as required.        □ 
 
2.1.3 Ceteris paribus conditionals 
A way of getting around the validation of those inference forms is to fashion conditional 
semantics whereby the single accessibility relation 𝑅 is replaced with a whole family of 
accessibility relations {𝑅𝐴: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟}, indexed by formulae. The philosophical motivation here 
is that not all worlds count as relevant in the evaluation of the conditional at some world, but 
rather only those worlds that are ceteris paribus the same as the world of evaluation. The 
model-theoretic means of capturing this intuition has been to have 𝑅𝐴 access only those 
worlds where 𝐴 is true and which are ceteris paribus the same as the actual world. So, it’s 
clear that unlike on Kripke frames, for any world, conditionals with different antecedents 
need not be evaluated on the same accessible worlds. The truth conditions for the ceteris 
paribus conditional > are almost the same as for the strict conditional, save for the newly 
introduced variability of the accessibility relation: 𝐴 > 𝐵 is true at a world 𝑤 iff at all worlds 
in {𝑢: 𝑤𝑅𝐴𝑢} 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 is true. And since {𝑢: 𝑤𝑅𝐴𝑢} = {𝑢: 𝑤𝑅𝐵𝑢} need not be true in general, for 
any world 𝑤 and distinct antecedents 𝐴 and 𝐵, the problematic inference forms are 
invalidated.68 Before I continue discussing other key differences of this approach to Kripke 
semantics, I’ll present the formal definition of the frames and models underlying the 
semantics of thusly conceived ceteris paribus conditionals. 
 
                                               
68 See (Priest 2008, §5.2-5.3). 
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Definition 2.2: A C frame is a pair (𝑊, {𝑅𝐴: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟}) where 𝑊 is a nonempty set, and for 
each 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟, 𝑅𝐴 ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝑊.
69 Formally, 𝑊 is an arbitrary set of objects. On the intended 
interpretation, relevant to the semantics under consideration, its elements are as possible 
worlds. 𝑅𝐴 is still called the accessibility relation, just like on Kripke frames, with one 
obvious key addition regarding the interpretation of the formula index. Intuitively 𝑤𝑅𝐴𝑢 
means that 𝑢 is an 𝐴-world accessible from 𝑤, which is ceteris paribus, the same as 𝑤.  
 
Definition 2.2.1: For convenience, define 𝑓𝐴(𝑤) ∶= {𝑢: 𝑤𝑅𝐴𝑢}, i.e. the set of worlds accessible 
from 𝑤 under 𝑅𝐴.  
 
Definition 2.2.2: It will also be convenient to define [𝐴]ℳ ∶= {𝑤 ∈ 𝑊: ℳ, 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴} for any 
model ℳ with domain 𝑊, and any class of models discussed in this chapter. The superscript 
will be often omitted in cases when its absence will not lead to ambiguity. 
 
Definition 2.3: A C model is a triple (𝑊, {𝑅𝐴: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟}, 𝑉), where (𝑊, {𝑅𝐴: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟}) is a C 
frame, as defined earlier, and 𝑉: 𝑃𝑉 ⟶ ℘(𝑊), is the function that assigns to each 
propositional variable 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 a subset of 𝑊. Informally we think of 𝑉(𝑝) as the set of worlds 
in the model where is 𝑝 true. 
Truth in a model is defined in terms the satisfiability relation ⊩  ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟. We read 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 
as ‘𝐴 is true at 𝑤’. Given a C-model (𝑊, {𝑅𝐴: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟}, 𝑉) and any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, define ⊩ as 
follows: 
 
   (1) – (6) are as for Kripke models. 
   (7) 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵    iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝐴𝑢, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐵. 
 
Equivalently we can express the truth conditions for 𝐴 > 𝐵 more concisely in terms of 
previously defined sets of worlds: 
 
   (7’) 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵    iff    𝑓𝐴(𝑤) ⊆ [𝐵]. 
        That is, iff 𝐵 is true at all 𝑅𝐴-accessible worlds. 
 
 
                                               
69C stands for conditional. I’m basing the frame theory and model theory for conditional logics on Priest (2008, 
§5.3). What I call C frames are special cases of structures widely known among computer scientists as labelled 
transition systems (𝑊, {𝑅𝑎: 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴}), where 𝑊 ≠ ∅ is a set of states, and 𝐴 ≠ ∅  is a set of labels (Blackburn 
2001, p.3). 
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Definition 2.4: C validity  
Let ⊨ ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝐶 𝐴 iff for all Kripke models (𝑊, {𝑅𝐴: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟}, 𝑉), and 
all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, if 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴. That is, valid inference is defined as truth 
preservation at all worlds in all C models. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff it is true in 
all C models (notation: ∅ ⊨𝐶 𝐴).  
 
Priest (2008, §5.3) calls the logic characterized by the class of C models conditional logic C. 
Since no constrains are placed on the relations 𝑅𝐴, C is the analogue for conditional logics of 
the modal logic K. Below is a counterexample to antecedent strengthening in C. 
 
Proposition 2.2: 𝑝 > 𝑞 ⊭𝐶 (𝑝 ∧ 𝑟) > 𝑞 
Proof : Consider the following countermodel: 𝑊 = {𝑤, 𝑢}, 𝑅𝑝 = ∅, 𝑅𝑝∧𝑟 = {(𝑤, 𝑢)}; for all 
other 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟, 𝑅𝐴 can be anything; and 𝑉 is such that 𝑢 ∉ [𝑞]. Now 𝑤 ⊩ 𝑝 > 𝑞, since ∅ =
𝑓𝑝(𝑤) ⊆ [𝐴] for any 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟, but 𝑤 ⊮ (𝑝 ∧ 𝑟) > 𝑞, since {𝑢} = 𝑓𝑝∧𝑟(𝑤) ⊈ [𝑝].
70      □ 
 
However, C is a rather weak logic, as it doesn’t even validate Modus Ponens for >. There’s 
an important extension of C, which is strong enough to validate Modus Ponens for >, while 
being sufficiently weak to invalidate the aforementioned questionable inference forms.71 An 
important extension of C is the logic C+, which results from placing additional constraints on 
𝑅𝐴. 
 
Definition 2.5: A C+ model is a C model where for each 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 the accessibility relation 𝑅𝐴 
satisfies the following additional constraints: 
    (1) 𝑓𝐴(𝑤) ⊆ [𝐴] 
All worlds that are 𝑅𝐴-accessible from 𝑤, are 𝐴-worlds. 
 
    (2) If 𝑤 ∈ [𝐴] then 𝑤 ∈ 𝑓𝐴(𝑤)  
If 𝐴 holds at a world then that world is self 𝑅𝐴-accessible.  
 
One may impose additional conditions on 𝑅𝐴 thereby generating other extensions of C. This 
is what we turn to now – discussing the general approach suggested by Stalnaker and Lewis 
                                               
70 I have borrowed this counter-model from Priest (2008, pp.86-87). 
71 Giving the corresponding proofs is beyond the relevant scope of this chapter. For a comprehensive discussion 
of C and C+ and their respective proof theories, see Priest (2008, §5.4-5.5). 
48 
 
 
in their seminal work on conditional logics. The next section gives a detailed account of 
Lewis’ similarity spheres semantics, which begins with an outline of Lewis’ reasoning and 
motivations that led him to the formulation of that approach to analyzing the counterfactual. 
Most of that is captured in my critical paraphrase of Lewis’ argument why the counterfactual 
can’t be any strict conditional. The manner in which Lewis chooses to express that argument 
serves also as an excellent introduction to some of the formal foundations of his systems of 
similarity spheres semantics.72 
 
2.2   Lewis’ general proposal for counterfactuals 
2.2.1 Why the counterfactual is not a strict conditional 
Lewis (1973) suggests a possible-world semantics for the counterfactual conditionals based 
on the idea of variably strict necessity, conceived as variable overall similarity of worlds. 
That account, being a milestone in the work on counterfactuals, and owing to its remarkably 
intuitive appeal has been a popular starting point to recent directions of research containing 
proposals for non-vacuous treatments of counterpossibles, unlike on Lewis’ own account 
(more on that later). I will presently cover Lewis’ motivations for claiming that the 
counterfactual is more like a variably strict conditional, since – as he argues – it can’t be any 
single strict conditional.  
 
Lewis argues that since in general the necessity operator acts like a restricted universal 
quantifier over possible worlds, necessity of a certain kind is just truth at worlds that satisfy 
some restriction. Such worlds are called accessible, in the sense of satisfying the conditions 
of the necessity under consideration.73 For example, physical necessity is truth at worlds 
satisfying the accessibility restriction of having the actual physical laws hold at them.  
For the purposes of his argument that the counterfactual is not any single strict conditional 
Lewis defines an alternative, yet clearly equivalent (which I’ll prove) class of frames to 
Kripke’s – a move that aims to shift emphasis from talking about various accessibility 
relations to talking about various spheres of accessibility (essentially, such spheres are just 
images of worlds under the accessibility relation) when modelling necessity. That picture 
aims to make salient the role of necessity operators as restricted universal quantifiers over 
possible worlds, thereby facilitating talk of variable necessity, which is the key idea 
                                               
72 For some interesting, current work on ceteris paribus conditionals see Girard & Triplett (2018). 
73 The reminder of this section is my paraphrase of Lewis’ discussion given in (Lewis 1973, pp.5-9).  
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underlying the notion of strict conditionals of varying strictness, and a foundational step to 
developing the notion of a variably strict conditional, as a model for the counterfactual. The 
next few definitions are devoted to that class of models. Aside from aiding his argument in 
the manner described above, these models are also the first conceptual step toward 
formulating Lewis’ sphere semantics for counterfactuals, which I precisely define and discuss 
in the next section.74 What follows is a detailed paraphrase of Lewis’ argument. 
 
Definition 2.6: A sphere frame is a pair (𝑊, 𝑆), where 𝑊 is as for Kripke frames, and 𝑆: 𝑊 ⟶
℘(𝑊).75 For each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, the set 𝑆𝑤 is called the sphere of accessibility around 𝑤, regarded as 
the set of worlds accessible from 𝑤. So, ‘𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤’ is read as ‘𝑢 is accessible from 𝑤’. 
 
It should be noted that Sphere frames are essentially equivalent to Kripke frames. Roughly, 
whereas on Kripke frames 𝑅 is an arbitrary binary relation on 𝑊, on sphere frames, each 𝑆𝑤 
corresponds to the image of 𝑤 under 𝑅, and 𝑆 is just the set {(𝑤, 𝑆𝑤): 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊}. A precise 
argument for this correspondence is given below, i.e. Lemma 2.3. 
 
Definition 2.7: A sphere model is the triple (𝑊, 𝑆, 𝑉), where (𝑊, 𝑆) is a sphere frame, and 𝑉 is 
as for Kripke models.  
Truth in a model is defined in terms the satisfiability relation ⊩  ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟. We read 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 
as ‘𝐴 is true at 𝑤’. Given a sphere model (𝑊, 𝑆, 𝑉) and any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, define ⊩ as follows: 
   (1) – (5) are as for Kripke models in Definition 1.2. 
   (6) 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴    iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤: 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. 
 
Lemma 2.3: The exists a one-to-one correspondence ℎ: 𝐊 ⟶ 𝐒 between the classes of Kripke 
frames 𝐊 and sphere frames 𝐒, such that 𝔉 is isomorphic to ℎ(𝔉) ∈ 𝐒 for each frame 𝔉 ∈ 𝐊. 
 
Proof : First to prove (1). I’ll proceed by showing that there exist injections: 𝑓: 𝐊 ⟶ 𝐒 and 
𝑔: 𝐒 ⟶ 𝐊, between K as and S, such that if 𝑓(𝔉𝐊) =  𝔉𝐒, then 𝑔(𝔉𝐒) = 𝔉𝐊, and if 𝑔(𝔉𝐒) = 𝔉𝐊, 
then 𝑓(𝔉𝐊) = 𝔉𝐒, for any 𝔉𝐊 and 𝔉𝐒. That is, 𝑔(𝑓(𝔉𝐊)) = 𝑓(𝑔(𝔉𝐒)), for any 𝔉𝐊 and 𝔉𝐒. This 
will justify the existence of the bijection ℎ: 𝐊 ⟶ 𝐒 defined as ℎ = 𝑓 and ℎ−1 = 𝑔.  
                                               
74 The entire discussion and setting up of the argument which I’m formally rephrasing here, plus the argument it 
leads up to, is to be found in (Lewis 1973, pp.5-9). 
75 These are not to be confused with sphere systems, discussed in the next section. Lewis (1973, p.7) states that 
the sphere formulation is obviously equivalent to the general (Kripke) semantics, but I demonstrate the required 
correspondence.  
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To compete the proof, it will also be shown that ℎ satisfies the isomorphic property, that is, 
ℎ(𝑅|𝑤) = 𝑆ℎ(𝑤), by showing that 𝑓(𝑅|𝑤) = 𝑆𝑓(𝑤) and 𝑔(𝑆𝑤) = 𝑅|𝑔(𝑤), for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊. 
 
Definition: for a relation 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑊2, let the image of 𝑤 under 𝑅 be the set 𝑅|𝑤 ≔ {𝑢: 𝑤𝑅𝑢}. 
 
Definition: Let the map 𝑓: 𝐊 ⟶ 𝐒 be defined as follows: 
(i) 𝑓(𝑊) = 𝑊. 
(ii) 𝑓(𝑅|𝑤) = 𝑆𝑤 = {𝑢: 𝑤𝑅𝑢}, and 𝑓(𝑅) = {(𝑤, 𝑆𝑤): 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊}. 
 
Definition: Let the map 𝑔: 𝐒 ⟶ 𝐊 be defined as follows: 
(i) 𝑔(𝑊) = 𝑊. 
(ii) 𝑔(𝑆𝑤) = 𝑅|𝑤 = {(𝑤, 𝑢): 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤}, and 𝑔(𝑆) = ⋃{𝑅|𝑤: 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊}. 
 
Definition: Let the map ℎ: 𝐊 ⟶ 𝐒, be as follows: ℎ = 𝑓 and ℎ−1 = 𝑔. 
 
Now to show that if 𝑓(𝑅) = 𝑆, then 𝑔(𝑆) = 𝑅, and if 𝑔(𝑆) = 𝑅, then 𝑓(𝑅) = 𝑆, for any 𝑅 and 𝑆, 
that is 𝑓 ∘ 𝑔 = 𝑔 ∘ 𝑓 = 𝑖𝑑, for any 𝑅 and 𝑆, which will justify the definition of the bijection ℎ 
as ℎ = 𝑓 and ℎ−1 = 𝑔. The functions are clearly injective. 
 
Start with some Kripke frame (𝑊, 𝑅) with 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝑊, and let 𝑓(𝑅) = {(𝑤, 𝑆𝑤): 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊}, such 
that for each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, 𝑓(𝑅|𝑤) = 𝑆𝑤 = {𝑢: 𝑤𝑅𝑢}. Now we consider the sphere frame 
(𝑓(𝑊), 𝑓(𝑅)) obtained this way, where 𝑆 = 𝑓(𝑅): 𝑓(𝑊) ⟶ ℘(𝑓(𝑊)), and show that 
𝑔(𝑓(𝑅)) = 𝑅. We start by establishing that 𝑔(𝑓(𝑅|𝑤)) = 𝑔(𝑆𝑤) = 𝑅|𝑤 for each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊. Clearly 
𝑅 = ⋃{𝑅|𝑤: 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊}, but since 𝑆 = 𝑓(𝑅), it follows from the definition of 𝑔 that 𝑔(𝑓(𝑅)) =
𝑔(𝑆) = ⋃{𝑅|𝑤: 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊} = 𝑅.                □ 
 
Now, we start with some sphere frame (𝑊, 𝑆) with 𝑆: 𝑊 ⟶ ℘(𝑊), and let 𝑔(𝑆) =
⋃{𝑅|𝑤: 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊}, such that 𝑔(𝑆𝑤) = 𝑅|𝑤 = {(𝑤, 𝑢): 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤} for each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊. Now we consider 
the Kripke frame (𝑔(𝑊), 𝑔(𝑆)) obtained this way, where 𝑅 = 𝑔(𝑆) ⊆ 𝑔(𝑊) × 𝑔(𝑊), and show 
that 𝑓(𝑔(𝑆)) = 𝑆. We start with noting that 𝑓(𝑔(𝑆𝑤)) = 𝑓(𝑅|𝑤) = 𝑆𝑤 for each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊. Clearly 
𝑆 = {(𝑤, 𝑆𝑤): 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊}, but since 𝑅 = 𝑔(𝑆), it follows that 𝑓(𝑔(𝑆)) = 𝑓(𝑅) = {(𝑤, 𝑆𝑤): 𝑤 ∈
𝑊} = 𝑆, by definition of 𝑓.                 □ 
 
Theorem 2.3.1: To any Kripke model ℳ there corresponds a unique sphere model ℳ′ such 
that for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 and 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟:  ℳ, 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴  iff  ℳ′, 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴. Extend ℎ in the following way: 
(iii) 𝑓(𝑉) = 𝑔(𝑉) = 𝑉 
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Now ℎ has been extended to a bijection between Kripke models and sphere models. The 
corresponding models have the same domain and same value assignments to propositional 
variables. Only 𝑅 and 𝑆 differ. Note that the only difference between Kripke models and 
sphere models are the truth conditions for □: 
 
For Kripke models: 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴  iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. 
For sphere models: 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴    iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤: 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. 
 
Now assume ℳ, 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴 for some Kripke model ℳ = (𝑊, 𝑅, 𝑉). Then by definition ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, 
such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. Now, consider ℳ′ = 𝑓(ℳ). Now, it will be shown that 𝑓(ℳ), 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴, 
on the assumption that ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. By definition, 𝑓(𝑅|𝑤) = {𝑢: 𝑤𝑅𝑢}, 
which consists of all worlds 𝑢 ∈ 𝑊, such that 𝑤𝑅𝑢. But if for all those worlds 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴, by 
hypothesis, then 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝑓(𝑅|𝑤). Hence 𝑓(ℳ), 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴, as required.      □ 
 
Now assume ℳ′, 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴 on the sphere model ℳ′ = 𝑓(ℳ) = (𝑓(𝑊), 𝑓(𝑅), 𝑓(𝑉)). We need to 
show that 𝑔(𝑓(ℳ)), 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴. Note that, since 𝑓(ℳ) = ℳ′, then 𝑔(𝑓(ℳ)) = 𝑔(ℳ′). So, now 
we start by assuming ℳ′, 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴 and need to show that 𝑔(ℳ′), 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴. Assuming ℳ′, 𝑤 ⊩
□𝐴, if follows that 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤. Now, 𝑔(𝑆𝑤) = 𝑅|𝑤 = {(𝑤, 𝑢): 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤}, so given the 
hypothesis, it follows that for all (𝑤, 𝑢) ∈ 𝑅, if (𝑤, 𝑢) ∈ 𝑔(𝑆𝑤) then 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. That is, if 𝑤𝑅𝑢 then 
𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. Therefore, 𝑔(ℳ′), 𝑤 ⊩ □𝐴, as required. This completes the proof.       □ 
 
2.2.1.1   Various kinds of necessity 
Lewis’ argument hinges on the demonstration that the counterfactual can’t be any single strict 
conditional. But in order to define strict conditionals of varying strictness, necessity operators 
corresponding to varying restrictions of the universal quantifier over possible worlds need to 
be defined. Variable necessity operators can be modelled in terms of correspondingly varying 
spheres of accessibility as the intended restrictions of the universal quantifier over worlds. 
There are infinitely many kinds of restrictions that one may impose on the range of 
accessibility for any world 𝑤, and to each such restriction there corresponds a necessity 
operator. I’ll gradually make the notion of such restrictions (and variable necessity operators) 
more precise. Let’s start with an intuitive description.  
 
Example 
Here are a few examples of such restrictions, relevant to the current discussion: 
  -   Logical necessity: 𝑆𝑤 is restricted to logically possible worlds. 
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  - Physical necessity: 𝑆𝑤 is restricted to worlds where the laws of nature prevailing at 𝑤 hold.  
  -  Necessity in respect of facts of so-and-so-kind: for example, 𝑆𝑤 is restricted to worlds 
where kangaroos have no tails. 
 
To each restriction there corresponds a necessity operator: □𝐿 corresponding to logical 
necessity, □𝑃 corresponding to physical necessity, □𝐾 corresponding to necessity in respect of 
facts of so-and-so-kind (e.g. kangaroos not having tails).  
 
Definition 2.8: Denote the index set of all restrictions on the range of accessibility with ℐ.  
Intuitively, each 𝑖 ∈ ℐ corresponds to some kind of necessity, e.g. logical, physical, etc. 
 
This gives rise to a class of operators {□𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ ℐ}. Intuitively, each □𝑖 is a necessity operator 
corresponding to some kind of necessity 𝑖 ∈ ℐ. Each such operator corresponds to a restriction 
of the universal quantifier over possible worlds to i-possible worlds. The next few definitions 
make this intuitive description more precise.  
To accommodate the new class of connectives, we need to expand the formal language 
described in §2.1.1 by the addition of the set of operators {□𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ ℐ}, and the class of 
abbreviations for the corresponding strict conditionals {>𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ ℐ}, thereby extending the set 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 of well-formed formulae in the following way:  
 
R3: If 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 and 𝑖 ∈ ℐ, then □𝑖𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
R4: If {𝐴, 𝐵} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 and 𝑖 ∈ ℐ, then 𝐴 >𝑖 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
 
In order to accommodate the expansion of our language, the original sphere frames need to be 
modified accordingly, by admitting sphere functions that correspond to each kind of variable 
necessity operator. 
 
Definition 2.9: A variable sphere frame is a pair (𝑊, {𝑆𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ ℐ}) where 𝑊 is a nonempty set 
of objects, and ℐ is a nonempty set of indices, and 𝑆𝑖: 𝑊 ⟶ ℘(𝑊) for each 𝑖 ∈ ℐ. We can 
denote {𝑆𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ ℐ} with 𝒮, for brevity when its content is unambiguous.76 
 
On the intended interpretation, the elements of 𝑊 are possible worlds, ℐ is as given in 
Definition 2.8, and for each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, the set 𝑆𝑤
𝑖  is called the i-sphere of accessibility around 𝑤, 
                                               
76 Thus variable sphere frames are sets paired with families of their subsets. 
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which is  regarded as the set of worlds accessible from 𝑤 corresponding to the restriction of 
the universal quantifier to i-possible worlds, relative to 𝑤.  
 
Definition 2.10: A variable sphere model is a triple (𝑊, 𝒮, 𝑉), where (𝑊, 𝒮) is a variable 
sphere frame, and 𝑉 is as for Kripke models.  
Truth in a model is defined in terms the satisfiability relation ⊩  ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟. We read 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 
as ‘𝐴 is true at 𝑤’. Given a variable sphere model (𝑊, 𝒮, 𝑉) and any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, define ⊩ as:  
 
   (1) – (5) are as for Kripke models in Definition 1.2, (the non-modal part of the language) 
   (6) 𝑤 ⊩ □𝑖𝐴    iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤
𝑖 : 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. 
 
2.2.1.2   Strict conditionals of varying strictness 
Now we’re ready to define a whole class of strict conditionals of varying strictness. Given a 
variable sphere model (𝑊, 𝒮, 𝑉) and any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, define ⊩ as follows: 
   (7) 𝑤 ⊩ □𝑖(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵)    iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤
𝑖 : 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵. 
 
Notation: Denote □𝑖(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵) with 𝐴 >𝑖 𝐵 for each 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 and 𝑖 ∈ ℐ. 
 
Definition 2.11: Hierarchy of strictness. For all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ℐ and all 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟:  
The conditional 𝐴 >𝑖 𝐵 is stricter at world 𝑤 than 𝐴 >𝑗 𝐵 iff  𝑆𝑤
𝑗 ⊊ 𝑆𝑤
𝑖 . The conditional 
𝐴 >𝑖 𝐵 is stricter than 𝐴 >𝑗 𝐵 iff for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, 𝐴 >𝑖 𝐵 is stricter at world 𝑤 than 𝐴 >𝑗 𝐵.  
 
2.2.1.3   The intended model 
The discussion throughout next section, mainly in the formulation of Lewis’ argument that no 
strict conditional is adequate to model the counterfactual will be done with reference to the 
intended variable sphere model ℳ0 = (𝑊
ℳ0 , 𝒮ℳ0 , 𝑉ℳ0), where 𝑊ℳ0 is the set of all possible 
worlds. Among its accessibility assignments, on top of those corresponding to logical 
necessity 𝑆𝐿, 𝒮ℳ0 also contains those corresponding to other kinds of necessity, like physical 
necessity 𝑆𝑃, and a whole plethora of necessities in respect of facts of so-and-so-kind, e.g. 
kangaroos not having tails 𝑆𝐾. On the intended model, 𝑆𝑤
𝐿 = 𝑊ℳ0 for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊ℳ0, whereas 
𝑆𝑤
𝑃  is the set of possible worlds where the laws of nature (physical laws) prevailing at 𝑤 hold. 
Finally, 𝑆𝑤
𝐾 is the set of possible worlds where the sentence 𝐾: ‘kangaroos have no tails’ is 
true i.e. 𝑆𝑤
𝐾 = [𝐾]ℳ0. As far as necessity in respect of facts of so-and-so-kind, this generalizes 
to 𝑆𝑤
𝐴 = [𝐴]ℳ0 for any facts expressed by 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
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Truth conditions for various strict conditionals on the intended model are as on any variable 
sphere models. Now those various kinds of necessity that only received an intuitive 
description in the example at the beginning of §2.2.1.1, can now be defined precisely: 
 
   (1) – (5) are as for Kripke models in Definition 1.2, (the non-modal part of the language) 
   (6) ℳ0, 𝑤 ⊩ □
𝑖𝐴    iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤
𝑖 :  ℳ0, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. 
   (7) ℳ0, 𝑤 ⊩ □
𝑖(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵)    iff    ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤
𝑖 :  ℳ0, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵. 
 
Some special kinds of various necessity operators: 
 
    ℳ0, 𝑤 ⊩ □
𝐿𝐴   iff   ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤
𝐿 :  ℳ0, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴.  
    ℳ0, 𝑤 ⊩ □
𝑃𝐴   iff   ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤
𝑃:  ℳ0, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴. 
    ℳ0, 𝑤 ⊩ □
𝐾𝐴   iff   ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤
𝐾:  ℳ0, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴.  
 
To tie the above with the notion of varying strictness, note that, 𝐴 >𝑃 𝐵 is stricter at the 
actual world than 𝐴 >𝐾 𝐵 on the intended model, and 𝐴 >𝐿 𝐵 is stricter than 𝐴 >𝐾 𝐵 on the 
intended model. 
 
2.2.1.4   Strict conditionals and comparative similarity of worlds  
The counterfactual proposed by Lewis, is closely related to ceteris paribus conditionality, and 
as such is not fundamentally different from the logics C and C+ discussed earlier. The 
difference lies in how the ceteris paribus clause is explained. It is evident from the passage 
below, that the kind of strict conditional Lewis has in mind is effectively based on 
accessibility that satisfies certain ceteris paribus constrains, which he then suggests are best 
expressed in terms of comparative similarity of worlds.  
 
Counterfactuals are related to a kind of strict conditional based on comparative 
similarity of possible worlds. A counterfactual 𝜑 > 𝜓 is true at a world w if and 
only if 𝜓 holds at certain 𝜑-worlds; but certainly not all 𝜑-worlds matter. ‘If 
kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over’ is true (or false, as the case may 
be) at our world, quite without regard to those possible worlds where kangaroos 
walk around on crutches, and stay upright that way. Those worlds are too far 
away from ours. What is meant by the counterfactual is that, things being pretty 
much as they are –the scarcity of crutches for kangaroos being pretty much as it 
actually is, and so on – if kangaroos had no tails they would topple over. Lewis 
(1973, pp.8-9) 
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Lewis also observes that in our consideration regarding what kind of restricted necessity 
should underlie the strict conditional that best captures counterfactual reasoning, aside from 
ruling out worlds that are grossly dissimilar from the actual world (e.g. where tailless 
kangaroos use crutches to stay upright), we also must avoid deeming as accessible worlds 
that are too similar (or at least be careful when doing so). For if we include into the 
accessibility sphere worlds where kangaroos have no tails, but otherwise everything else is 
exactly the same as the actual world, then kangaroos despite being tailless would 
nevertheless leave tail tracks in the sand, and their genetic make-up, being as it actually is, 
would nevertheless somehow still code for different phenotypical traits (absence of tail). 
Lewis concludes that counterfactuals are apparently based on a strict conditional 
corresponding to an accessibility assignment determined by an overall similarity of worlds, 
where respects of difference and respects of similarity are “somehow” balanced off against 
each other.  
 
In the light of this, let’s consider again our earlier example of tailless-kangaroos necessity. It 
is clear from the above concerns regarding the intended notion of comparative similarity of 
worlds that the strict conditional □𝐾(𝐾 ⊃ 𝑇) would fall short of being the adequate model for 
the evaluation of the counterfactual ‘If Kangaroos had no tails, they would Topple over’. 
This inadequacy stems from the fact that the restriction corresponding to □𝐾, namely [𝐾]ℳ0, 
includes all possible 𝐾-worlds, and as such it may include worlds that have just been argued 
to be “too far” to be regarded as relevant to the evaluation of the counterfactual in question.  
 
What we require, is a restriction that meets the similarity criteria that Lewis has in mind. That 
is, we are interested in 𝑠 ∈ ℐ corresponding to an accessibility restriction 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ∈ 𝒮ℳ0 
determined by an overall similarity of worlds such that 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ∩ [𝐾]ℳ0 doesn’t contain worlds 
where kangaroos manage to stay upright with the aid of crutches, or worlds where kangaroos 
leave a tail track behind in the sand as they actually do (despite their taillessness). That is, all 
𝐾-worlds in 𝑆𝑤
𝑠  are sufficiently similar to 𝑤 to count as relevant in the evaluation of the 
counterfactual with antecedent 𝐾 at 𝑤. Then the strict conditional □𝑠(𝐾 ⊃ 𝑇) would meet the 
accessibility assignment requirement as determined by an overall similarity of worlds in the 
manner intended by Lewis. It’s apparent that Lewis intends there to be a fitting restriction 𝑠 ∈
ℐ of this kind in general, for any antecedent 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 of any strict conditional based on 
comparative similarity of worlds. 
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This would yield the following account of the counterfactual when considered as a single 
strict conditional based on the comparative similarity of worlds, i.e. the intended model truth 
conditions for the counterfactual in terms of a single strict conditional based on the 
comparative similarity of worlds are as follows: 
 
Definition 2.12: The counterfactual ‘If 𝐴, then 𝐵’ is true at a world 𝑤 iff  ℳ0, 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 >
𝑠 𝐵. 
 
Recalling that ℳ0, 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 >
𝑠 𝐵  iff  ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 :  ℳ0, 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 for all 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟, 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, and 
where all worlds in 𝑆𝑤
𝑠  are regarded as sufficiently similar to 𝑤 to count as relevant in the 
evaluation of the counterfactual with antecedent 𝐴 at 𝑤.  
 
To be precise, the intended accessibility restriction 𝑆𝑤
𝑠  corresponding to 𝑠 ∈ ℐ isn’t constant, 
but rather a function of the antecedent. Lewis’ argument that the counterfactual cannot be any 
strict conditional amounts to showing that this can’t be done on the intended model, where 
we are only equipped with a class of strict conditionals of fixed strictness. The accessibility 
restriction index denoted with 𝑠, used throughout the discussion in the next section is just to 
remind us that we’re not talking about arbitrary elements of ℐ, but ones that correspond to 
accessibility restrictions determined by an overall similarity of worlds. I devote the next 
section to Lewis’ argument, and given that it is expressed with direct reference to the 
intended model ℳ0, I shall omit any model-denoting superscripts. 
 
2.2.1.5   The argument 
Lewis gives the following argument in support of the claim that no single strict conditional 
𝐴 >𝑠 𝐵, fashioned in the manner just discussed, is adequate to model the counterfactual: 
counterfactuals, modelled this way – by any single strict conditional – fare well when 
considered in isolation from other counterfactuals, but problems arise if several 
counterfactuals are considered together.77 Naturally, this is unacceptable if an adequate 
analysis is to be given for a language that contains conjunctions. The argument makes use of 
the fact that the antecedent-strengthening rule, which is valid for strict conditionals – see 
Proposition 2.1 – and a fortiori for strict conditionals corresponding to an accessibility 
assignment determined by an overall similarity of worlds. Suppose we’re using a 
counterfactual modelled by any single strict conditional ‘>𝑠’ of some fixed strictness (as 
                                               
77 Paraphrasing Lewis (1973, pp.910). 
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defined above, in Definition 2.12). Lewis invites us to consider the following list of 
counterfactuals, with their respective translations into the object language given below:78  
 
If I walked on the lawn, no harm would come of it. 
  𝑝1 >
𝑠 𝑞 
 
If I walked on the lawn and everyone did that, the lawn would be ruined.  
 (𝑝1 ∧  𝑝2) >
𝑠 ~𝑞   
 
If I walked on the lawn and everyone did that, but everyone was careful,  
no harm would come of it.  
(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2 ∧ 𝑝3) >
𝑠 𝑞   
 
If … 
 
This sequence of counterfactuals listed below on the left, is accompanied by a corresponding 
list of their respective negated opposites on the right, to aid the argument.79  For the kind of 
cases that are being considered, both the counterfactual and its negated opposite are held true.  
 
 (1) 𝑝1 >
𝑠 𝑞    and    ~(𝑝1 >
𝑠 ~𝑝) 
 (2) (𝑝1 ∧  𝑝2) >
𝑠 ~𝜓    and   ~((𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) >
𝑠 𝑞) 
 (3) (𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2 ∧ 𝑝3) >
𝑠 𝜓    and   ~((𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2 ∧ 𝑝3) >
𝑠 ~𝑞) 
   :  : 
 
We can imagine prolonging such sequences to arbitrary length. All the above counterfactuals 
are intuitively true. However, it’s evident that they can’t all be true on any single strict 
conditional of fixed strictness. That is, it should be observed that each counterfactual (on the 
left) at each stage n, contradicts the opposite of the counterfactual at stage n+1. That is, the 
expression in the left column at stage n contradicts the expression in the right column at stage 
n+1.  
Consider, the first two stages. No matter what degree of similarity of worlds is captured by 
𝑆𝑤
𝑠 , if 𝑤 ⊩ 𝑝1 >
𝑠 𝑞, then 𝑞 is true in all 𝑝1-worlds in 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 . That is,  𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ∩ [𝑝1] ⊆ [𝑞], so in 
particular 𝑞 is true in all (𝑝1 ∧  𝑝2)-worlds in 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 , i.e.  𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ∩ [𝑝1 ∧  𝑝2] ⊆ [𝑞], since 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ∩ [𝑝1] ∩
[𝑝2] ⊆ 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ∩ [𝑝1] and 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ∩ [𝑝1 ∧  𝑝2] = 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ∩ [𝑝1] ∩ [𝑝2]. So, if the counterfactual is any strict 
                                               
78 Lewis (1973, p.10). The negated opposites (listed on the right of each counterfactual) are included since the 
cases Lewis has in mind are such that they’re also hold. 
79 Lewis refers to 𝐴 > ~𝐵 as the opposite of 𝐴 > 𝐵, and vice versa, 𝐴 > 𝐵 as the opposite of 𝐴 > ~𝐵. 
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conditional >𝑠, then 𝑝1 >
𝑠 𝑞 implies (𝑝1 ∧  𝑝2) >
𝑠 𝑞 and contradicts ~((𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) >
𝑠 𝑞). This 
argument holds for any 𝑠 ∈ ℐ, as a corollary of Proposition 2.1. 
 
Therefore – Lewis concludes – the counterfactual is not any strict conditional, and he uses 
this argument as motivation to suggest a variably strict conditional as the better alternative 
for the account of the counterfactual. In the next section I give a detailed account of that 
proposal. 
 
2.2.2 Counterfactuals as variably strict conditionals 
In the last section we gave an overview of Lewis’ reasons for claiming that strict conditionals 
best corresponding to counterfactuals are those whose accessibility assignment (conceived of 
as a sphere of accessibility) is determined by an overall similarity of worlds, and we also saw 
Lewis’ argument that no single strict conditional suffices to give an adequate account of the 
counterfactual. This means that a fortiori no single strict conditional whose accessibility 
assignment is determined by an overall similarity of worlds suffices to give an adequate 
account of the counterfactual. In this section I present Lewis’ solution to this in the form of a 
variably strict conditional account of the counterfactual, and then I’ll move onto giving a 
comprehensive overview (and discussion) of various conceptions of comparative similarity in 
terms of the model theory offered by Lewis for that account. 
 
The systems of similarity spheres model theory developed by Lewis (1973) is a proposal to 
analyze he counterfactual as a variably strict conditional, rather than any single strict 
conditional of fixed strictness. On that novel proposal, instead of a single sphere of 
accessibility, being a subset of 𝑊, for each world and 𝑖 ∈ ℐ  – as in the case of sphere frames 
(𝑊, 𝑆) or variable sphere frames (𝑊, 𝒮) – each world is assigned a set of accessibility spheres 
$𝑤 ⊆ ℘(𝑊) that satisfy certain restrictions. Each $𝑤 is a variable accessibility assignment. On 
this picture, the criteria deeming worlds as relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual at 
some world w is expressed in terms of comparative overall similarity of worlds, whereby any 
given sphere of accessibility 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤, determined by such considerations, is thought to contain 
worlds that are similar to w to some fixed degree. This way, in conjunction with other spheres 
of accessibility 𝑆′ ∈ $𝑤 a basis for comparative similarity of worlds to w is established. The 
intuition here is that worlds in some sphere 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤, around some world w, are more similar to 
w than those worlds that are outside 𝑆. Below is an excerpt from Lewis that captures the heart 
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of the idea of systems of similarity spheres as representations of comparative similarity of 
worlds:  
 
The system of spheres used in interpreting counterfactuals is meant to carry 
information about the comparative overall similarity of worlds. Any particular 
sphere around a world w is to contain just the worlds that resemble w to at least a 
certain degree. This degree is different for different spheres around w. The 
smaller the sphere the more similar to w must a world be to fall within it. 
[W]henever one world lies within some sphere around w and another world lies 
outside that sphere, the first world is more closely similar to w than the second. 
(Lewis 1973, p.14) 
 
Before giving the formal definition, we can illustrate the core idea of such systems of spheres 
with the aid of the notion of a hierarchy of strictness, introduced earlier in Definition 2.11. 
This illustration will employ elements of Lewis’ explanation of the ceteris paribus clause in 
terms of comparative similarity of worlds, and key observations he made in the argument, 
which has been discussed at the end of the previous section. Consider the two counterfactuals 
(1) and (2) given below, which I’ll presently use to set up a scenario highlighting the link 
between Lewis’ view that counterfactuals are strict conditionals corresponding to an 
accessibility assignment determined by an overall similarity of worlds, and the limitations of 
strict conditionals to meet this task (as discussed at the end of the previous section). In this 
example I’ll only rely on the first two stages employed in Lewis’ argument, i.e. with the 
stipulation that all (i), (ii), and (iii) are true (which agrees with intuition). 
 
(1) If I walked on the lawn, no harm would come of it. 
 (i)  𝑝1 >
𝑠 𝑞 
 
(2) If I walked on the lawn and everyone did that, the lawn would be ruined.  
 (ii) (𝑝1 ∧  𝑝2) >
𝑠 ~𝑞           and            (iii)     ~((𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) >
𝑠 𝑞) 
 
If the above counterfactuals were analysed as any strict conditional, then the stipulated 
scenario would be impossible, since if 𝑝1 >
𝑠 𝑞 is true, then so is (𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) >
𝑠 𝑞, by 
Proposition 2.1, which contradicts ~((𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) >
𝑠 𝑞). In other words, there is no variable 
sphere model (𝑊, 𝒮, 𝑉) such that all (i)-(iii) are true at some world 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊. However, we 
could assume (1) as true, based on the strict conditional >𝑠 that corresponds to an 
accessibility assignment 𝑆𝑤
𝑠  determined by an overall similarity such that worlds where 
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‘everyone else walks on the lawn’, denoted [𝑝2], would be disregarded as irrelevant to its 
evaluation at world 𝑤. That is, the choice of 𝑠 ∈ ℐ would be such that 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ∩ [𝑝2] = ∅ for the 
same reasons as worlds where kangaroos walk upright with the aid of crutches would be 
disregarded as irrelevant to analyzing the counterfactual ‘If kangaroos had no tails, they 
would topple over’.  
 
As for (2), we could analyse it by a stricter conditional than >𝑠 (recall Definition 2.11), 
denoted >𝑠′, that corresponds to an accessibility assignment 𝑆𝑤
𝑠′ determined by overall 
similarity of worlds such that 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑤
𝑠′ and 𝑆𝑤
𝑠′ ∩ [𝑝2] ≠ ∅, and all the 𝑝2-worlds in 𝑆𝑤
𝑠′ are ~𝑞-
worlds. On a system of spheres, we would analyse the counterfactuals (1) and (2) in the above 
scenario by a variably strict conditional >, fashioned in a manner so that the evaluation of the 
counterfactual (1) is done in terms of  >𝑠 at some world 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, and the evaluation of the 
counterfactual (2) at 𝑤 is done in terms of  >𝑠′. In other words, a system of spheres model 
(𝑊, $, 𝑉) for the variably strict conditional can be fashioned such that the variable 
accessibility assignment $𝑤 = {𝑆𝑤
𝑠 , 𝑆𝑤
𝑠′} satisfies the intended comparative similarity 
relationship 𝑆𝑤
𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑤
𝑠′, thereby allowing all 𝑝1 > 𝑞, (𝑝1 ∧  𝑝2) > ~𝑞 and ~((𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) > 𝑞) to be 
true at 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊. The intuition that worlds in 𝑆𝑤
𝑠  are more similar to 𝑤 than those in 𝑆𝑤
𝑠′\𝑆𝑤
𝑠  
appears to be preserved, because on the supposition that actually nobody walks on the lawn, 
it seems strongly intuitive that worlds where only I walk on the lawn are more similar to the 
actual world than those worlds where the lawn is stampeded by everyone in the neighborhood 
(or by everyone on Earth).  
 
Given that much of which worlds are deemed relevant to the analysis is determined by the 
antecedent, there is no need to adjoin any indices to the variably strict conditional – there’s 
only one. I have already touched on this in the previous section, when discussing the relevant 
antecedent worlds (sufficiently similar worlds) to the evaluation of the counterfactual and 
noting that Lewis intends there to be a fitting restriction of that kind for any antecedent of any 
strict conditional based on comparative similarity of worlds. I will also say more about this in 
the next section, once the formal model theory has been defined, but what has been illustrated 
by the above example should suffice for an intuitive outline of the rationale underlying the 
systems of spheres models for the variably strict conditional. Such a framework turns out to 
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be robust enough to express, not only Stalnaker’s theory80 of the counterfactual, but also 
other notable reformulations, and analogies in temporal and deontic logic, of which Lewis 
(1973) gives a comprehensive analysis. I won’t discuss those general correspondences here – 
it will suffice to say that most theories of the counterfactual (as variably strict conditional), 
relevant to the current chapter, can be expressed in terms of Lewis’ ‘similarity sphere’ 
semantics, which I define and discuss in detail in the next section.  
 
2.2.3 Similarity Spheres semantics for counterfactuals81 
In the previous couple of sections, we have shown how Lewis argues in favour of the view 
that counterfactuals are based on a strict conditional corresponding to an accessibility 
assignment determined by an overall similarity of worlds, and that no single strict conditional 
fashioned this way can adequately serve as a model for the counterfactual. I have also given 
an informal discussion in the previous section how Lewis’ proposal to model the 
counterfactual as a variably strict conditional can be viewed as a direct modification of the 
intended variable sphere model. In this section I present the formal definition of the most 
basic model theory for the variably strict conditional, i.e. systems of spheres models, and give 
a critical overview of various conceptions of comparative similarity of worlds and the 
corresponding restrictions on the systems of spheres assignments, with attention to inferences 
that such restrictions validate. This overview will include a critical comparison of Lewis’ and 
Stalnaker’s theories, as well as a case for the system that I believe to be the most suitable.  
 
Definition 2.13: A system of spheres $ is a function82 
$:  𝑊 ⟶ ℘(℘(𝑊)) 
that assigns to each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 a set of subsets of 𝑊, and satisfies the following condition: 
   (S1)   $𝑤 is nested: for all 𝑆, 𝑇 ∈ $𝑤 either 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇 or 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆. 
 
 
                                               
80 Stalnaker (1968), Lewis (1973, §3.4). I’ll say more about Stalnaker’s account of the counterfactual in sections 
§2.2.7 and §2.2.8, when contrasting it with Lewis’ account. 
81 To place Lewis’ semantics in a broader semantic perspective, see (Pacuit 2017, §1.4.3) for an exposition of the 
fact that his systems of spheres are an instance of neighbourhood semantics. That is, sphere frames (𝑊, $) are 
just neighbourhood frames (𝑊, 𝑁), where 𝑁(𝑤) is interpreted as the neighbourhood around 𝑤, with the kinds 
of constraints placed on $𝑤 that Lewis believed best represented the intended notion of overall similarity of 
worlds, applicable to his analysis of the counterfactual. 
82 Based on Lewis (1973, pp.13-14). 
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Theorem 2.4: For all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, each $𝑤 such that ∅ ∈ $𝑤 has the following properties:
83 
(S2)   $𝑤 is closed under finite unions: for every finite 𝒮 ⊆ $𝑤, ⋃𝒮 ∈ $𝑤.  
(S3)   $𝑤 is closed under finite intersections: for every finite 𝒮 ⊆ $𝑤 such that 𝒮 ≠ ∅, ⋂𝒮 ∈ $𝑤. 
 
Both follow directly from S1. 
 
Proof : Proof by induction on the size of 𝒮. First, consider the trivial cases when 𝒮 = ∅, and 
the case when 𝒮 is a singleton. When 𝒮 = ∅, then ⋃𝒮 = ∅, so ⋃𝒮 ∈ $𝑤, by stipulation. When 
𝒮 = {𝑆}, then ⋃𝒮 = ⋂𝒮 = 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤. Now for the base case when 𝒮 = {𝑆, 𝑇}. By S1, either 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇, 
in which case ⋃𝒮 = 𝑇 ∈ $𝑤 and ⋂𝒮 = 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤, or 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆 in which case ⋃𝒮 = 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤 and ⋂𝒮 =
𝑇 ∈ $𝑤.  
Now, suppose that both ⋃𝒮 ∈ $𝑤 and ⋂𝒮 ∈ $𝑤 for |𝒮| = 𝑘, for some 𝑘 ∈ ℕ. Next, suppose that 
|𝒮| = 𝑘 + 1, and take any 𝒯 ⊆ 𝒮 such that |𝒯| = 𝑘. Then by the induction hypothesis, we have 
both ⋃𝒯 ∈ $𝑤 and ⋂𝒯 ∈ $𝑤. Next consider 𝒮\𝒯 = {𝑆}. Then 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤. By S1, either 𝑆 ⊆ ⋃𝒯 in 
which case ⋃𝒮 = ⋃𝒯 ∈ $𝑤, or ⋃𝒯 ⊆ 𝑆 in which case ⋃𝒮 = 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤. Similarly, either 𝑆 ⊆ ⋂𝒯 
in which case ⋂𝒮 = 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤, or ⋂𝒯 ⊆ 𝑆 in which case ⋂𝒮 = ⋂𝒯 ∈ $𝑤, as required.      □ 
 
Note that from the definition of a system of spheres we have ⋃$𝑤 ⊆ 𝑊. All worlds outside 
⋃$𝑤 are to be regarded “as being all equally similar to 𝑤, and less similar to 𝑤 than any 
world that the spheres reach” (Lewis, 1973, p.16). 
 
Definition 2.14: The ordered pair (𝑊, $) is a frame based on a system of spheres, where W is 
a set, and $ is as given in Definition 2.13. For brevity, call such ordered pairs S-frames. On 
the intended interpretation, relevant to the semantics under consideration, the elements 0f 𝑊 
are possible worlds. 
 
Having established the basic frame theory, we can now define the formal truth conditions for 
the extended language and give the basic model theory. 
 
 
                                               
83 Lewis (1973, p.15) argues that although somewhat unintuitive, it is technically convenient to leave the empty 
set in as a sphere around each centered world. However, it can be easily verified that the presence of the empty 
sphere has no effect at all on the difference to the truth conditions. I haven’t stipulated S2 and S3, as Lewis did, 
but instead I have shown them to be a consequence of S1 (for arbitrary unions and nonempty intersections we 
need additional conditions, which I address in §2.2.7). Lewis stipulates S2 and S3 alongside S1, so the closure 
under unions implies ∅ ∈ $𝑤 for each 𝑤. Not stipulating S2, I had to stipulate ∅ ∈ $𝑤. 
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Definition 2.15: A system of spheres model (or S-model) is the triple (𝑊, $, [. ]) such that:84  
(1)   (𝑊, $) is an S-frame 
(2)   [. ]: 𝐹𝑜𝑟 ⟶ ℘(𝑊) assigns to each 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 a subset of 𝑊 (worlds where 𝐴 is true)85. . . 
. . ..Below  is the recursive definition of [. ].  
(3)   [~𝐴] = 𝑊\[𝐴] 
  [𝐴 ∧ 𝐵] = [𝐴] ∩ [𝐵] 
  [𝐴 ∨ 𝐵] = [𝐴] ∪ [𝐵] 
  [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵] = [~𝐴] ∪ [𝐵] 
(4)   𝑤 ∈ [□𝐴]   iff   [𝐴] = 𝑊 
  𝑤 ∈ [◊𝐴]   iff   [𝐴] ∩ 𝑊 ≠ ∅ 
  𝑤 ∈ [𝐴 > 𝐵]   iff   [𝐴] ∩ ⋃$𝑤 = ∅  or  ∃𝑆 ∈ $𝑤(∅ ≠ (𝑆 ∩ [𝐴]) ⊆ [𝐵]) 
 
Definition 2.16: S-validity  
Let ⊨𝐒 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝐒 𝐴 iff for all models (𝑊, $, [. ]), and all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, if 𝑤 ⊩
𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴. That is, valid inference is defined as truth preservation at all 
worlds in all systems of spheres models. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐒 𝐴. 
Call this logic S. 
 
Definition 2.17: Entertainability 
A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be entertainable at a world 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 iff  [𝐴] ∩ ⋃$𝑤 ≠ ∅. 
 
2.2.4 Centering: strict vs. weak 
Condition S1 leaves open a number of conceptions of comparative similarity of worlds. In 
particular, with regard to the location of 𝑤 in $𝑤. This is important, since each $𝑤 for each 
world 𝑤 has been set up for the purpose of evaluating counterfactuals at 𝑤. It should be noted 
that some additional constraint regarding the location of 𝑤 in $𝑤 is required to validate 
Modus Ponens for >, since S alone doesn’t. That is: 
 
Proposition 2.5:   𝑝, 𝑝 > 𝑞 ⊭𝐒 𝑞 
Proof : Consider the countermodel: 𝑊 = {𝑢, 𝑤}, $𝑤 = {{𝑢}, {𝑢, 𝑤}}, {𝑢, 𝑤} ⊆ [𝑝], 𝑢 ∈ [𝑞], 𝑤 ∉
[𝑞]. It’s clear that the system of spheres $𝑤 satisfies S1-S3. Also, 𝑤 ∈ [𝑝 > 𝑞], since there is 
some sphere 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤, namely {𝑢}, such that {𝑢} ∩ [𝑝] = {𝑢} ⊆ [𝑞] = {𝑢}.        □ 
                                               
84 Based on Lewis (1970, p.76), where he calls them 𝛽 models. 
85 Thus 𝑤 ∈ [𝐴] means ‘A is true at world w’. 
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Let us discuss two important restrictions on $, whose addition validates Modus Ponens, and 
critically examine any other implication that their addition would have for the theory. Lewis 
(in agreement with Stalnaker) insisted on the additional constraint, called the centering 
condition, motivated by the conception of comparative similarity of worlds whereby (i) any 
world w is as similar to itself as any other world is to it, and (ii) no other world is as similar to 
a world w as w is to itself.86 This conception of comparative similarity motivates the 
following restriction on $: 
 
Definition 2.18: Call the system $ centered on 𝑤 iff for every 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊: {𝑤} ∈ $𝑤. 
Abbreviation: (C). 
 
However, the system S+C validates inferring 𝐴 > 𝐵 from assuming both the antecedent and 
the consequent, without regard for any connection, or lack thereof for that matter, between A 
and B. 
 
Proposition 2.6:   𝐴, 𝐵 ⊨𝐒+C 𝐴 > 𝐵 
Proof : Suppose 𝑤 ∈ [𝐴] ∩ [𝐵] for some 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 and $ satisfying S1 and C. Then {𝑤} ∈ $𝑤, and 
{𝑤} ∩ [𝐴] = {𝑤} ⊆ [𝐴] ∩ [𝐵] ⊆ [𝐵]. Hence 𝑤 ∈ [𝐴 > 𝐵], as required.        □ 
 
But consider the following examples, which have the above form, yet seem intuitively 
invalid. 
(1) Suppose I toss a fair coin and it lands heads, so the counterfactual ‘If I tossed a fair 
coin, it would land heads’ would be, erroneously evaluated as true, given that it is just 
as likely to land tails. 
(2) Suppose I have scrambled eggs for breakfast, and (as usual) the Sun rises in the East, 
then ‘Were I to have scrambled eggs for breakfast, the Sun would rise in the East’ 
would be true, despite the absence of a causal, or any other relevant connection 
between the antecedent and consequent. 
 
In general, most would agree that the truth of the counterfactual doesn’t merely depend on the 
truth of the antecedent and consequent, but some connection obtaining between the two. 
Read (1995, p.94) suggested that if we interpreted similarity as similarity in relevant respects, 
then other worlds could tie in similarity with the actual world, thereby providing a 
                                               
86 Stalnaker (1968), Lewis (1973). 
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mechanism for invalidating the above inference.87 This motivates a weaker centering 
condition than C – formulated, but not adopted by Lewis – which corresponds to the 
conception of comparative similarity of worlds whereby any world w is as similar to itself as 
any other world is to it. This conception of comparative similarity of worlds motivates the 
following restriction on $: 
 
Definition 2.19: Call $𝑤 weakly centered on 𝑤 if and only if 𝑤 belongs to every nonempty 
sphere around 𝑤, and there is at least one nonempty sphere around 𝑤, that is: $𝑤 is weakly 
centered on 𝑤 iff 𝑤 ∈ ⋂($𝑤 ∖ ∅) and ∃𝑆 ∈ $𝑤(𝑆 ≠ ∅). 
Abbreviation: (W). 
 
The worlds that are allowed to tie in similarity to w, i.e. worlds in ⋂$𝑤 are interpreted as 
being as similar in relevant respects to w as w is to itself.   
 
NOTE: C implies W, since {𝑤} ∈ $𝑤 and S1 implies 𝑤 ∈ ⋂$𝑤 = {𝑤}. Hence, S+C is a proper 
extension of S+W.88 
 
It turns out that adding W to S1, has the virtue of making the logic strong enough to validate 
Modus Ponens, but not as strong as to validate the aforementioned problematic inference that 
an advocate of C is committed to. That is, S +W has the following virtues: 
 
Proposition 2.7:   𝐴, 𝐴 > 𝐵 ⊨𝐒+W 𝐵 
Proof : Assume that 𝑤 ∈ [𝐴] and 𝑤 ∈ [𝐴 > 𝐵] for some 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 according to some weakly 
centered system of spheres $. Now, 𝑤 ∈ [𝐴] and 𝑤 ∈ [𝐴 > 𝐵], from hypothesis, which implies 
that there is some 𝑆 ∈ $𝑤 such that 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵]. Given W and S1 we infer that 𝑤 ∈ ⋂$𝑤 ⊆ 𝑇 
for any 𝑇 ∈ $𝑤, so in particular 𝑤 ∈ 𝑆. Hence 𝑤 ∈ [𝐵], as required.        □ 
 
Proposition 2.8:   𝑝, 𝑞 ⊭𝐒+W 𝑝 > 𝑞 
Proof : Consider the following countermodel: 𝑊 = {𝑤, 𝑢}, $𝑤 = {{𝑤, 𝑢}}, 𝑤 ∈ [𝑝] ∩ [𝑞], 𝑢 ∈
[𝑝], and 𝑢 ∉ [𝑞]. It’s clear that $𝑤 satisfies S1 and W. But, {𝑤, 𝑢} = {𝑤, 𝑢} ∩ [𝑝] ⊈ [𝑞] = {𝑤}. □ 
 
This makes S +W the weakest system of that validates Modus Ponens. 
                                               
87 Nolan (1997, p.543) also endorses that approach. 
88 The system S+W is what Lewis (1973) calls VW, which is obtained from Lewis’ preferred system VC (commonly 
referred to as C1) by replacing the strict centering condition with the weak centering condition, or equivalently 
removing the axiom (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ⊃ (𝐴 > 𝐵) from the axiomatized version of VC (Lewis 1973, p.132). 
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2.2.5 Universality condition 
We saw earlier, in §2.2.1.3 that on the comparative similarity of worlds approach to 
expressing ceteris paribus constrains not all antecedent-worlds matter in determining whether 
a counterfactual is true at some world – some worlds may be so dissimilar from the world at 
which the counterfactual is being considered that including them in the analysis would lead to 
a wrong result (recall the example with worlds where tailless kangaroos stay upright using 
crutches). This means that there may also be possible worlds that are so bizarre as to be left 
out of consideration to determining the truth of any counterfactual at the world of evaluation. 
Call such worlds absolutely irrelevant. In other words, given some $𝑤, the question is 
whether there are any worlds that are precluded from determining the truth of any 
counterfactual at 𝑤 due to their dissimilarity to 𝑤. Whether one wishes to completely rule out 
some worlds from the analysis (or not) motivates the formulation of another restriction on $: 
 
Definition 2.20: Call the system $ universal iff for every 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊: ⋃$𝑤 = 𝑊.  
Abbreviation: (U). 
 
This condition offered in Lewis’ general proposal is highly relevant to the semantics of 
counterpossibles. It concerns the limits of the accessibility relation, or equivalently, the limits 
of the similarity of worlds. Lewis leaves it open whether the union of all similarity spheres 
around some centered world should contain all possible worlds – it may not, and those worlds 
that are left out are to be interpreted as irrelevant to the evaluation of the counterfactual.  
 
If ⋃$𝑖 is the set of all worlds, for each i, I will call $ universal. If not, then I regard 
the worlds that the spheres around i do not reach – those that lie outside of the 
union of ⋃$𝑖 – as being all equally similar to i, and less similar to i than any world 
that the spheres reach. We will see that any such world will be left out of 
consideration in determining whether a counterfactual is true at i. It is as if, from 
the point of view of i, these remotest worlds were not possible at all.  (Lewis 
1973, p.16) 
 
This is yet another example of how the character of Lewis’ (1973) work makes his semantics 
not only amenable to the kind of extensions that shall be considered in this thesis, but also 
highly suggestive with regard to how one may actually proceed in doing so. From the above 
passage, it’s reasonable to interpret impossible worlds in relation to the universality 
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restriction as those that are among the absolutely irrelevant worlds in evaluating a 
counterfactual at some possible world. I will return to this interpretation in Chapter 5. 
 
2.2.6 The Limit Assumption 
In the last few sections we have discussed a variety of conceptions of comparative similarity 
of worlds and saw how they translate to corresponding restrictions on $𝑤 and what 
characteristic inference forms the respective systems validate. The assumptions underlying 
those various notions of comparative similarity included general limits on the similarity 
(centering conditions) and dissimilarity (universality condition) of worlds to 𝑤. The aspect of 
comparative similarity that we now turn to involves an assumption about similarity of 
antecedent-worlds to 𝑤, and the corresponding properties of $𝑤 – namely whether for any 
entertainable antecedent 𝐴 there should always exist the most similar 𝐴-worlds. 
 
Because this assumption has consistently drawn the attention of philosophers, ever since its 
initial formulation, I’ll devote a whole section to describing it and highlighting some of its 
key implications for comparative similarity theories of the counterfactual. Lewis (1973, §1.4) 
identifies a subtle and important property that one could very well assume comparative 
similarity of worlds to have, yet which isn’t implied by S1. As we’ll shortly see, the property 
in question corresponds to a generalization of the derived property S3 in Theorem 2.4.  
 
If there are finitely many spheres $𝑤 around some world 𝑤, then any non-empty set of those 
spheres has a smallest member (the same would hold if $𝑤 was infinite and we only 
considered finite and non-empty subsets of $𝑤). In particular, for any entertainable antecedent 
𝐴, the set of all 𝐴-permitting spheres, i.e. the set {𝑆 ∈ $𝑤: 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅}, has a smallest member, 
which is just the intersection of all 𝐴-permitting spheres: ⋂{𝑆 ∈ $𝑤: 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅}. This sphere 
is said to contain the closest (or most similar) 𝐴-worlds to w, i.e. all and only those 𝐴-worlds 
than which no other 𝐴-world is closer (more similar) to w. But if there are infinitely many 
spheres, there may not always exist smallest antecedent-permitting spheres around w, for 
every antecedent. If there are infinite sequences of smaller and smaller spheres without end, 
then there are sets of spheres without a smallest member (least element). In particular, for 
some world w and antecedent 𝐴 there may not always be the smallest 𝐴-permitting sphere 
around w (containing the most similar 𝐴-worlds to w). To assume otherwise is to make the 
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Limit Assumption.89 That is, it need not be the case that for every entertainable antecedent 
there always exists at least one most similar world.90 
 
Definition 2.21: The Limit Assumption: for any 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟, if ⋃$𝑤 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅ then there exists a 
smallest 𝐴-permitting sphere (containing the most similar antecedent-worlds to w). We can 
formalize it as follows: for any 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 if ⋃$𝑤 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅ then ⋂{𝑆 ∈ $𝑤: 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅} ∈ $𝑤.  
Abbreviation: (LA) 
 
With LA the truth conditions for the counterfactual could be greatly simplified:  
 
Definition 2.22: Truth conditions for the counterfactual with the Limit Assumption 
The counterfactual 𝐴 > 𝐵 is true at world w (according to $) if and only if  
 
   There is no A-permitting sphere in $𝑤: ⋃$𝑤 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅ 
  or 
   B holds at every A-world in the smallest A-permitting sphere: ⋂{𝑆 ∈ $𝑤: 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅} ⊆ [𝐵] 
 
Or even simpler:  
 
The counterfactual 𝐴 > 𝐵 is true at world w (according to $) if and only if  
 
    B holds at every closest (most similar) 𝐴-world: [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵]  
 
(Where [𝐴] ∶= ⋂{𝑆 ∈ $𝑤: 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅} ∩ [𝐴] and no world outside of ⋃$𝑤 is closest). 
 
Lewis observes that this assumption can’t always be made, and consequently decides against 
adding it to the conditions that characterize $. He argues that because there may be cases 
where LA is simply false, truth conditions from Definition 2.22 would give the wrong 
analysis. Consider the following argument: I’m thinking (at this moment) of a line that is half 
a unit in length (in Euclidian 3-space). But let us suppose, counterfactually, that I thought 
(just then) of a line that was longer than a unit. That is, the counterfactual antecedent is ‘I’m 
thinking of a line that is longer than a unit’, abbreviated with ‘1 < 𝐿’. Next, we see that 
{𝑆 ∈ $@: 𝑆 ∩ [1 < 𝐿] ≠ ∅} is the set of all (1 < 𝐿)-permitting spheres, i.e. spheres containing 
worlds where I’m thinking about a line that is longer than a unit. Now, here’s a key step in 
Lewis’ argument: the worlds where I’m thinking of a line that is 1½ units long are more 
similar to the actual world than worlds where I’m thinking of a line that is 2 units long, and 
                                               
89 (Lewis 1973, §1.4, pp.19-20) 
90 The Limit Assumption is explicit in Stalnaker’s truth conditions for the counterfactual – which I discuss in the 
next section – so this argument can be viewed as being indirectly aimed at Stalnaker’s analysis. 
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likewise the worlds where I’m thinking of a line that is 1¼ units long are more similar to the 
actual world than worlds where I’m thinking of a line that is 1½ units long, and so on, ad 
infinitum.91 The shorter we make the line (above 1 unit), the more similar we make it to the 
length that I actually thought about, so presumably, the closer we come to the actual world.92 
But how long is the line that I’m thinking about in the closest (most similar) (1 < 𝐿)-worlds? 
The short answer is that there is no such length. 93 Since there is no smallest length that is 
greater than one unit, there are no worlds where I’m thinking about a line with such length, 
and consequently no smallest sphere containing all and only such worlds. Hence, 
⋂{𝑆 ∈ $𝑤: 𝑆 ∩ [1 < 𝐿] ≠ ∅} = ∅.
94 
 
On the truth conditions given in Definition 2.22, the counterfactual ‘If I thought just then 
about a line that is longer than one unit, then…’ would be vacuously and erroneously 
evaluated as true for any consequent. In particular, the following counterfactual would be 
erroneously evaluated as true: ‘Had I been thinking about a line that is longer than one unit, 
then I would have been thinking about a line that is not longer than one unit’. But it would be 
evaluated vacuously as true not because the antecedent does not express an entertainable 
proposition (clearly it does, e.g. take worlds where I was thinking of the line being 1½ units 
long), but because there are no closest (most similar) accessible worlds where it is true. 
 
There have been a number of replies to Lewis’ argument against LA.95 Some (Pollock 1976, 
Stalnaker 1980) demonstrate questionable implications of denying LA, others (Hájek 2014) 
argue that the implications about comparative similarity stemming from Lewis’ formulation 
of the argument against LA commit him to the truth of clearly false counterfactuals. Another 
                                               
91 Lewis uses a different example – one involving a physical line (that is actually less than an inch long and the 
counterfactual supposition is that it is more than 1’’ long), printed on a page, but admits that such examples 
aren’t decisive, since given the printing process, there would be a limit on how long a line can be printed, being 
contingent on the printing process (e.g. the number of ink molecules on the page being finite). To avoid this, I 
have chosen a to exemplify an idealized (mathematical) line, which isn’t subject to these kinds of physical 
restrictions. To make it unambiguous and precise, say that I’ve been actually thinking about the half-unit vector 
0.5𝒊 in the representation of Euclidian 3-space ℝ3 (where 𝒊 is the unit vector in the 𝑥-coordinate direction), and 
in the counterfactual supposition I’m thinking of some 𝑙𝒊 where 1 < 𝑙 ∈ ℝ. 
92 This part of Lewis’ argument gets him in trouble (a point I’ll return to shortly) and seems to be at odds with 
what he says earlier: “And so it goes; respects of similarity and difference trade off. If we try too hard for exact 
similarity to the actual world in one respect, we will get excessive differences in some other respect” (Lewis 
1973, p.9). 
93 This follows from the property of real numbers that for any two real numbers 𝑥 < 𝑦 there is a third real 
number 𝑧 such that 𝑥 < 𝑧 < 𝑦. 
94 Based on Lewis (1973, §1.4, p.20). 
95 (Pollock 1976; Stalnaker 1980; Hájek 2014)  
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family of replies (Stalnaker 1980, Brogaard & Salerno 2013) involve appeal to a conception 
of comparative similarity – one that emphasizes the respects of similarity that are relevant to 
the context in which a counterfactual is being considered – which can diffuse the problematic 
consequence of accepting LA, identified by Lewis, and avoid the aforementioned issue raised 
by (Hájek 2014). I adopt a version of this conception of comparative similarity – one that is 
consistent with S1+W – and devote part of Chapter 4 to motivating and defending it. For 
now, we turn to an example of a theory that has adopted the limit assumption. 
 
2.2.7 Stalnaker’s theory and conditional excluded middle 
Having discussed various conceptions of comparative similarity of worlds in the previous 
sections, we have only hinted at the character of Stalnaker’s theory. In this section we 
examine carefully the systems of spheres corresponding to the account of the conditional 
given by Stalnaker (1968, 1970), which, aside from the limit assumption places another 
significant restriction on $. It’s yet another addition to the kinds of assumptions about 
comparative similarity that result in logics that are misaligned with the intended logic of 
counterfactuals. 
 
I won’t discuss the formal account of Stalnaker’s (1968, 1970) original model theory, other 
than saying that he had originally based his semantics on Kripke frames, augmenting them 
with a world selection function 𝑓: 𝐹𝑜𝑟 × 𝑊 ⟶ 𝑊 that selects for each antecedent-world pair 
(𝐴, 𝑤) a single world 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑤) regarded as the most similar 𝐴-world to 𝑤. Lewis (1973, §3.4) 
shows how such selection-function models can be equivalently expressed in terms of his own 
similarity sphere models (given appropriate restrictions on $) – and that’s the manner in 
which I choose to talk about Stalnaker’s theory in this chapter, which after all is devoted to 
Lewis’ semantics.96  
 
Stalnaker’s truth conditions for the counterfactual: 
“Consider a possible world in which A is true, and which otherwise differs minimally from 
the actual world. ‘If A, then B’ is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible 
world.”97 
                                               
96 For an account of conditional logics in terms of the selection functions, and a comprehensive comparison of 
Stalnaker’s and Lewis’ theories in terms of selection functions see (Priest 2008, §5) or (Lewis 1973, §2.7, §3.4). 
For a general discussion of the selection-function semantics for conditional logics see (Chellas 1975) or (Nute 
1980, §3.2). 
97 (Stalnaker 1968, p.102) 
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Apparently, in addition to the limit assumption – that for any world w and entertainable 
antecedent A there is at least one A-world that is most similar to w – Stalnaker makes a 
stronger assumption, i.e. that there is a unique world like this.98 It leads to an important 
difference between Lewis’ and Stalnaker’s accounts of the counterfactual. Adding this 
assumption to S1 validates Conditional Excluded Middle (abbr. CEM), i.e. ‘(𝐴 > 𝐵)  ∨  (𝐴 >
~𝐵)’.99 Lewis calls CEM the “principal virtue and the principal vice” of Stalnaker’s theory, 
presumably because although it may appeal to the intuitions of ordinary language users, 
nevertheless it’s hardly true of the subjunctive conditional – as I’ll shortly demonstrate via 
Lewis’ argument against CEM.  
 
Definition 2.23: Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption: for every world 𝑤 and antecedent 𝐴, that 
is entertainable at 𝑤, there is a smallest 𝐴–admitting sphere around 𝑤 containing exactly one 
𝐴–world. Formally, $ is said to satisfy Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption if and only if for 
all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 and 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟:  
if ⋃$𝑤 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅, then (∃𝑆 ∈ $𝑤)(∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑊)(𝑆 = ⋂{𝑇 ∈ $𝑤: 𝑇 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅}  ∧  𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] = {𝑢}). 
Abbreviation: (SA).100 
 
Clearly, the uniqueness component of SA does all the work in the validation of CEM, since if 
for each antecedent there exists a smallest antecedent-permitting sphere containing only a 
single antecedent-world, then given that LEM is valid, the consequent of either disjunct must 
be either true or false at that world, thus making exactly one of the disjuncts true. Below is a 
proof. 
 
Proposition 2.9:    ⊨𝐒+SA (𝐴 > 𝐵) ∨ (𝐴 > ~𝐵) 
Proof : Either ⋃$𝑤 ∩ [𝐴] = ∅, or ⋃$𝑤 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅. Both disjuncts are true for the vacuous case. 
If ⋃$𝑤 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅, then SA allows us to infer that ∃𝑆 ∈ $𝑤∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑊(𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] = {𝑢}). Either 𝑢 ∈
                                               
98 In the relevant literature, this condition is sometimes referred to as Stalnaker’s assumption (Lewis 1973), or 
the uniqueness assumption (Stalnaker 1980), or Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption (Nute 1980).  
99 (Lewis 1973, p.79). 
100 As for the treatment of impossible antecedents, Stalnaker also includes the absurd world where everything is 
the case and where all counterpossibles are evaluated, so SA also holds for impossible antecedents (Stalnaker 
1970), (Lewis 1973, p.77). In that regard their theories are the same: on Lewis’ account all counterpossibles 
come out vacuously true, by definition. They’re also all true for Stalnaker since all consequents of 
counterpossibles are true at the absurd world. For good discussions of the differences between Stalnaker’s and 
Lewis’ similarity semantics for the counterfactual and the corresponding theories see (Lewis 1973, §3.4), (Read 
1995, pp.82-95) and (Priest 2008, §5.7). I will return to the problem of vacuous counterpossibles in §2.3. 
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[𝐵] or 𝑢 ∈ [~𝐵], by LEM, so, {𝑢} = 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵] ∋ 𝑢 or {𝑢} = 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [~𝐵] ∋ 𝑢. So, exactly 
one of the disjuncts must be true, by Definition 2.15.         □ 
 
Proposition 2.10:    ⊭𝐒+C (𝑝 > 𝑞) ∨ (𝑝 > ~𝑞)101 
Proof : Consider the countermodel: 𝑊 = {𝑤, 𝑢, 𝑣}, $𝑤 = {{𝑤}, {𝑤, 𝑢, 𝑣}} and let 𝑤 ∈ [~𝑝], and 
𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ [𝑝]. The model clearly satisfies S1 and C. Also, let 𝑢 ∈ [𝑞] and 𝑣 ∈ [~𝑞]. Now, 𝑊 ∩
[𝑝] ≠ ∅, since {𝑤, 𝑢, 𝑣} ∩ [𝑝] = {𝑢, 𝑣} ≠ ∅, but neither {𝑢, 𝑣} ⊆ [~𝑞] nor {𝑢, 𝑣} ⊆ [𝑞]. So, neither 
disjunct is true, by Definition 2.15, as required.          □ 
 
The system corresponding to Stalnaker’s theory is in fact a proper extension of all the 
systems we’ve discussed so far, since, if we recall he favors the stronger of the centering 
conditions C, so by adding SA, his preferred system S+C+SA is clearly a proper extension of 
Lewis’ preferred system S+C. The logics corresponding to systems S+C and S+C+SA are 
known in the relevant literature as C1 (or VC) and C2, respectively.102 
 
Lewis admits that his theory was motivated by the observation that the whole appeal of CEM 
is due to ordinary language speakers rarely making the distinction between the external 
negation of a whole counterfactual, i.e. ~(𝐴 > 𝐵) and the same counterfactual with a negated 
consequent i.e. 𝐴 > ~𝐵. This results in many ordinary language speakers choosing to reject 
the violation of CEM, because prima facie it appears to be a contradiction. Stalnaker’s theory 
aligns with that intuition.  
 
Lewis (1973) brings up Quine’s (1950) example involving the renowned composers Bizet 
and Verdi, where their nationalities are counterfactually identified: as a matter of fact, Bizet 
was French, and Vivaldi was Italian. However, it’s neither the case that if they were 
compatriots, Bizet would be Italian, nor is it the case that if they were compatriots, Vivaldi 
would be French. Nevertheless, certainly if they were compatriots, they’d be either French or 
Italian. That is, Lewis claims that the following conjunction is true, but given CEM it can’t 
be, since it insists on the first or second conjunct being false: ~(𝐴 > 𝐵) ∧ ~(𝐴 > ~𝐵) ∧
(𝐴 > (𝐵 ∨ ~𝐵)).103 
                                               
101 Hence, ⊭𝐒+W (𝐴 > 𝐵) ∨ (𝐴 > ~𝐵). 
102 Lewis (1973, p.130), Nute (1980, p.53), Priest (2008, §5.7). 
103 (Lewis 1973, p.80). Note that ~(𝐴 > 𝐵) ∧ ~(𝐴 > ~𝐵) is equivalent to the negation of CEM, by De Morgan 
laws. 
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Therefore, to allow for the aforementioned distinctions, CEM needs to be invalidated. On the 
similarity sphere semantics this is achieved by allowing similarity ties between worlds (as 
exemplified in the countermodel to CEM given earlier). That is, there is a tie in similarity to 
the actual world between a world 𝑤𝐹 where the two composers are both French, and the 
world 𝑤𝐼 where they’re both Italian. Presumably a world 𝑤𝐺 where they’re both German, say, 
would be less similar to the actual world than 𝑤𝐼 and 𝑤𝐹 are.
104 So, if Bizet and Verdi were 
compatriots, then it seems that neither of the following is true: 
 
- If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, then they would both be Italian. 
- If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, then they would both be French (i.e. not Italian). 
 
A more recent counterexample to CEM, inspired by Hájek (2014), is based on a probabilistic 
argument. Suppose I didn’t toss a fair coin just now. But were I to toss that coin just now, 
would it land heads or tails? Surely it would land heads or tails, but it seems that both of the 
following would be false: 
 
- If I tossed the coin just now, it would land Heads. 
- If I tossed the coin just now, it would land Tails (i.e. not Heads). 
 
On the assumption that we’re dealing with a fair coin, claiming that either of the above is true 
would run in the face of the fact that we’re dealing with probabilistic (stochastic) process. It 
appears that Lewis’ original qualms with CEM have gathered wider acceptance among 
philosophers.105 There are many other counterexamples, once the form of the error is 
understood, but I chose to highlight the one above since Hájek (2014) employs the stochastic 
character of such a coin-toss event in setting up a nondeterministic version of Fine’s (1975) 
argument against Lewis’ similarity account of the counterfactual. The point is that the failure 
of CEM makes Lewis’ theory more resistant than Stalnaker’s to such a family of objections.  
 
2.3  Lewis’ analysis of counterpossibles 
One of the major drawbacks of Lewis’ account of the counterfactual is that it evaluates all 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents as true. Since ⋃$𝑤 ⊆ 𝑊, for all models, and on 
the intended interpretation 𝑊 is a set containing possible worlds, there are no spheres 
containing impossible worlds. In other words, impossible worlds are not entertainable. So, 
                                               
104 (Priest 2008, p.95) 
105 As it will be shown in Chapter 4, the failure of CEM serves as a good counter to some recent (Hájek 2014) 
objections to Lewis’ general account. 
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considering the truth conditions for the counterfactual, then for all worlds 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 and any 
antecedent 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 of a counterfactual 𝐴 > 𝐵 that expresses an impossible proposition [𝐴] ∩
⋃$𝑤 = ∅.  Consequently, for any 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟, the counterfactual 𝐴 > 𝐵 is evaluated as true – 
vacuously so, by Lewis’ truth conditions for, as given in Definition 2.15. Hence, ⊨𝐒 𝐴 > 𝐵 
holds for any 𝐵, whenever 𝐴 expresses an impossible proposition, and a fortiori it holds for 
all extensions of S. 
 
Proposition 2.11:    ⊨𝐒 𝐴 > 𝐵 whenever 𝐴 expresses an impossible proposition. 
Proof : Antecedents expressing an impossibility are not entertainable, so by Definition 2.15 
any counterfactual with such an antecedent satisfies the vacuous condition at all worlds.     □ 
 
However, the claim that all counterpossibles are vacuously true – and as such semantically 
uninformative, since their consequents make no contribution to the truth value – conflicts 
with our intuitions, as there appears to exist a plethora of cases where a counterpossible is 
clearly false or non-vacuously true. Consider the examples given below. In addition to their 
intuitive appeal (of non-vacuously meaningful truth values), a good case can be made for 
either their falsity or non-vacuous truth (to which I devote a large part of Chapter 3), yet 
Lewis’ account falls short of offering the corresponding, adequate analysis. 
  
(1) If Sally were to square the circle, then someone would have squared the circle. 
(2) If Sally were to square the circle and I were to double the cube, then I would be Sally. 
(3) If paraconsistent logic were correct, ex contradictione quodlibet would still be valid.  
Consider the first two - whereas (1) seems true and non-vacuously so, it would seem odd to 
insist that (2) is false, yet a vacuous-account doesn’t distinguish between their truth values. 
We can argue for the falsity of (3) as follows: since paraconsistent logics invalidate ex 
contradictione quodlibet by definition, the consequent of (3) runs contrary to the meaning of 
the antecedent.  
 
To justify his position, Lewis gives the following argument, which to no lesser extent 
employs intuition than the examples of apparently false and non-vacuously true 
counterpossibles listed in the previous paragraph:106 
 
                                               
106 This isn’t the only argument that Lewis gives in support of the vacuous analysis. There are others, but their 
adequate treatment is beyond the scope of this chapter. E.g. there’s Lewis’ famous marvellous mountain 
argument (Lewis 1986, p.7) against impossible worlds, which I discuss in the next chapter. 
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Confronted by an antecedent that is not really an entertainable supposition, one 
may react by saying, with a shrug: If that were so, anything you like would be 
true!  
Further, it seems that a counterfactual in which the antecedent logically implies 
the consequent ought always to be true; and one sort of impossible antecedent, a 
self-contradictory one, logically implies any consequent. (Lewis 1973, p.24) 
 
There are two justifications given by Lewis there. My reply is in line with the analysis given 
by Brogaard and Salerno (2013, pp.648-9). Even if we grant Lewis the claim that all 
counterfactuals with antecedents that aren’t entertainable suppositions invoke triviality, it 
doesn’t mean that (unless assumed) all impossibility-expressing antecedents fail to be 
entertainable suppositions. So apparently Lewis’ first justification rests on the unwarranted 
assumption that all counterpossibles involve antecedents that are not entertainable.  
In the second justification contained in the above passage, Lewis states that a counterfactual 
whose antecedent logically implies the consequent ought to always be true. That is, Lewis 
appeals to the validity of conditional proof (CP) for counterfactuals: if 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 then ⊨ 𝐴 > 𝐵. 
He then points to the validity of ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ), i.e. 𝐴 ∧ ~𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 to 
suggest that at least counterpossibles with contradictory antecedents (or more generally, 
antecedents corresponding to a conjunction of formulae that form an inconsistent set) should 
be trivially true, i.e. ⊨ (𝐴 ∧ ~𝐴) > 𝐵.  
There are two things to note here: the first is that assuming CP and ECQ, as Lewis does, can 
only support the less general claim that only counterfactuals logically impossible antecedents 
are trivially true, rather than the general claim that all counterpossibles are trivially true – 
which would require a further assumption that every impossibility, of every kind, is 
equivalent to some contradiction. So even if we granted Lewis the right to make those 
assumptions in this context, then his argument justifies a vacuous analysis of only a narrow 
subclass of counterpossibles. The second thing to note is a point made by Brogaard and 
Salerno (2013) that assuming CP in this context is very much theory-laden, since anyone who 
is already convinced that there are false counterpossibles will hardly be persuaded by appeals 
to an inference to which false counterpossibles constitute a counterexample.107 That is, CP is 
valid if and only if all counterpossibles are vacuously true. It appears that Lewis’ above 
attempt at justifying vacuously true analysis of counterpossibles, amounts to little more than 
an expression of skepticism regarding the alternative. 
                                               
107 For example, Nolan’s (1997) proposal is based on the rejection of CP for the counterfactual/counterpossible. 
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2.4  Summary 
We have seen that conditional logics, to which Lewis’ analysis of the counterfactual belongs, 
avoid commitment to some troublesome inference forms. We have also discussed Lewis’ 
motivations for settling on a model of the counterfactual based on a variably strict conditional 
based on comparative similarity of worlds and argued for the system S+W as the one with the 
least number of questionable commitments. However even S+W gives a vacuous analysis of 
counterpossibles, which I believe is an inadequate analysis of the more general conception of 
the counterfactual. I’ve addressed some of Lewis’ justifications for the vacuous analysis and 
shown them to be inconclusive or unconvincing. In Chapter 3 I address some the 
metaphysical reasons that potentially explain Lewis’ insistence on the vacuous analysis – that 
reply of mine is part of the general case I make for a possible and impossible worlds 
semantics as a very natural approach to a non-vacuous account of counterpossibles. The 
approach to developing a non-vacuous analysis of counterpossibles that I endorse and follow, 
is one which has gained a fair amount of interest in the last couple of decades, and which 
takes the Lewis-style account of the counterfactual (just presented) as a starting point, and 
introduces impossible worlds as a means of giving content to impossible antecedents.108 An 
account of non-vacuous counterpossibles in terms of impossible world semantics, developed 
and given in Chapter 5 proceeds in that manner, whereas Chapter 4 develops a conception of 
comparative similarity that places emphasis on the respects of similarity that are relevant to 
the context in which a counterfactual is being considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
108 Nolan (1997); Mares (1997); Vander Laan (2004); Brogaard & Salerno (2013); Bjerring (2014); Berto (2014, 
2017). 
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Chapter 3 
 
David Lewis’ Marvelous Mountain argument against impossible worlds. 
 
 
‘On the mountain both P and Q’ is equivalent to ‘On the 
mountain P, and on the mountain Q’; likewise ‘On the 
mountain not P’ is equivalent to ‘Not: on the mountain P’; 
putting these together, the alleged truth ‘On the mountain 
both P and not P’ is equivalent to the overt contradiction 
‘On the mountain P, and not: on the mountain P’.  
Lewis (1986) 
 
According to the consistent theory of objects, the 
traditional and widespread idea that impossible objects 
are quite beyond logical reach […] depends upon the long-
standing confusion between attributing inconsistent 
properties to an item (e.g. f and ~f) and inconsistently 
attributing properties to it (e.g. saying it has f and that it 
is not the case that it has f). 
Routley (1980)   
 
 
3.0   Introduction 
This chapter contains a defense of the extended argument from admissible paraphrase, 
against Lewis’ (1986) objection. The central feature of this defense is a refutation of Lewis’ 
(1986) famous ‘marvelous mountain’ argument which was set up as a reductio ad absurdum 
in Counterpart Theory (CT), and which amounts to a rejection of impossible individuals 
(impossibilia) and by extension of impossible worlds. To ensure the clarity of that refutation, 
an overview of the CT elements on which the success of the reductio hinges, will be 
summarized beforehand.109  
 
The following defense of impossibilia in Lewis’s theory – which ultimately reduces to 
pointing out that the commutative property (e.g. ‘at world w: not A’ being equivalent to ‘it is 
not the case that at world w: A’ ) is illicitly ascribed to the restricting modifier and truth-
functional connectives on the extended domain – parallels Meinong’s defense of impossibilia 
                                               
109 The extended argument from admissible paraphrase, aka ‘argument from ways’ (Vander Laan 1997), is a 
quite common strategy in the literature that is employed in support of impossible worlds (Yagisawa 1988), 
(Vander Laan 1997), (Berto 2009), (Nolan 1997). See (Yagisawa 1988, p.183) for a modal realist account, 
(Vander Laan 1997, p.598) for an abstractionist account, and (Berto 2009, p.3) for a hybrid account, whereby 
“possible worlds are taken as concrete Lewisian worlds, and impossibilities are represented as set-theoretic 
constructions out of them”. 
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in his theory of objects against Russell’s charge that the theory violates LNC.110 Both 
arguments defend the consistency of theories of impossibilia, by pointing to a key distinction 
between a wider and a narrower negation (and the corresponding rules), and pointing out that 
their scopes differ. In Meinong’s case, the narrower, property negation ‘there is an object that 
is not blue’ is to be distinguished from sentential negation ‘it’s not the case that there is an 
object that is blue’ when impossible objects are considered. Thus, similarly to the foregoing 
denial of the derivability of a contradiction from the admission of world-bound individuals 
that instantiate contradictions, Meinong denies the derivability of a contradiction from the 
admission of object-bound contradictory properties. That is, given the incongruence of 
predicate/sentence negation scopes in the presence of impossible objects one cannot infer the 
contradiction ‘a is round and it is not the case that a is round’ from ‘a being both round and 
not round’. Routley’s summing up of Meinong’s defense of a consistent theory of impossible 
objects places the following refutation of Lewis’s reductio in historical perspective whilst 
highlighting the essential feature of contention. 
 
According to the consistent theory of objects, the traditional and widespread idea 
that impossible objects are quite beyond logical reach (that they violate the 
fundamental laws of logic, are not amenable to logical treatment, and hence 
cannot be proper subjects of logical investigation) depends upon the long-
standing confusion between attributing inconsistent properties to an item (e.g. f 
and ~f) and inconsistently attributing properties to it (e.g. saying it has f and that 
it is not the case that it has f). Only in the second case would impossibilia be 
beyond the scope of consistent logic. It is now evident that this hoary confusion 
can be cleaned up by making appropriate negation scope distinction.  
(Routley 1980 p.89, my emphasis). 
 
3.1  The extended argument from admissible paraphrase – a defense. 
In the context of investigating the nature of the truth of subjunctives asserted by way of 
reductio, where he considers them as being instances of non-trivially true counterpossibles, 
Lewis (1973, p.24) for the sake of argument accurately envisages the overview character of 
                                               
110 Routley (1980,n p.89). 
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such an extension, which would proceed by positing impossible worlds, before quickly 
dismissing it, on grounds of it being founded on a ‘confused fantasy’.111  
 
[O]ne sometimes asserts counterfactuals by way of reductio in philosophy, 
mathematics, and even logic. These counterfactuals are asserted in argument, and 
must therefore be thought true; but their antecedents deny what are thought to be 
philosophical, mathematical, or even logical truths, and must therefore be thought 
not only false but impossible. These asserted counterphilosophicals, 
countermathematicals, and counterlogicals look like examples of vacuously true 
counterfactuals. 
There are other things they might be, however. They might not really be 
counterfactuals, but subjunctive conditionals of some other kind. More 
interesting, they might be non-vacuously true counterfactuals, understood in the 
way I have proposed; but so understood under the pretense that along with the 
possible possible worlds that differ from our world only in matters of contingent, 
empirical fact, there also are some impossible possible worlds that differ from 
our world in matters of philosophical, mathematical, and even logical truth. (The 
pretense need not be taken very seriously to explain what happens in 
conversation; it just might be that this part of our conversational practice is 
founded upon a confused fantasy.) (Lewis 1973, p.24) 
 
What is contained in the phrase ‘a confused fantasy’? It refers to the claim, which Lewis 
labels ‘a pretense’, that posits the existence of impossible worlds that differ from the actual 
one in matters of philosophical, mathematical and logical truth. Does Lewis label such an 
extension of his analysis a fantasy because there are no ways the world could not have turned 
out? But then we could use Lewis’ own justification for possible worlds given in the form of 
his argument from admissible paraphrase, by merely extending it in support of impossible 
worlds, whilst maintaining its form.112 So, if Lewis’ argument from admissible paraphrase for 
possible worlds is sound, then the soundness of the extended justification is only conditioned 
                                               
111 I take that what Lewis means by subjunctives asserted by way of reductio, are subjunctives of the form 
where the antecedent is the hypothesis of the reductio argument and the consequent the absurd conclusion 
derived. That is given the reductio ‘HYP… ⊥,’ Lewis has in mind the subjunctive ‘HYP > ⊥’. 
112 The argument appears throughout Lewis’ work. The versions of the argument I’m primarily relying on are 
taken from Lewis (1973, p.84) and Lewis (1986, p.2). Vander Laan (1997, §3) refers to it as ‘the argument from 
ways’. 
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on whether one accepts the rather uncontroversial premise that not everything is possible.113 
Here is the original version of Lewis’ argument: 
 
Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have 
been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an 
existential quantification. It says that there exist many entities of a certain 
description, to wit ‘ways things could have been’. I believe that things could have 
been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases of what I 
believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence 
of entities that might be called ‘ways things could have been’. I prefer to call 
them ‘possible worlds’. (Lewis 1973, p.84) 
  
To reiterate, if we accept this argument, then why should we not accept the following 
argument that there are impossible worlds?114 The extended argument is a conditional thesis: 
if the paraphrase argument justifies belief in possible worlds, as ways things could have been, 
then by parity of reasoning, the same form of the argument justifies belief in impossible 
worlds, as ways things could not have been.115 Being a conditional thesis, the full parity of 
reasoning argument can also be viewed as a reductio of genuine realism, directed to those 
who commit to concrete possible worlds only.116   
 
The conditional argument first appears in Naylor (1986, pp.28-29) where it is presented in a 
way that could be interpreted as a direct reductio of genuine realism. It has also been taken up 
by Yagisawa (1988, p.183) where it serves as a lynchpin thesis in the conditional 
endorsement of extended modal realism. However, Yagisawa leaves it up to the reader 
whether the conditional thesis is to be taken as serving the modus ponens argument endorsing 
concrete impossible worlds, or the modus tollens arguments that would effectively echo 
Naylor’s (1986) intended reductio of Lewis’s justification of possible worlds, the soundness 
of which is premised on a consensus that impossible worlds do indeed lead to trouble. In 
Naylor’ (1986) note to Lewis, the implication seems to be that a conclusion to the effect that 
the argument can be shown to speak equally in favour of impossible worlds is trouble 
enough. This is implicit since Naylor appears to expect the extended conclusion to speak for 
                                               
113 Mortenson (1989), is the rare exception to that view. 
114 Naylor (1986, p.29) 
115 Divers (2002, p.68) 
116 In fact the extended argument can be viewed as a reductio of Lewis’s theory of genuine possible worlds 
(Yagisawa 1988), (Divers 2002). 
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itself without any further comment, since he doesn’t bother to make one. But this is not really 
enough without an independent reason as to what is troublesome about positing impossible 
worlds. Moreover, Skyrms (1976, p.326) had already warned against caricaturizing Lewis’s 
argument in a way that ignores the included proviso that taking the paraphrase at face value is 
only justified insofar as it doesn’t lead to trouble.  
 
I do not make it an inviolable principle to take seeming existential quantifications 
in ordinary language at their face value. But I do recognize a presumption in favor 
of taking sentences at their face value, unless (1) taking them at face value is 
known to lead to trouble, and (2) taking them some other way is known not to. 
Lewis (1973, p.84) 
 
But naturally there is no consensus as to what ‘trouble’ exactly amounts to. There is however 
a predicament that a classicist would wish to avoid, which would be taken as sufficient 
grounds to reject the extended argument, without abandoning the original one – namely, 
theoretical inconsistency. As it will be shown, Lewis gives an argument precisely to that 
effect, albeit a bad one. For him this is reason enough to reject the parity of reasoning 
argument, but it is a reason premised on a misunderstanding highlighted in the fragment from 
Routley, which I demonstrate in the sext section. Consequently, I conclude that the extended 
argument from admissible paraphrase in favour of impossible worlds is safe from the charge 
of running into the kind of trouble that Lewis believes it does. 
 
To appreciate Lewis’s reasons for banishing impossibilia from his ontology, it is necessary to 
give at least a rudimentary outline of those key elements of his metaphysics that are the 
primary suspects in being responsible for this “impossibilia phobia”.  
 
3.2 The status of objects in possibilist realism: an outline of Genuine Realism (GR). 
Possible worlds exist simpliciter according to genuine realism, henceforth abbreviated with 
GR. They are spatiotemporally and causally isolated individuals, made up of mereological 
sums (fusions) of their parts. All parts of a world w stand in some spatiotemporal relation to 
each other, and if anything is spatiotemporally related to any part of w, then it is also a part of 
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w. Modal idioms reduce to unrestricted existential quantification over that which exists 
simpliciter, i.e. worlds, and objects that stand in a parthood relation to them.117  
 
You might say that strictly speaking, only this-worldly things really exist; and I 
am ready enough to agree; but on my view this ‘strict’ speaking is restricted 
speaking, on a par with saying that all the beer is in the fridge and ignoring most 
of the beer there is. When we quantify over less than all there is, we leave out 
things that (unrestrictedly speaking) exist simpliciter. Lewis (1986, p.3). 
 
The genuine realist (GR) takes unrestricted first-order existential quantification 
to range over a domain of individuals among which only some actually exist. 
Divers (2002, p.21) 
 
GR possible worlds are just as real as our world. That is, actuality is indexical, i.e. relative to 
the world where ‘this world’ is uttered.118 So the sentence token ‘our world’ in the previous 
sentence renders the world where it has been written down (this(!) world) as actual.  
 
When such expressions occur with their primary sense, their function is 
straightforwardly token-reflexive – that is, in any world w (in any sentential 
context of any sentence token) the expression introduces the world in which the 
token is uttered. To call a world ‘actual’ in this primary sense, is like referring to 
this place as ‘here’, or to this time as ‘now’ or to oneself as ‘I’.  
(Divers 2002, p.44) 
 
Modality reduces to quantification over worlds and their parts. This isn’t unique to GR. 
However, GR has the virtue of a single, metaphysically undifferentiated domain of 
quantification – all worlds, and their parts are of the same ontological kind, i.e. differing not 
in kind, but only what goes on at them.119 This allows GR to make use of unrestricted 
existential quantification – existence of any x is existence simpliciter; either x is itself a 
world, or it is part of some world. 
 
                                               
117 There is the odd feature of GR that worlds are taken to be individuals, not sets, even though they seem to 
contain stuff just as sets would. That is, in GR worlds don’t contain their respective parts, but rather consist of 
them, or more precisely stand in a parthood relation to them. For details, see Divers (2002, pp.45-46). 
118 Ref. Lewis’ indexical theory of actuality expressed in Lewis (1970) Anselm and Actuality. 
119 Lewis (1973, p.85). 
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The domain of quantification is to contain every possible world and everything 
in every world. Lewis (1968, p.114) 
 
If asked what sort of thing [possible worlds] are […] I can only ask [my 
questioner] to admit that he knows what sort of thing our actual world is, and then 
explain that other worlds are more things of that sort, differing not in kind but 
only what goes on at them. Lewis (1973, p.85) 
 
The difference between this and the other worlds is not a categorical difference. 
Nor does this world differ from the others in its manner of existing.  
Lewis (1986, p.2) 
 
This means that modal extensionalism has a metaphysical edge over 
intensionalism, which postulates an extra sui generis metaphysical kind. And that 
is a significant philosophical virtue of modal extensionalism.120   
Yagisawa (1988, p.178) 
 
This is a good place to introduce the key distinction (one that will be highly relevant in this 
chapter) between GR and actualist realism (aka actualist representationism) (AR), where 
according to the latter only the actual world exists, and non-actual possible worlds are mere 
abstractions (conceived of in one way or another). 
 
Broadly, GR conceives of the possible worlds as a vast plurality of non-actual, 
concrete things while AR conceives of the possible worlds as a vast plurality of 
actual, abstract things. (Divers 2002, p.22) 
 
GR gives an eliminative extensionalist account of intension, modality in particular (Yagisawa 
calls it modal extensionalism), much in the same way as actualist extensionalism eliminates 
intensional notions such as properties and relations by replacing them with some extensional 
entities found in the actual world.121  
Lewis (1965) proposes a translation of  the language of quantified modal logic (QML) into a 
first-order logical theory, which he coins Counterpart Theory (CT). “Conceptually, GR 
intends CT as an element in the non-modal analysis of modal concepts. Semantically, GR 
                                               
120 Yagisawa (1988) calls Realist Possibilism and its (proposed therein) extension, which admits impossible 
worlds, Realist Impossibilism by what he considers to be their essential feature, i.e. modal extensionalism. 
121 Yagisawa (1988, pp.177-178). 
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holds CT essential to capturing the expressive capacity of modal English and CT may serve 
as a metalanguage that articulates a PW-semantics for QML” (Divers, 2002, p.123). 
 
Instead of formalizing our modal discourse by means of modal operators, we 
could follow our usual practice. We could stick to our standard logic 
(quantification theory with identity and without ineliminable singular terms) and 
provide it with predicates and a domain of quantification suited  to the topic of 
modality. That done, certain expressions are available which take the place of 
modal operators. The new predicates required, together with postulates on them, 
constitute the system I call Counterpart Theory. Lewis (1968) 
 
For the purposes of this chapter the following characterization will suffice. I present below 
those elements of CT that will be relevant to our discussion. The primitive predicates of 
counterpart theory relevant to our discussion are: 
 
𝑊𝑥 (𝑥 is a possible world) 
𝐼𝑥𝑦 (𝑥 is in possible world 𝑦) 
 
The domain of quantification is to contain every possible world and everything in every 
world. The primitives are to be understood according to their English readings and the 
following postulates: 
 
    P1: ∀𝑥 ∀𝑦(𝐼𝑥𝑦 →  𝑊𝑦)   Nothing is in anything except a world. 
    P7: ∃𝑥(𝑊𝑥 & ∀𝑦(𝐼𝑦𝑥 ↔  𝐴𝑦))  Some world contains all and only actual things. 
 
Key relevant GR predicates used by Divers (2002) are defined as follows: 
 
𝑊𝛼 (𝛼 is a world) 
𝑃𝛼𝛽 (𝛼 is a part of 𝛽) 
 
Consider the following absolute alethic de dicto possibility and its translation from English 
(1), to its admissible paraphrase with a direct reference to possible worlds (2), and finally its 
explicit GR interpretation (3), and the explicit CT translation in (4).122 
 
(1) There may have been blue swans. 
(2) There is a possible world at which there are blue swans. 
                                               
122 The translations (1)-(3) are given by Divers (2002, p.43), and the latter (4)-(6) being the original formulation 
and translation given by Lewis (1968). 
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(3) ∃𝑥∃𝑦[𝑊𝑥 & 𝑃𝑦𝑥 & 𝑆𝑦 & 𝐵𝑦]. 
(4) ∃𝑦(𝑊𝑦 & ∃𝑥(𝐼𝑥𝑦 & 𝑆𝑥 & 𝐵𝑥)). 123 
Note the restricting modifier 𝑊𝑦 & ∃𝑥(𝐼𝑥𝑦 & … ) in the scope of the outermost quantifier in 
(4). Its purpose is to restrict the domains of quantifiers that appear in its scope. Universal 
quantifiers would be restricted analogously. Below is the standard translation of the modal 
formulas, which is not unique to GR. What is unique to GR, as the Black/blue Swans example 
(below) from Lewis’ Counterpart Theory (CT) will show, is the manner in which the world-
indexed (world-restricted) formulae are treated. 
 
(5) □𝜑 translates to ∀𝑦(𝑊𝑦 ⊃ 𝜑𝑦) 
(6) ◊𝜑 translates to ∃𝑦(𝑊𝑦 & 𝜑𝑦) 
To form the world-indexed (world-restricted) sentence 𝜑𝑦(𝜑 holds in world 𝑦), the range of 
each quantifier appearing in 𝜑 is restricted to the world 𝑦. That is, the quantification ‘∀𝑥’ 
appearing in the formula 𝜑 is replaced by ∀𝑥(𝐼𝑥𝑦 ⊃ ⋯ ), and similarly, ‘∃𝑥’ in 𝜑 is replaced 
by ∃𝑥(𝐼𝑥𝑦 & … ), as we’ve already seen in (4).124 Recall that existence at some possible world 
is the same kind of existence as at the actual world, so the usual quantifiers (albeit restricted 
to the given world) are used.  
 
[T]he phrase ‘at w’ […] works mainly by restricting the domains of quantifiers in 
their scope, in much the same way that restricting modifier ‘in Australia’ does. In 
Australia, all swans are black – all swans are indeed black, if we ignore everything 
not in Australia; quantifying only over things in Australia, all swans are black. At 
some strange world w, all swans are blue – all swans are indeed blue, if we ignore 
everything not part of the world w; quantifying only over things that are part of w, 
all swans are blue. (Lewis 1986, p.5) 
 
The above, brief characterization of the role of such modifiers was primarily intended to aid a 
clear appreciation of Lewis’ argument for rejecting the admission of impossible worlds into 
his modal realist ontology. Let’s now turn to the analysis of his argument. 
 
 
                                               
123 To be precise, (4) is the Counterpart Theory (CT) translation of the quantified modal logic de dicto expression 
‘◊∃𝑥𝐹𝑥’. Lewis (1968, p.118). Also, Lewis (1968) uses and Divers (2002) uses for propositional conjunction. I 
leave in the distinct symbols for fidelity’s sake. 
124 Lewis (1968, p.118). 
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3.3   Trouble in paradise? – impossibilia and CT.125 
The ‘marvellous mountain’ argument against impossible worlds. 
Lewis’s rejection of impossibilia, and consequently impossible worlds is, more precisely, the 
rejection of the existence of genuine world-bound individuals that instantiate 
impossibilities.126 Lewis goes on to argue that the admission of inconsistent objects in a GR 
framework (hence impossible from a classical perspective) leads to a literal contradiction, 
and that is trouble enough for him to turn down impossible worlds, since he endorses ECQ 
(and needless to say he is not a trivialist). That is, Lewis argues that CT, which is a GR 
theory, is rendered inconsistent on the assumption of the existence of some classical 
impossibilia (objects with contradictory properties). I’ll show in the next section that this 
argument is unsound since Lewis assumes that classically impossible worlds have classical 
properties – in particular, he assumes that the ‘at world’ restricting modifier commutes with 
truth-functional connectives for formulae that hold at inconsistent worlds.127  
 
[S]uppose travellers told of a place in this world – a marvellous mountain, far 
away in the bush – where contradictions are true. Allegedly we have truths of the 
form ‘On the mountain both P and not P’. But if ‘on the mountain’ is a restricting 
modifier, which works by limiting domains of implicit and explicit quantification 
to a certain part of all that there is, then it has no effect on the truth-functional 
connectives. Then the order of modifier and connectives makes no difference. So 
‘On the mountain both P and Q’ is equivalent to ‘On the mountain P, and on the 
mountain Q’; likewise ‘On the mountain not P’ is equivalent to ‘Not: on the 
mountain P’; putting these together, the alleged truth ‘On the mountain both P 
and not P’ is equivalent to the overt contradiction ‘On the mountain P, and not: 
on the mountain P’. That is, there is no difference between a contradiction within 
the scope of the modifier and a plain contradiction that has the modifier within it. 
So to tell the alleged truth about the marvellously contradictory things that 
happen on the mountain is no different from contradicting yourself. But there is 
                                               
125 Lewis refers to modal realism as ‘A Philosopher’s Paradise’. Also, that’s the title of Ch.1 in Lewis (1986). Here 
‘trouble’ is taken to be anything that would be unacceptable to Lewis – in this case an inconsistent theory.  
126 (Divers 2002, p.67). Because in CT all individuals are by definition part of some world, so “individuals” whose 
parts are not spatiotemporally related, i.e. cross world “individuals” do not count as possibilia. I follow Divers in 
interpreting Lewis’ marvellous mountain as a world-bound impossible individual. 
127 Commutativity here is understood as functional commutativity, where one function is the ‘at w:’ modifier 
and the other functions are the truth functions, e.g. negation, appearing in the scope of the modifier ‘at w: not 
A’. On the assumption of commutativity ‘at w: not A’ is equivalent to ‘not at w: A’. I’ll make this more precise 
later. 
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no subject matter, however marvellous, about which you can tell the truth by 
contradicting yourself. (Lewis 1986, p.7, f.1) 
 
 
3.4   No trouble: the ‘marvellous mountain’ argument is unsound. 
Lewis assumes that all restricting modifiers such as ‘In Australia’, ‘On a mountain far away’ 
or ‘at world w’ (abbreviated ‘at w’) commute with respect to truth-functional connectives in 
regimes other than classical ones. 
 
The following objection to Lewis’ ‘marvellous mountain’ argument, which he gave against 
the existence of inconsistent worlds, is not widely proposed among rival theories to GR.128 
There is a tendency among authors working in impossible world semantics, especially those 
who endorse non GR approaches to possible and impossible worlds to see the force of Lewis’ 
argument stemming from the metaphysical aspect of its concretism – of the assumed nature 
of possible worlds in CT – as being a sufficient condition (and the key culprit), and only few 
take issue with the commutativity of the 'at w’ modifier with the truth-functional connectives. 
That is, it seems to me that some authors are a little too quick to accept Lewis’ derivation of 
the literal contradiction, and blame its success on the GR ontology ― an alleged shortcoming 
of GR they like to point out as the fulcrum of that derivation.129 For those authors, granting 
Lewis this apparently absurd consequence seems just a little too convenient, and indeed often 
serves as their cue to endorse less committal ontologies.130 For example, Nolan (1997, p.541) 
thinks that Lewis’ emphatic rejection of impossible worlds largely flows from what he takes 
them and their parts to be – namely as existing simpliciter. This, Nolan identifies as reason 
enough to derive a contradiction from positing objects with inconsistent properties.  
 
Extending this approach to impossible objects produces literal impossibilities, it 
seems: if the impossibilium corresponding to the blue swan-and-not-a-swan is 
literally a swan and is literally not a swan, then a contradiction is literally true. 
(Nolan 1997, p.541) 
 
                                               
128 A similar version of the argument can be found in Kiourti (2010, Ch. IV, §4.41). Mares (2004, pp.84-87) sees 
the problem with this property in the case of negation, which as a matter of fact is the key culprit. Lycan (1994, 
pp.39-41) believes that Lewis’ argument fails, observing that a truly inclusive quantifier would require the 
invalidation of the entailment: at w: ~P entails ~(at w: P). 
129 E.g. (Nolan 1997, p.541), (Jago 2012, p.64), (Vander Laan 1997, p.606). 
130 Kiourti (2010, p.102) also makes this observation. 
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But this analysis takes it for granted that Lewis’ reductio argument is sound. That is, Nolan 
takes it for granted that it’s fine to go from there being some individual that is both a swan 
and not a swan, to it being the case that the said individual is a swan and it not being the 
case that it is a swan. However, the applicability of that inference doesn’t rest on the 
metaphysical nature of the objects whose existence is being posited, but on the logical 
principles thought as correspondingly fitting the metaphysical view, and consequently 
employed in the analysis. Vander Laan (1997, p.606) thinks that Lewis’ reasons for rejecting 
impossibilia stem from his concretism and his insistence to take ‘at w’ as a restricting 
modifier, i.e. as merely restricting quantification over concrete worlds that are said to exist 
much in the same way as our world.  
 
Lewis goes on to say that ‘at so-and-so world’ is indeed a restricting modifier, 
unlike ‘in such-and-such story’, since worlds are like the actual world, not like 
stories. It is this last point that is of interest here. Lewis’s reasons for rejecting 
impossible worlds stem from his concretism, that is, his view that worlds are 
concrete objects much like us and our surroundings. (Vander Laan 1997, p.606) 
 
But this analysis assumes as correct Lewis’ analysis of concrete impossibilia. Lewis’ 
rejection of classically impossible worlds does not rely on the metaphysical nature of the 
objects in the quantifier’s scope, but rather on the logical assumptions he makes about them, 
which are embodied by the posited properties of the ‘at w’ modifier. Vander Laan then 
suggests an abstractionist approach that treats worlds more like stories rather than concrete 
objects, i.e. where ‘at so-and-so world’ modifier is intended along the lines of  ‘according to 
such-and-such story’. Such an approach, he observes, would avoid the problem of ending up 
in contradiction, since stories, unlike worlds, need not be maximal nor consistent. 
 
How should we read ‘on the mountain’? Let’s recall that such modifiers act by restricting the 
quantifiers in their scope to the domain of a single world, much in the same way as the ‘in 
Australia’ restricting modifier restricts all talk to that which exists in Australia. So, all swans 
are indeed black if we restrict our discourse only to what exists in Australia. Lewis assumes 
the existence of a domain―the marvellous mountain―where contradictions are true, but for 
simplicity we can speak of maximal domains, i.e. worlds, where contradictions are true. The 
objection to Lewis doesn’t hinge in any way on such domain generalisation, but rather will 
simplify the discussion – it will be a lot simpler to speak of worlds than their subdomains.  
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The premise that assumes the existence of a mountain such that ‘On the mountain P and not 
P’, amounts to assuming the existence of an inconsistent world, since according to Lewis’s 
version of GR anything that exists must do so at some world.131 So were anything to exist ‘on 
the mountain’, it would exist ‘on the mountain at some world’. So, since we’re considering 
the marvellous goings-on ‘on the mountain’ then a fortiori we’re considering those goings-on 
at the world whose part is the marvellous mountain.  
 
The key point to appreciate here is that since Lewis insists that the modifier and truth 
functional connectives commute in general, then it follows that this commutativity holds for 
the particular case when the modifier restricts quantification to the entire domain of some 
world. This shift of domain does somewhat reduce the generality of the original argument, 
but the refutation works equally well. That is, given that individuals are world bound in CT, 
and assuming in line with Divers that the marvellous mountain is intended as a world-bound 
impossibilium, extending the scope of the ‘on the mountain’ restricting quantifier to the 
world 𝑤 of which the mountain is a mereological part of, and employing ‘at 𝑤’ instead, will 
not result in an omission of what happens on the mountain relative to the actual world. The 
point is that if a special case (here, about certain spatiotemporally related mereological sums 
of individuals) of a general claim (here, about any individual) is refuted, then so is the general 
claim. And the choice to lay out the refutation focusing on the special case is motivated only 
by clarity and simplicity of presentation. 
 
One further thing to note is that given some world 𝑤 (say the actual world) and some 
mereological subdomain of it (of the actual world X, say ‘Australia in the year 2015’) the 
truth of ‘at X: 𝜑’ implies the truth of ‘at 𝑤: 𝜑’ if and only if 𝜑 expresses an existential 
proposition, and the converse is true if 𝜑 expresses a universal proposition, for any X that is 
part of 𝑤. To see this, observe that ‘in Australia in 2015, there are wombats’ implies ‘at the 
actual world (i.e. in some spatiotemporal location), there are wombats’, but ‘in Australia in 
2015 all swans are black’ doesn’t imply that ‘actually, all swans are black’. Conversely 
actually ‘every human is a mammal’ implies ‘all humans in Australia are mammals’, but 
‘there exist giant black holes’ doesn’t imply that ‘in Australia there are black holes’. In my 
shift of domain (to worlds, from mountains) in the present refutation, I have taken care to 
avoid any possible issues that could arise due to the negligence of those relationships.  
                                               
131 In (Lewis 1968, p.114) axiom P1. 
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Lewis wants us to accept a certain property of the ‘at w’ modifier – namely that it commutes 
with the truth-functional connectives. Let’s denote this alleged property of the modifier with 
MC, for modifier commutativity with truth-functional connectives: 
 
(MC) For any domain 𝑋, and corresponding restricting modifier 𝜂𝑋, truth-functional 
connective/operator 𝑓, and sentence(s) 𝜑: 132 
(𝜂𝑋 ∘ 𝑓)(𝜑)  iff  (𝑓 ∘ 𝜂𝑋)(𝜑) 
 
For clarification (examples), see the special cases of MC defined on the next page – namely 
MCC and MCN. Naturally, in this general definition worlds are just special kinds of domains. 
So, it is clear that if 𝑋 is a subdomain of some world and is equivalent to a proposition with 
the I or O form, then the truth of 𝜂𝑋(𝜑) entails the truth of 𝜂𝑤(𝜑), and the converse is true 
when 𝜑 is either of the A or E form.133 
 
What reasons does Lewis give in support of that property of the modifier? Well, given that 
the modifier restricts the domain of all quantifiers within its scope to one possible world, and 
given that worlds are (by definition of Lewis’ CT) just mereological sums of their parts, what 
occurs at any given world, or region of some world, is amenable to purely mereological 
(extensional analysis). That is, saying ‘in the box there’s a green marble and a red marble’ is 
the same as saying that ‘in the box there’s a green marble’ and ‘in the box there’s a red 
marble’. That is ‘at w: A and B’ should be equivalent to ‘at w: A’ and ‘at w: B’, which indeed 
most people will accept as intuitively reasonable (by MC).  
 
So far so (almost) good, it would seem. But Lewis then swiftly proceeds to harness our 
intuitions further (as if that was a completely seamless, immediate step), whilst we’re still 
under the spell of the apparently innocuous134 nature of the instance of MC just presented, 
and asks us to accept as equally innocuous to have MC extended to apply to yet another truth-
functional connective – namely negation, i.e. ‘at w: not A’ and ‘not at w: A’ being equivalent 
– in other words, negation and the restricting modifier commute. That is, we’re supposed to 
accept this broader applicability as equally unproblematic, and not only when applied to 
possible worlds, but apparently to impossible ones as well, since it is explicitly applied to the 
                                               
132 Where ∘ denotes the function-composition relation. When f is a unary operator (e.g. negation) then it acts 
on a single sentence, else if f is a dyadic connective (e.g. conjunction) acts on a pair of sentences. For 
clarification (examples), see the special cases MCC and MCN, further below. 
133 A: Every S is P. E: No S is P.  I: Some S is P. O: Some S is not P. 
134 Varzi (1997) gives a coherent account of non-adjunctive worlds. 
91 
 
 
‘on the mountain’ restricting modifier, and the mountain has been stipulated to be an 
inconsistent regime. Let’s denote these instances of MC as follows: 
 
(MCC)  ‘at w: A and B’   iff   ‘at w: A and at w: B’. 
(MCN) ‘at w: not A’  iff  ‘not at w: A’. 
 
In fact, the argument hinges on MCN holding. But it cannot hold.135 To be sure, MC holds for 
classical worlds. That is, the commutativity of the ‘at w’ restricting modifier holds for 
classical truth-functional connectives, i.e. whose properties do not violate the principles of 
classical logic, but such principles are not guaranteed to obtain at non-classical worlds and 
the corresponding commutativity principle fails in such situations. Hoping that the reader’s 
intuitions about classical mereology can work in his favour, in a way that they may be guided 
by the common-sense analogy: ‘in the box there is no green marble’ therefore it’s not the 
case that ‘in the box there is a green marble’. But affirming this purported property of the 
restricting modifier, as I will show, makes the unwarranted assumption that it ought to hold 
for inconsistent worlds, which ultimately boils down to wrongly assuming that inconsistent 
objects, and worlds of which they are a part, are to be analysed classically; in particular, that 
LNC ought to hold there. That is, MCN presupposes LNC, i.e. if LNC fails so does MCN.136 
 
It will be of benefit to have a clear outline of the essential elements of Lewis’s argument and 
its immediate consequences. 
 
 (Hyp) There is a world w such that at w: A and not A. 
 (P1) MCC and MCN are true of the domain restricting modifier for all worlds. 
(C1)     There is a world w such that at w: A and not at w: A.       (Hyp.+P1) 
 (P2) There is no subject matter whereby one can tell the truth by contradicting  
  themselves (LNC). 
 (C2) Therefore, there is no such w. 
                                               
135 Kiourti (2010, pp.116-119) raises similar objections to accepting MCN and consequently follows a very similar 
line of reasoning to mine in demonstrating what this assumption amounts to. My conclusion differs by virtue of 
how I have formulated the objection – Kiourti concludes that Lewis begs the question against the hypothesis of 
concrete impossibilia, where I conclude that the argument is unsound on grounds of the falsity of hypothesis 
concerning the properties of the ‘at w’ modifier, where w needn’t be a classical world. 
136 Given that Lewis is committed to a classical truth conditional theory of meaning, his adherence to MCN is 
understandable. After all, denying MCN may require a denial of the classical truth conditional theory of meaning 
or denying that the connective ‘¬’ means not (classical negation) at impossible worlds. However, these 
alternatives cannot be ignored without the risk of begging the question. For example, one may reject MCN by 
adopting an information theoretic theory of meaning, e.g. see (Mares 1997, 2004) – a theory which requires 
dialethism and a paraconsistent view of negation, both of which Lewis rejects emphatically. 
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 (C3) Therefore there are no inconsistent worlds.137   (RAA) 
 (C4) There are no impossible worlds. 
 
Why assume that MCN ought to always hold for all worlds, both possible and impossible?138 
Let’s think of circumstances that would violate MCN. Consider a world w* that contains 
some genuinely inconsistent object a. That is, let us assume that ‘at w*: Pa and not Pa’ for 
some property P. Now, given that Pa is a truth value glut (both true and false, but in 
particular true) at w*, we should analyse it accordingly, which means we have no justified 
recourse to MCN, which presupposes LNC, precisely because the existence of a at w* is a 
counterexample to LNC! That is, we cannot infer ‘not at w*: Pa’ from ‘at w*: not Pa’, 
precisely because both Pa and not Pa hold at w.139   
 
In other words, the assumption of the universality of MCN, rests on the erroneous supressed 
assumption that LNC ought to hold for inconsistent worlds in much the same way as it does 
for consistent ones, like boxes and fridges, which we are familiar with. But we are not 
considering consistent worlds, so appeal to MCN is unjustified, precisely because w* is an 
inconsistent world. We will run into literal contradictions, i.e. ‘at w Pa’ and ‘not at w Pa’ 
being true simpliciter, only if we assume the existence of truth value gluts, and then proceed 
to analyse them classically by unwarranted appeal to MCN. This is what Lewis in fact does. 
By refraining from any such questionable steps, we don’t end up in explicit contradiction. So, 
although w* is a genuinely inconsistent world, the theory remains consistent. That is, 
assuming the existence of w*, doesn’t lead to a contradiction simpliciter. But if the only 
reason for Lewis’ rejection of the existence of genuine inconsistent worlds is the success of 
this reductio ad absurdum, then his argument fails, because the attempted reductio ad 
absurdum from assuming the existence of w* is unsound (since P1 is false). Consequently, 
using only Lewis’s reasons for rejecting the existence of genuine inconsistent worlds, it 
doesn’t follow that they don’t exist. 
 
                                               
137 The argument has the form of reductio ad absurdum. 
138 An analogue of this argument has been made in the context of extended theories of objects that include 
non-existent objects, e.g. Parsons’s theory – a succinct summary of Parsons’s analogue to the foregoing 
argument is given in (Zalta 1988, p.132). 
139 An analogous issue arises, concerning a questionable principle in theories of non-existent objects, e.g. 
Parsons (1980, p.19, p.105), Zalta (1988, pp.131-4). The analogy is along the lines possible vs. impossible and 
existent vs. non-existent. Parsons points out that the analogous principle to MCN holds for all existing objects, 
but not all objects (where impossible ones are among the non-existent). In that theory inconsistent objects are 
classified as non-existent objects, much in the same way as Lewis would classify them as classically impossible. 
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For similar reasons, a “Lewis-type” reductio ad absurdum against the existence of genuine 
incomplete worlds isn’t sound either.140 That is, given the breakdown of Lewis’s argument 
above, the argument with the following conclusion is unsound, also due to P1’ being false. 
 
 (Hyp’) There is a world w such that it’s neither the case that at w: A nor is it the case 
  that at w: not A. 
 (P1’) MCC and MCN are true of the domain restricting modifier for all worlds. 
 (C1’) There is a world w such that at w: A and not at w: A.          (Hyp+P1)
 (P2’) There is no subject matter whereby one can tell the truth by contradicting  
  themselves (LNC). 
 (C2’) Therefore, there is no such w. 
 (C3’) Therefore there are no incomplete worlds.          (RAA) 
 (C4’) There are no impossible worlds. 
 
Let us assume the existence of an incomplete world w° that has, as one of its parts, an object 
a such that neither Pa nor not Pa is true at w°, and then let us investigate what is really doing 
the work in a "successful” derivation of a contradiction. That is, Pa is a truth value gap at w°, 
so we have both ‘not at w° Pa’ and ‘not at w° not Pa’. How is MCN justified here, and can it 
be used to derive a contradiction? In particular, can we use MCN to infer ‘at w°: not Pa’ from 
not ‘at w°: Pa’? Call that particular MCN instance MCNI for importing negation, i.e. going 
from not ‘at w A’ to ‘at w not A’, as the dual move to MCNE from the previous, inconsistent 
world w* example, which hinged on exporting negation, i.e. from ‘at w not A’ to not ‘at w A’. 
 
 (MCNI)     Importing negation: If ‘not at w: A’, then ‘at w: not A’. 
 (MCNE)  Exporting negation: If ‘at w: not A’, then ‘not at w: A’. 
 
That would suffice for a derivation of a contradiction, since we already have ‘not at w° not 
Pa’. This is also necessary since I have already argued that the other direction, i.e. MCNE is 
unwarranted, thereby disabling the only other way of deriving a contradiction. (In passing we 
can quickly set out that other means of deriving a contradiction, were MCNE to be allowed in 
the case of incomplete worlds. Given MCNE we can go from not ‘at w° not Pa’ to not [not 
‘at w° Pa’], and from there to ‘at w° Pa’, and given that we also have not ‘at w° Pa’, a 
contradiction ensues. But MCNE fails (as argued earlier), so let’s focus on the inapplicability 
of MCNI in the case at hand.) The use of MCNI would seem wrong, since w° is an 
                                               
140 The next two paragraphs can be skipped. 
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incomplete world, so we cannot assume that the failure of Pa being true at w° means that not 
Pa should be true there. To do so would be to assume that there is a logical connection 
between the failure of Pa being true at w° and the truth of not Pa at w° after all. As a matter 
of fact, it would amount to assuming that LEM ought to hold at w°, but it needn’t because w° 
isn’t a classically possible world, and as a matter of fact it doesn’t, precisely because Pa is a 
truth value gap at w°. 
 
So, the above shows that Lewis-type arguments against the existence of impossible worlds 
fail, because they fail to rule out the existence of inconsistent and incomplete worlds, which 
are classically impossible. 
 
3.5   No trouble: the ‘marvellous mountain’ argument is invalid.  
The objection that shows ‘the marvellous mountain’ argument to be unsound can be modified 
to showing the argument to be invalid if we observe that assuming (and that what Lewis 
does) that MCC and MCN should always hold of the restricting modifier, amounts to 
assuming that there are no worlds where MCC or MCN fails to hold of the modifier, i.e. there 
are no inconsistent or incomplete worlds. Insisting on MCN always holding of the modifier, 
amounts to insisting that all worlds obey LNC, which consequently rules out there being any 
inconsistent worlds – the precise and particular conclusion that Lewis argues for (C3). But 
having already employed a principle (MCN) that doesn’t hold for inconsistent worlds, Lewis 
has effectively assumed that there are no such worlds (since the use of MCN is blatantly 
illicit at such worlds), in particular the world from the hypothesis, where the marvellous 
mountain is said to exist. This begs the question against the existence of genuinely 
inconsistent individuals. 
 
Consider the contrast in the applicability of MCN in the two following cases; the first based 
on an example from Lewis (Lewis 1986), where MCN intuitively and uncontroversially 
applies, and the second one borrowed from Priest’s story Sylvan’s Box (Priest 1997) where it 
just obviously cannot apply, since the box is stipulated to be an impossible object. That is, the 
box from the story is both empty and contains a wooden figurine fixed to its bottom, whereas 
the fridge is a classical object, as are its contents. 
 
(1)  In the fridge: there is no beer. 
(2)  In the box: there is no wooden figurine.  
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These two propositions have the negation within the scope of their respective domain 
restricting modifiers. Now if MCN was valid for both classical and non-classical domains its 
application would warrant salva veritate the following transformations of (1) and (2):141 
 
(3)  It’s not the case that in the fridge: there is some beer. 
(4)  It’s not the case that in the box: there is a wooden figurine. 
 
It’s rather obvious that the move from (1) to (3) via recourse to MCN is not only natural and 
intuitive, but justified, under the (stipulated) assumption that the fridge and its contents are 
classical – in particular they obey LNC. In fact the two propositions are classically equivalent 
– (1) is true if and only if (3) is true. By contrast, given that the box is what it is – an 
impossibilia of the truth value glut kind, (2) doesn’t imply (4) because whereas (2) is true (4) 
is as a matter of fact false (and false only), and its negation is true. Hence assuming MCN as 
valid rules out talk of inconsistent worlds, because we have just seen such worlds are 
counterexamples to MCN’s validity. The fallacy is clear once we reveal all the enthymematic 
content that the premises carry: 
 
(Hyp) There is an inconsistent world w such that at w: A and not A. 
(P1) MCC and MCN are true of the domain restricting modifier for all worlds, 
which implies that there are no inconsistent worlds (question begging). 
(C1)     There is a world w such that at w: A and not at w: A.       (Hyp+P1) 
(P2) There is no subject matter whereby one can tell the truth by contradicting  
  themselves (LNC).  
(C2) Therefore, there is no such w. 
(C3) Therefore there are no inconsistent worlds.    (RAA) 
(C4) There are no impossible worlds. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion let’s clearly emphasize what the above means for the extended argument from 
admissible paraphrase. Let’s recall that the explicit position of Lewis (1973) is that such face-
value interpretation ought to be regarded as affording the best semantic theory of the 
discourse if it does not lead to trouble and the alternatives do (Divers 2002, p.68): 
 
                                               
141 I’m aware of the implicit fictionalist account of possible and impossible worlds, which the story can be seen 
to endorse. The box from the story is to be considered as a Lewisean kind of impossibilia, i.e. real and concrete. I 
only use this example for historical reasons 
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I do not make it an inviolable principle to take seeming existential quantifications 
in ordinary language at their face value. But I do recognize a presumption in favor 
of taking sentences at their face value, unless (1) taking them at face value is 
known to lead to trouble, and (2) taking them some other way is known not to. 
(Lewis 1973, p.84) 
 
It has been shown that, on the extended account, the most obvious kind of trouble to 
Lewis―an inconsistent theory―does not arise, so although not entirely dismissed (1) is 
substantially weakened. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Ordering Semantics for Counterfactuals  
&  
A Contextualized Account of Counterfactuals 
 
 
We may separate the contribution of 
practice and context from the contribution 
of the world, evaluating counterfactuals as 
true or false at a world, and according to a 
'frame' determined somehow by practice 
and context.  
 
(Lewis, 1981) 
 
Our system of spheres is nothing but a 
convenient device for carrying information 
about the comparative similarity of worlds. 
We could do away with the spheres, and give 
the truth conditions for counterfactuals 
directly in terms of comparative similarity of 
worlds […]  
 
(Lewis 1973) 
 
 
 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter gives an account of a contextualized (context relativized) counterfactual of the 
form ‘In context C: If it were the case that … , then it would be the case that …’, based on 
Lewis’ (1974, 1981) analysis of the counterfactual. Drawing on earlier work by Lewis (1973, 
1981) I first give an ordering semantics for counterfactuals, based on the idea of comparative 
similarity, interpreted as ‘similarity in relevant respects’ or as ‘relevant similarity’, and 
modelled by total preorderings of possible worlds. Subsequently, building on that analysis I 
develop model-theoretic methods for a semantic consequence relation of contextualized 
counterfactuals (contextualized validity), which is given as the culminating item of the 
chapter. 
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The early part of the chapter (§4.1-§4.2) is devoted to defining the counterfactual language 
and an ordering semantics model theory, where comparative similarity of worlds is modelled 
by total preorders. In section §4.2, drawing on arguments given earlier in chapter 2, the 
resulting logic CS that I endorse is much like Lewis’ preferred account of the counterfactual 
save for strict centering being replaced with a weaker centering condition. That is, CS is just 
the logic that Lewis (1973) calls VW, which is obtained from Lewis’ preferred system VC 
(commonly referred to as C1) by replacing the strict centering condition with the weak 
centering condition, or equivalently removing the axiom (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ⊃ (𝐴 > 𝐵) from the 
axiomatized version of VC (Lewis 1973, p.132). The system CS has a special relationship to 
the system S of chapter 2. The appendix on page 163 contains the proof of the equivalence of 
the class of CS models and the class of S models. That is, these classes validate the same sets 
of formulae and inferences. 
 
In section §4.3 I further develop those features of CS model theory that are designed to 
provide a foundation for the logics of contextualized counterfactuals CS+, CS1+ and CS2+ 
developed in sections §4.4.3-§4.4.5. Because those features are central in their significance, 
they deserve a fitting prelude at this point.  
 
Ordering  frames, which constitute the basis of CS model theory given in §4.2 are – much 
like systems of spheres – a means of carrying information about the comparative similarity of 
worlds, relative to the actual world (or any other world where a counterfactual’s truth is being 
evaluated). On Lewis’ (1981, §2) conception of comparative similarity (which I adopt) as 
being largely determined by contextual considerations – contingent both on the facts that 
obtain at the actual world and what (counter-facts) we deem as relevant in any given 
conversational setting – ordering frames can be viewed as carriers of contextual information. 
On the reading of similarity as similarity in relevant respects, which I also maintain, 
comparative similarity of worlds is closely tied to relevance. Just as we think of possible 
worlds as the ways the world could be, we can think of ordering frames as ways that all facts 
and propositions could be distributed as a function of their relevance (importance, 
significance) to any given conversation.  
This role of ordering frames – as contextual information carriers – can be developed further, 
in order to account for transformations (on ordering frames) interpreted as adding or 
subtracting contextual information. In §4.3 I define special classes of ordering frames, viz. 
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refinements and their duals, dilutions, which result from adding or subtracting contextual 
information, respectively to/from other ordering frames.  
As an introductory example, consider the domain of integers and let us stipulate absolute 
value as the sole relevant parameter of “similarity to zero” – the smaller the absolute value, 
the greater the similarity to zero. Then any integer n and its negative counterpart -n are said to 
be equivalent in terms of their comparative similarity to zero, yielding the following 
ordering, (where the leftmost item indicates zero as being the most similar integer to itself, 
and rightward being the direction of increasing dissimilarity to zero): 
 
(4.1)   {0}, {-1, 1}, {-2, 2}, … , {-n, n}, … 
 
This ordering (which is a total preordering of the integers) can be said to carry the 
information about all integers’ relevant similarity to zero, where relevant similarity in this 
case is the integer’s absolute value. We could add more information to this ordering – that is, 
we could refine the information in this ordering by adding a parameter that would introduce 
distinctions where none previously existed on account of their irrelevance, i.e. +/- sign 
distinction irrelevance.  
 
A refinement of (4.1) would be an ordering that results from introducing new distinctions 
(interpreted as adding contextual information to the original ordering), whilst preserving the 
previous relevant comparative similarity differences (interpreted as preserving contextual 
information carried by the original ordering).142 For example, consider a refinement in which 
all positive integers are taken to be more similar to zero than their negative counterparts: 
 
(4.2)   {0}, {1}, {-1}, {2}, {-2}, … , {n}, {-n}, … 
 
Note that the original comparative similarity distinctions (original contextual information) 
have been preserved, i.e. as before any m is more similar to zero than any n iff |m|<|n|.  
The central idea of refinements immediately gives rise to a more general and equally 
important concept of mutual refinements which are refinements of more than one ordering 
frame, and which are central to the notion of contextual information preservation underlying 
the semantic consequence relation defined on the contextualized language in §4.4.5.  
 
                                               
142 There are rudimentary parallels between what I call refinements and set partition refinements. 
100 
 
 
Sections §4.4.1-§4.4.3 constitute the model theory of the proposed analysis of contextualized 
counterfactuals, consisting of context representation, a formal language and its semantics. 
Setting up the basics of the semantics for the contextualized language in §4.4.1 I designate 
the role of context representation to CS ordering frames (which constitute the basis of the CS 
account of counterfactuals given earlier) and argue that they are adequate for that purpose. 
 
The formal language for contextualized counterfactuals, given in section §4.4.2, introduces 
context-indexed connectives >𝑐 for each context c. That is, expressions like 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 in the 
formal language intend to model contextualized counterfactuals of the form ‘In context c: If it 
were the case that 𝐴, then then it would be the case that 𝐵’, where 𝐴 and 𝐵 express 
propositions. Subsequently, the corresponding semantics (CS+ model theory) of thus 
contextualized language allows making distinctions in the truth value of counterfactuals with 
the same antecedents (and even the same antecedents and consequents), by appeal to 
contextual considerations explicitly indicated by their respective context indices.  
 
The semantics for the contextualized language, is developed in §4.4.2 and §4.4.3,  and draws 
strongly on CS model theory (intended to serve as the foundation for CS+ model theory), i.e. 
by developing a mechanism that reduces the truth conditions of 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 on a CS+ model to 
those of 𝐴 > 𝐵 on a corresponding CS model whose underlying ordering frame is taken to 
represent context c.143 That is, contextual considerations underlying a context-indexed 
expression are cashed out in terms of contextual information carried by ordering frames. The 
greater expressive power of the contextualized formal language gives the proposed analysis 
clear advantages over some alternative accounts.144   
  
The culmination of the chapter is the logic of contextualized counterfactuals CS2+, offered in 
the form of a semantic consequence (contextualized validity), developed throughout sections 
§4.4.3-§4.4.5. I begin with the most basic system of the contextualized language CS+, 
defined at the end of f §4.3, which is hardly a logic of contextualized counterfactuals, since it 
                                               
143 The general character of the model theory of the contextualized language doesn’t require the use any 
particular counterfactual analysis as its basis. The formalism is not entirely dependent on the base conditional 
logic. The proposal is a general prescription of how to  contextualize a conditional language. The advantage of 
CS are the results about ordering frames and mutual refinements that allow to fashion a meaningful notion of 
contextual information preservation when defining semantic consequence.  
144 Gabbay’s (1972) account has allowed for distinguishing between counterfactuals with same antecedents but 
different consequents, however falls short of distinguishing counterfactuals with the same antecedent and 
consequent, an observation also made by Nute (1980, p.76).  
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doesn’t place any formal validity constraints on semantic consequence that require a 
contextual link between the premises and conclusion.  
 
To develop such a notion of a contextual connection between the premises and the conclusion 
– a form of contextual information preservation – I show in §4.4.4 that CS+ preserves much 
of CS, if certain contextual restrictions are in place, and then I define the first proper logic of 
contextualized counterfactual CS1+ at the beginning of §4.4.5 with those contextual 
constraints included. To give a sense the contextual constraints placed on CS1+ semantic 
consequence, let us consider the following example: 
 
In context a : If Caesar had been in command, he would have used the A-bomb. 
In context b : If Caesar had been in command, he would have used catapults. 
       Therefore 
In context c : If Caesar had been in command, he would have used the A-bomb and catapults. 
 
The fundamental idea underlying contextualized validity is to add a condition of the existence 
of a link between the contextual information underlying the premises and the conclusion. To 
put it simply, for the contextualized inference to be valid it is required that the conclusion 
context c preserves the contextual information of the contexts a and b that make the premises 
true.145 Only then a truth preserving inference can be said to be contextually valid. There is an 
interesting parallel between this requirement and the syntactic necessary condition for valid 
relevant conditionals that we have encountered earlier (chapter 1, Definition 1.7), which 
demands that the antecedent and consequent share a common propositional variable. Here, on 
the other hand, we have an analogous semantic necessary condition for valid inference, which 
demands that the premises and the conclusion share a common structure, interpreted as a 
carrier of contextual information. 
 
                                               
145 Berto (2014, p.113; 2017, p.11) notices – in the context of a logic of imagination – that the conclusion 
shouldn’t come automatically, as a logical entailment. However, the solution he suggests (Berto 2014, p.113, f.9; 
Berto 2017, p.11), of fixing the premises to range across a single context, although sound, needn’t be that 
strong. The challenge, as I see it is to allow premises to range over more than one context and propose a means 
for contextual information that ensures truth preservation. There are some parallels between my conditions for 
contextualized validity and those suggested by Priest (2017, §3.2), for what he calls material validity, albeit 
expressed in terms of imported information. 
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I conclude §4.4.5 and the chapter by defining the system CS2+, which is weaker than CS1+ 
due to an alteration of the contextual constraints – one motivated by the invalidation of some 
questionable inferences whose formal validity CS1+ inherits from CS. 
 
The main results of section §4.3, devoted to the model theory based on ordering frames, are 
Lemma 4.3, regarding the duality between refinements and dilutions, Proposition 4.5 which 
establishes important truth preserving property of refinements, and the dual result concerning 
falsity preserving properties of dilutions is given by Corollary 4.5.1. The main results in 
section §4.4 of the modified model theory for the contextualized language are Theorem 4.9, 
and Theorem 4.10, which say that depending on the extent of restrictions on the kind of 
context indices appearing in the premises and conclusion, CS+ preserves either all of the 
logic CS, or some of it. Corollaries 4.9.1 and 4.9.2 say that CS+ reduces to S5 or CS if the 
context index-set is empty or a singleton, respectively.  
 
4.1 The formal language 
First let’s start with the basic ingredients for our language, i.e. a set of propositional variables  
𝑃𝑉 = {𝑝𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ ℕ} the elements of which shall be denoted with lowercase Roman letters 
(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, … ) or subscripted lowercase Roman 𝑝’s (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑘 , … ), or lowercase Greek letters 
(𝜑, 𝜓, 𝜒, … ); unary connectives: ~ (negation), □ (necessity), ◊ (possibility); and binary 
connectives: ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), ⊃ (material conditional), > (counterfactual 
conditional). For the metalanguage, upper case letters (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, … ) shall be used as variables 
ranging over complex formulae and propositional variables. 
 
Definition 4.1.1: Define our language of interest, denoted ℒ, to be the set: {~, □,.◊, .∧, .∨, ⊃, >}.  
 
Definition 4.1.2: Let the set of propositional variables be 𝑃𝑉 = {𝑝𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ ℕ}. 
 
Now we define the set of well-formed formulae.146 
Definition 4.1.3: Let 𝐹𝑜𝑟 be the smallest set closed under the following well-formed formula 
formation rules: 
 
                                               
146 E.g. the counterfactual ‘If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over’ would have the form: 𝑝 > 𝑞, 
where 𝑝 stands for ‘kangaroos have no tails’ and 𝑞 stands for ‘kangaroos topple over’. This is the same 
language, as defined in §2.1.1. 
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B:      All propositional variables are wffs, i.e. 𝑃𝑉 ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
R1: If 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 then {~𝐴, □𝐴,.◊𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
R2: If {𝐴, 𝐵} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 then {𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵, 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐵} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
 
Definition 4.1.4: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. The set of subformulae of 𝐴 is the smallest set 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) satisfying 
the following conditions:  
1. 𝐴 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) 
2. For each ∗ ∈ {~, □,.◊. } if ∗ 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴), then 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴). 
3. For each ∘ ∈ {∧,∨, ⊃, >} if 𝐵 ∘ 𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴), then 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) and 𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴). 
Next, we proceed to defining structures on which > is to be defined. The conditions that have 
been adopted are those thought to be best in terms of what Lewis’ account offers, i.e. what 
inferences it validates and which ones it invalidates, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Note that for all 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: if 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴), then 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐵) ⊆ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴). 
Proof : It’s immediate, from the definition. 
 
Definition 4.1.5: It will be helpful to define the subset of 𝐹𝑜𝑟 that contains all and only 
formulae that contain occurrences of >. Denote that subset with 𝐹𝑜𝑟>.  
More formally: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>  iff   ∃𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) such that 𝐵 = 𝐶 > 𝐷 for some 𝐶, 𝐷 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟.  
 
Definition 4.1.6: Denote the set 𝐹𝑜𝑟\𝐹𝑜𝑟> with 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , which is just the set of wffs of basic 
modal language. 
 
Definition 4.1.7: Define 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0 ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟> as follows: 𝐶 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0 iff whenever 𝐴 > 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐶), 
then both 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 
 
That is, 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0 is just like 𝐹𝑜𝑟>, but any instances of 𝐴 > 𝐵 are restricted in the above sense. 
Example: ~(𝑝 > (𝑞 ⊃ 𝑟)) ∧ (((𝑝 ∧ ~𝑞) > 𝑟) ∨ (𝑞 > ~𝑟)) ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0 but 𝑝 > (𝑝 > 𝑝) ∉ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0. 
 
Definition 4.1.8: Define 𝐹𝑜𝑟(>) ≔ {𝐴 > 𝐵: 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟}.  That is, 𝐹𝑜𝑟(>) is just the set of 𝐹𝑜𝑟 
formulae whose main connective is >. 
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4.2 Comparative Similarity 
In order to know what the relations in our semantics are, we need to introduce their intended 
meaning and basic properties. The systems of spheres discussed in §2.2 are just a convenient, 
and intuitive way for representing information about the comparative similarity of worlds.147 
We can do the same, directly in terms of comparative similarity of worlds, together with 
accessibility. To make this explicit let’s consider the following definitions. 
 
Definition 4.2.1: A binary relation 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑆 × 𝑆 on a set 𝑆, denoted by ≲, is a preorder iff it is:  
(1)    Transitive: ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 ((𝑥 ≲ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≲ 𝑧) ⟶ 𝑥 ≲ 𝑧). 
(2)    Reflexive: ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 (𝑥 ≲ 𝑥). 
If ≲ satisfies (1), (2), and (3), it is a total preorder (also called a non-strict weak order). 
(3)   Totality: ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 (𝑥 ≲ 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 ≲ 𝑥 ). 148 
 
Definition 4.2.1.1: For any preorder ≲, denote (𝑥, 𝑦) ∉ ≲, i.e. ‘it is not  the case that 𝑥 ≲ 𝑦’ 
with 𝑦 < 𝑥, and let us write 𝑥~𝑦 to mean that both 𝑥 ≲ 𝑦 and 𝑦 ≲ 𝑥. 
 
Corollary 4.0.1: If ≲ is a preorder on 𝑆 then for no 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆: 𝑥 < 𝑥. 
Proof : This follows directly from reflexivity of ≲, i.e. 𝑥 < 𝑥 means (𝑥, 𝑥) ∉ ≲, contradicting 
reflexivity of ≲.                         □ 
 
Corollary 4.0.2: If ≲ is a total preorder on 𝑆 then for all 𝑦, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆: 
(i) 𝑥 < 𝑦  iff  (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ≲  and  (𝑦, 𝑥) ∉ ≲  
(ii) 𝑥 ≲ 𝑦  iff  𝑥 < 𝑦  or  𝑥~𝑦   
Proof : (i) (𝑦, 𝑥) ∉ ≲  follows from definition of 𝑥 < 𝑦, and (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ≲ follows from totality of  
≲. (ii) Given totality, either (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ≲  and (𝑦, 𝑥) ∉ ≲  or both (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ≲  and (𝑦, 𝑥) ∈ ≲. The 
third, totality satisfying option (𝑥, 𝑦) ∉ ≲ and (𝑦, 𝑥) ∈ ≲ is clearly impossible.      □ 
 
My definition of ordering frames based on comparative similarity closely follows the 
definition of comparative similarity system in Lewis (1973, p.48), save for the condition 
corresponding to what Lewis calls centering, i.e. 
 
                                               
147 Lewis (1973, p.48). 
148 Lewis (1973, p.48) refers to this property as strongly connected. 
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(CS3.1)      The element 𝑖 is <𝑖-minimal: ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊(𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 ⟶ 𝑖 <𝑖 𝑗 ). 
 
which I replace with a weaker condition (CS3) corresponding to weak centering for reasons 
already given in §2.2.5.  
 
Definition 4.2.2: An ordering frame based on comparative similarity is a pair (𝑊, ≲), where 
𝑊 is a nonempty set and ≲: 𝑊 ⟶ ℘(𝑊) × ℘(𝑊 × 𝑊) is a function that assigns to each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊 
a pair (𝑆𝑖, ≲𝑖), consisting of a set 𝑆𝑖 ⊆ 𝑊, regarded as the set of worlds accessible from 𝑖, and 
a binary relation ≲𝑖 on 𝑊, regarded as the ordering of worlds in respect of their comparative 
similarity to 𝑖 and satisfying the following conditions, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊:  
 
(CS1)       ≲𝑖 is a total preorder on 𝑊 
(CS2)      𝑖 is self-accessible: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖. 
(CS3)      𝑖 is ≲𝑖-minimal: ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊(𝑖 ≲𝑖 𝑗 ). 
(CS4)      Inaccessible worlds are ≲𝑖-maximal: ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊(𝑘 ∉ 𝑆𝑖 ⟶ 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘). 
(CS5)      Accessible worlds are more similar to 𝑖 than inaccessible worlds: 
∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊((𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ∧ 𝑘 ∉ 𝑆𝑖) ⟶ 𝑗 <𝑖 𝑘) 
 
On the intended interpretation, elements of 𝑊 are possible worlds, 𝑆𝑖 is regarded as the set of 
worlds accessible from 𝑖, and ≲𝑖 is regarded as the ordering of worlds in respect of their 
comparative similarity to 𝑖, with the following intended meaning: 
 
𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 :  𝑗 is at least as similar to 𝑖 as 𝑘 is. 
𝑗 <𝑖 𝑘 :  𝑗 is more similar to 𝑖 than 𝑘 is. 
𝑗 ∼𝑖 𝑘 :  𝑗 and 𝑘 are equally similar to 𝑖.
149 
 
Definition 4.2.3: Denote the class of ordering frames from Definition 4.2.2 by CS. 
Note that since centering implies weak centering, the class of ordering frames where we 
substitute (CS3) for centering is a proper subclass of CS.150 
 
                                               
149 Lewis’ (1981, p.220) definition of ∼𝑖  in terms of a strict comparative similarity relation <𝑖  is logically 
equivalent to the one he gave earlier, in Lewis (1973, p.48) – the one I choose to use in the remainder of the 
chapter. In terms of <𝑖  the comparative similarity equivalence ∼𝑖 is defined as follows: 𝑗 ∼𝑖 𝑘: neither 𝑗 <𝑖 𝑘 
nor  𝑗 <𝑖 𝑘. 
150 Since, if 𝑗 <𝑖
𝐹 𝑘, then 𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐹 𝑘 for any 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊, by totality and definition of <𝑖
𝐹. 
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Definition 4.2.4: Given some 𝐹 ∈ CS, let 𝑊𝐹 denote the domain of 𝐹 and let ≲𝐹 denote 𝐹’s 
ordering/accessibility assignment on 𝐹’s domain, i.e. 𝑊𝐹 ⟶ ℘(𝑊𝐹) × ℘(𝑊𝐹 × 𝑊𝐹) as 
defined in 4.2.2. Also, let 𝑆𝑖
𝐹 and ≲𝑖
𝐹 denote the elements of the image (𝑆𝑖
𝐹 , ≲𝑖
𝐹) of 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝐹 
under ≲𝐹.  
 
It may be of use to define comparative similarity equivalence classes. 
 
Definition 4.2.4.1: Let ⟦𝑘⟧𝑖
𝐹 = {𝑗~𝑖
𝐹𝑘: 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐹} for 𝐹 ∈ CS and all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝐹.  
That is, ⟦𝑘⟧𝑖
𝐹 is the similarity equivalence class of worlds that are equally similar to 𝑖 as 𝑘 is, 
according to the ordering assignment (𝑆𝑖
𝐹 , ≲𝑖
𝐹).151 
 
To define the notion of truth according to an ordering frame, we need to define models. I’m 
tempted to adopt a valuation relation from Dunn’s (1976) semantics for FDE, which will 
facilitate generalizing the model theory once impossible worlds are introduced in Chapter 5. 
That is, use a valuation relation 𝜌 ⊆ (𝑊 × 𝑃𝑉) × {0,1}, and for Lewis’ account restrict 𝜌 so it 
is a function.152  
 
Definition 4.2.5: A model based on comparative similarity is the triple (𝑊, ≲, 𝜌) such that 
(𝑊, ≲) is an ordering frame and for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜌𝑖 ⊆ 𝑃𝑉 × {0,1} is a relation between 𝑃𝑉 and 
{0,1}. Informally we think of {𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑝𝜌𝑖1} as the set of worlds in the model where is 𝑝 true, 
and {𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑝𝜌𝑖0} as the set of worlds in the model where is 𝑝 false.  
For the duration of this chapter, we constrain 𝜌 so that for all 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊 either 𝑝𝜌𝑖0 or 
𝑝𝜌𝑖1, but not both. That is, for the time being we place the following constraints on 𝜌: 
 
Exclusion: for no 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, both 𝑝𝜌𝑖0 and 𝑝𝜌𝑖1. 
Exhaustion: for all 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, either 𝑝𝜌𝑖0 or 𝑝𝜌𝑖1.
153 
 
Note that thus restricted 𝜌 is effectively a function 𝜌𝑖: 𝑃𝑉 ⟶ {0,1} for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊. Truth in a 
model is defined in terms the satisfiability relation ⊩  ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟. We read 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 as ‘𝐴 is true 
at 𝑖’. Given a model (𝑊, ≲, 𝜌) and any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, define ⊩ as follows: 
 
   (1) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝑝     iff    𝑝𝜌𝑖1 
                                               
151 Note that for every assignment (𝑆𝑖
𝐹 , ≲𝑖
𝐹), the set of all ~𝑖
𝐹  equivalence classes {⟦𝑗⟧𝑖
𝐹: 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐹} partitions 𝑆𝑖
𝐹. 
152 To be precise, I will use Priest’s reconstruction of Dunn’s (1976) formulation, where in the latter truth values 
are identified with subsets of {0,1}. 
153 Borrowed from Priest (2008, §8.4). 
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   (2) 𝑖 ⊩ ~𝐴  iff    not  𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 
   (3) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  iff    𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴  and  𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 
   (4) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵  iff    𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴  or  𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 
   (5) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵  iff    𝑖 ⊩ ~𝐴  or  𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 
   (6) 𝑖 ⊩ □𝐴  iff    ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴. 
   (7) 𝑖 ⊩ ◊𝐴   iff    ∃𝑗 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴. 
   (8) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵  iff   (i)  ~∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖: 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴, or 
       (ii)    ∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖: 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴   and   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 (𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵) 
 
• Any reference to 𝜌 for the remainder of this chapter assumes 𝜌 satisfying both 
exclusion and exhaustion. For convenience, let’s introduce the following notation: 
𝑖 ⊩ Σ    iff     𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴  for all 𝐴 ∈ Σ 
• When we want to explicitly refer to truth at a world in a particular model 𝔄, we shall 
employ the following notation: 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 and  𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩ Σ.  
 
• Also denote with 𝔄 ⊩ 𝐴 when 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝔄. 
 
Definition 4.2.6: It will also be convenient to define [𝐴]𝔄 ∶= {𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴} for any model 𝔄 
with domain 𝑊. The superscript will be omitted in cases when its absence will not lead to 
ambiguity. 
 
Definition 4.2.7: Let ⊨𝐂𝐒 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴 iff for all models (𝑊, ≲, 𝜌), and 
all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, if 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴. We say an inference from Σ to 𝐴 is valid iff 
Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴. That is, valid inference is defined as truth preservation at all worlds in all CS-
models. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴. Call this logic CS. 
 
Note that since the truth conditions for □ and ◊ formulae are defined in terms of unrestricted 
quantification over possible worlds, i.e. only >-formulae truth conditions contain 
accessibility restrictions, the above validity conditions give the modal logic S5 for the basic 
modal language. 
 
Just as we have relativized formula validity to a model 𝔄 ⊩ 𝐴 it will be of use to define valid 
inference relativized to a model. 
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Definition 4.2.7.1: Let ⊨𝔄 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and given a CS model 𝔄 = (𝑊, ≲, 𝜌) write 
• ⊨𝔄 𝐴  iff   𝔄 ⊩ 𝐴 
• Σ ⊨𝔄 𝐴  iff  for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, if 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴. 
 
This allows us to give a more succinct definition of semantic consequence: 
    Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴   iff   for all CS models 𝔄:  Σ ⊨𝔄 𝐴   
Note that it is immediate from the above definitions that ⊨𝐂𝐒 ⊆ ⊨𝔄 .  
 
4.3 Ordering frame refinements and dilutions 
Let us start now turn to defining ordering frame refinements and dilutions.154 
 
Definition 4.3.1: Let ℛ ⊆ 𝐂𝐒 × 𝐂𝐒 and call an ordering frame 𝐺 a refinement of ordering 
frame 𝐹 iff (𝐹, 𝐺) ∈ ℛ. And define (𝐹, 𝐺) ∈ ℛ  iff:  
(i) 𝑊𝐺 = 𝑊𝐹,  
and for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝐹:  
(ii) ≲𝑖
𝐺  ⊆ ≲𝑖
𝐹 
(iii) 𝑆𝑖
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑖
𝐹 
 
Definition 4.3.1.1: A proper refinement of 𝐹 is a refinement 𝐺, such that 𝐺 ≠ 𝐹. 
 
Definition 4.3.1.2: Let ℛ[𝐹] ≔ {𝐺 ∈ 𝐂𝐒: (𝐹, 𝐺) ∈ ℛ} denote the image of 𝐹 under ℛ, i.e. the 
set of all refinements of 𝐹. 
 
Definition 4.3.2: Let 𝒟 ⊆ 𝐂𝐒 × 𝐂𝐒 and call an ordering frame 𝐺 a dilution of ordering frame 𝐹 
iff (𝐹, 𝐺) ∈ 𝒟. And define (𝐹, 𝐺) ∈ 𝒟 iff: 
(i) 𝑊𝐺 = 𝑊𝐹,  
and for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝐹: 
(ii) ≲𝑖
𝐹 ⊆ ≲𝑖
𝐺 
(iii) 𝑆𝑖
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑖
𝐹 
 
                                               
154 The essential idea of refinements is based on Lewis (1981, pp.226-7). However, Lewis (1981) defines 
refinements on strict preorder relations: if 𝑗 <𝑖
𝐹 𝑘, then 𝑗 <𝑖
𝐺 𝑘 (where 𝐺 is a refinement of 𝐹). Given the way I 
have defined refinements (using total preorders) Lewis’ definition is a derived property of refinements, i.e. 
Lemma 4.1. 
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Definition 4.3.2.1: A proper dilution of 𝐹 is a dilution 𝐺 of 𝐹, such that 𝐺 ≠ 𝐹. 
 
NOTE: the orderings of refinements and dilutions are total, by definition of ordering frames.  
 
Definition 4.3.2.2: Let 𝒟[𝐹] ≔ {𝐺 ∈ 𝐂𝐒: (𝐹, 𝐺) ∈ 𝒟} denote the image of 𝐹 under 𝒟, i.e. the 
set of all dilutions of 𝐹. 
 
4.3.1 Intended role and meaning of ordering frame refinements & dilutions 
The following informal discussion intends to give a better understanding of what refinements 
and dilutions are, and how it is precisely that they represent what they are intended to 
represent. It includes a number of examples and important limit cases. It is important that the 
readers’ intuitions about refinements and dilutions are secured, since these structures are 
central to most of the content in this chapter. 
 
4.3.1.1  Representing total preorders 
If will be useful to employ useful representations of total preorders in our discussion to aid 
the explanation how they are intended to carry contextual information. The definition below 
offers an intuitive means of representing total preorders. 
 
Definition 4.3.3: Let (𝑆, ≲) be a total preorder. Let 𝑎 | 𝑏 represent 𝑎 < 𝑏 and 𝑎 𝑏 or 𝑏 𝑎 (or 
with commas, e.g. 𝑎, 𝑏 or 𝑎, 𝑏) represent 𝑎~𝑏 for any 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑆, such that 𝑎 ≠ 𝑏.155 Reflexivity 
in this picture is left as implicit. For larger, or infinite collections, I may write 
𝑎1 … 𝑎𝑛 | 𝑏1𝑏2 …  
 
Example: Let (𝑊, ≲) = ({𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑}, {(𝑎, 𝑏), (𝑎, 𝑐), (𝑎, 𝑑), (𝑏, 𝑐), (𝑏, 𝑑), (𝑐, 𝑏), (𝑐, 𝑑), … }), where 
the ellipsis denotes the remaining reflexive pairs. We say that 𝑎 | 𝑏 𝑐 | 𝑑 represents (𝑊, ≲). 
Note that 𝑎 | 𝑐 𝑏 | 𝑑 is the other valid representation. 
 
Example: Let 𝑃 = (ℤ, ≲𝑃) be the total preorder on the integers, defined: 𝑚 ≲𝑃 𝑛 iff |𝑚| ≤ |𝑛|. 
Intuitively we can say 𝑚 ≲ 𝑛 iff m is at least as close to zero as n. We can represent (ℤ, ≲) as: 
 
0 | − 1, 1 | − 2, 2 | −3, 3 | …  
 
Clearly, −𝑛 ~𝑃𝑛 for all 𝑛 ∈ ℤ, and 𝑚 <𝑃 𝑛 for all 𝑚, 𝑛 ∈ ℤ such that |𝑚| < |𝑛|. 
                                               
155 Recall from definition 4.2.1.1 that for any preorder ≲ on a set S, we denote (𝑥, 𝑦) ∉ ≲, i.e. ‘it is not the case 
that 𝑥 ≲ 𝑦’ with 𝑦 < 𝑥, and we write 𝑥~𝑦 to mean that both 𝑥 ≲ 𝑦 and 𝑦 ≲ 𝑥. 
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4.3.1.2  Refinements and Dilutions 
Strictly speaking, the terms refinement and dilution apply to entire ordering frames (which 
are more like families of total preorders), not the particular ordering assignments (similarity 
assignments). That is, ordering frames have the general structure (𝑊, {(𝑆𝑖, ≲𝑖): 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊}), and 
refinements are defined on such structures, but in the following explanation of the basic 
properties of refinements and dilutions I’ll also extend the use of the term 
refinement/dilution, to the individual assignments themselves, i.e. if 𝐺 is a refinement of 𝐹, 
I’ll also refer to (𝑆𝑖
𝐺 , ≲𝑖
𝐺) as the refinement of (𝑆𝑖
𝐹, ≲𝑖
𝐹) for some 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, since after all it is the 
ordering relationships of such individual assignments between ordering frames and their 
refinements/dilutions that are key. The following examples focus on the motivation and 
intended meaning of conditions (ii) of definitions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 regarding the relationship of 
the particular ordering assignments to their refined/diluted counterparts. That is, we’re going 
to discuss the meaning (formal and the intended interpretation) of the relationship between an 
assignment ≲𝑖
𝐹 and its counterparts when the frame 𝐹 is refined or diluted. 
 
Example: Form the earlier example featuring (ℤ, ≲𝑃), there are infinitely many proper 
refinements, each resolving some tie in “closeness to zero”, e.g.  
 
0 | −1 |  1  | − 2, 2 |−3, 3 | …  
or 
0 | − 1, 1 |  2  | − 2  |−3, 3 | …  
or 
0 | − 1, 1 | … | −𝑘 |  𝑘  | …  
 
for some integer 𝑘. We could define a refinement where positive integers are deemed as more 
similar to zero than negative integers, despite their absolute value tie in closeness: 
 
0 |   1   | − 1  |   2   | − 2  |   3   | − 3  | …  
Or vice-versa: 
0 | −1   |  1  | −2   |  2  | −3   |  3  | …  
 
Example: The total preorder on some world major cities is defined in terms of population 
size as compared to Brisbane (i.e. weakly centered on Brisbane), and we’ll consider a 
refinement that includes distance to Brisbane as an additional similarity parameter. Below are 
the relevant similarity parameters, i.e. the demographics and distance from Brisbane (~ 
denotes approx.).  
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Population (million):   Distance from Brisbane (1000 km): 
Brisbane:  ~2         0  
Perth:    ~2   ~4.3  
Auckland:   ~2   ~2.3  
Warsaw:  ~2   ~15 
Gold Coast:  ~0.6   ~0.1  
Sydney:   ~5   ~1 
Athens   ~0.7   ~15  
St. Petersburg:  ~5   ~14  
 
The similarity assignment F, or more precisely 
({Br, Per, Auc, War, G. Coa, Ath, Syd, St. Pet}, ≲Br
𝐹 ) carries the information about the comparative 
similarity of cities, relative to Brisbane, where the only relevant similarity parameter is a 
city’s population.  
The refinement R1 of F takes distance as an additional relevant parameter, but in a very 
coarse-grained manner – distance differences relative to Brisbane within two thousand 
kilometres don’t register as sufficiently relevant for the distinction i.e. Perth and Auckland 
aren’t distinguished nor are Sydney and the Gold Coast, nor St. Petersburg and Athens.  
The refinement R2 of R1 and a fortiori a refinement of F, introduces more resolution, 
making differences in distance relative to Brisbane below a thousand kilometres relevant, 
thereby distinguishing even the distance-to-Brisbane difference between Sydney and the Gold 
Coast, which is approximately a thousand kilometres. 
 
F Brisbane, Perth, Auckland Warsaw | Gold-Coast, Athens, Sydney, St. Petersburg 
R1  Brisbane, Perth, Auckland | Warsaw | Gold-Coast, Sydney | Athens, St. Petersburg 
R2   Brisbane | Perth, Auckland | Warsaw | Gold-Coast | Sydney | Athens | St. Petersburg 
 
Basically, in total preorders a proper refinement resolves at least a single symmetric pair, i.e. 
contains exactly one pair from the two contained in the original preorder, so for any total 
preorder (𝑊, ≲) = (𝑊, {(𝑎, 𝑏), (𝑏, 𝑎), … }), there exist refinements (𝑊, ≲𝛼) = (𝑊, ≲ ∖ {(𝑎, 𝑏)}) 
and (𝑊, ≲𝛽) = (𝑊, ≲ ∖ {(𝑏, 𝑎)}). We interpret this as refinements resolving comparative 
similarity ties (symmetric pairs). Clearly, both ≲𝛼 and ≲𝛽 are subsets of  ≲. It follows that 
maximal (in the sense of most symmetric pairs being resolved) refinements are linear (in the 
sense that if (𝑊, ≲𝛼) is some maximal refinement of (𝑊, ≲), then (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ ≲𝛼 and (𝑏, 𝑎) ∈ ≲𝛼 
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implies 𝑎 = 𝑏). There are two important limit cases. Namely, each maximal refinement is a 
linear order on 𝑊, and there’s a single maximal dilution i.e. 𝑊 × 𝑊. 
 
Example: Let (𝑊, ≲) = ({𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑}, {(𝑎, 𝑏), (𝑎, 𝑐), (𝑎, 𝑑), (𝑏, 𝑐), (𝑏, 𝑑), (𝑐, 𝑏), (𝑐, 𝑑), … }), where 
the ellipsis denotes the remaining reflexive pairs. Let’s consider the only two proper 
refinements of (𝑊, ≲), namely (𝑊, ≲ ∖ {(𝑐, 𝑏)}) and (𝑊, ≲ ∖ {(𝑏, 𝑐)}). 
 
𝑎 | 𝑏 𝑐 | 𝑑  (𝑊, ≲) 
𝑎 | 𝑏 | 𝑐 | 𝑑  (𝑊, ≲ ∖ {(𝑐, 𝑏)}) 
𝑎 | 𝑐 | 𝑏 | 𝑑  (𝑊, ≲ ∖ {(𝑏, 𝑐)}) 
 
Clearly ≲ ∖ {(𝑐, 𝑏)} ⊆ ≲ and ≲ ∖ {(𝑏, 𝑐)} ⊆ ≲. Note that both refinements happen to be 
maximal refinements of (𝑊, ≲). Also, (𝑊, ≲) is a dilution of (𝑊, ≲ ∖ {(𝑐, 𝑏)}) and 
(𝑊, ≲ ∖ {(𝑏, 𝑐)}), by definition of dilutions. 
 
4.3.1.3  Interpretation: Contextual Information 
Refinements, whilst containing more contextual information (when we refine, we add 
contextual information by making additional distinctions), preserve the contextual 
information of the original ordering frame. Another way of looking at this is to view those 
distinctions (absent from the original ordering frame) as becoming relevant on the context 
represented by the refinement. Dilutions do the opposite – they remove previously existing 
distinctions, so when we dilute we are removing contextual information (irrelevant 
information), i.e. distinctions that have been relevant on the original frame are no longer 
relevant on the dilution. 
 
Usually we tend to think of submodels as providing less information than their extensions. 
But in this case, there is a sense in which the opposite seems to be happening. When we 
refine, we are taking submodels, and we can keep going until we get to a linear ordering: that 
direction feels like we are adding information. On the other hand, if we take supermodels 
(dilute), the limit is the case where everything is related to everything else, which feels like 
we are losing information. This tends to go against the usual intuitions.156  
 
 
                                               
156 I owe this observation to Toby Meadows. 
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4.3.2 Properties of ordering frame refinements and dilutions 
Now we resume the formal discussion and prove some basic properties of refinements and 
dilutions. Frame refinements preserve the strict ordering of original ordering frames in the 
following sense: 
 
Lemma 4.1: If 𝐺 is a refinement of 𝐹, then if 𝑗 <𝑖
𝐹 𝑘 for any 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 according to some 
comparative similarity assignment (𝑆𝑖
𝐹 , ≲𝑖
𝐹), then 𝑗 <𝑖
𝐺 𝑘 according to (𝑆𝑖
𝐺 , ≲𝑖
𝐺). 
Proof : It suffices to note that, since ≲𝑖
𝐹 is total and ≲𝑖
𝐺  ⊆ ≲𝑖
𝐹 for each 𝑖, then if (𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ ≲𝑖
𝐹 and 
(𝑘, 𝑗) ∉ ≲𝑖
𝐹, i.e. 𝑗 <𝑖
𝐹 𝑘, then it follows that both (𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ ≲𝑖
𝐺 and (𝑘, 𝑗) ∉ ≲𝑖
𝐺, i.e. 𝑗 <𝑖
𝐺 𝑘. 
Denying (𝑘, 𝑗) ∉ ≲𝑖
𝐺 contradicts the subset property, and (𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ ≲𝑖
𝐺 contradicts totality.     □ 
 
We have a dual result to Lemma 4.1 for frame dilutions. That is, frame dilutions preserve the 
non-strict ordering of original ordering frames in the following sense: 
 
Lemma 4.2: If 𝐺 is a dilution of 𝐹 then if 𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐹 𝑘 for any 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 according to some comparative 
similarity assignment (𝑆𝑖
𝐹 , ≲𝑖
𝐹), then 𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐺 𝑘 according to (𝑆𝑖
𝐺 , ≲𝑖
𝐺). 
Proof : It suffices to observe that, since ≲𝑖
𝐹⊆ ≲𝑖
𝐺 for each 𝑖, if (𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ ≲𝑖
𝐹 then (𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ ≲𝑖
𝐺.     □ 
 
Corollary 4.2.1: If 𝑗~𝑖
𝐹𝑘 for any 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 according to some comparative similarity assignment 
(𝑆𝑖
𝐹 , ≲𝑖
𝐹) on a frame 𝐹, then 𝑗~𝑖
𝐺𝑘 according to any dilution 𝐺 of 𝐹.  
Proof :  Immediate from Lemma 4.2 and definition of ∼𝑖.         □ 
 
The dual relationship between frame refinements and frame dilutions, although implicit in the 
definition, deserves highlighting. 
 
Lemma 4.3: For any ordering frames 𝐹, 𝐺 ∈ CS, (𝐹, 𝐺) ∈ ℛ  iff  (𝐺, 𝐹) ∈ 𝒟. 
Proof :  It’s immediate from definitions of refinements and dilutions.                 □ 
 
Lemma 4.4: For any ordering frames 𝐹 = (𝑊𝐹 , ≲𝐹), 𝐺 = (𝑊𝐺 , ≲𝐺), and any 𝜌:  
If  𝑊𝐹 = 𝑊𝐺 and 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , then (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴  iff  (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴. 
Proof : It suffices to observe that the truth of formulae in 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is independent of ≲.     □ 
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The result below is central to some key applications in this chapter. Refinements are truth-
preserving in the following sense:157   
 
Proposition 4.5: If a counterfactual 𝐴 > 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0 is true at a world according to some 
ordering frame 𝐹, then it is true at that world according to any refinement of 𝐹. That is, for all 
𝐹 = (𝑊𝐹 , ≲𝐹) ∈ CS, and for all 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊
𝐹, and 𝜌:  
 
(𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵    iff    (∀𝐺 ∈ ℛ[𝐹])((𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵) 
 
Proof : (⟵) Is immediate, since 𝐹 ∈ ℛ[𝐹]. (⟶) Consider some 𝐹 ∈ CS, 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊
𝐹, 
and 𝜌, such that (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵, Hence, for all 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊
𝐹, 𝜌 either ~∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐹: 
(𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴 or ∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐹: (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴 and ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐹(𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐹 𝑘 ⟶ (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵). Let us start 
with the vacuous case (first disjunct) and assume for arbitrary 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊
𝐹, and 𝜌 that 
~∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐹: (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴. From this, Lemma 4.4, and the fact that 𝑆𝑖
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑖
𝐹 we can infer that 
~∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐺: (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴. Next, let us assume (the main hypothesis) ∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐹: (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴 and  
∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐹(𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐹 𝑘 ⟶ (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵). To distinguish it from other assumptions call this 
assumption the main hypothesis. It follows that ∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐺 and (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴 for all 𝐺 ∈ ℛ[𝐹], by 
Lemma 4.4 and the fact that 𝑆𝑖
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑖
𝐹. Now, to show that ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐺(𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐺 𝑘 ⟶ (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵) 
we’ll proceed by assuming 𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐺 𝑘 for arbitrary 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐺, 𝐺 ∈ ℛ[𝐹], and show (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵. 
So, let’s assume 𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐺 𝑘 for arbitrary 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐺, 𝐺 ∈ ℛ[𝐹], and note that since 𝐺 is a refinement of 
𝐹, then 𝐹 is a dilution of 𝐺, by Lemma 4.3. Also, it should be noted that dilutions are ≲-
preserving in the sense of Lemma 4.2. Hence, we conclude 𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐹 𝑘, by Lemma 4.2 and 4.3 . 
From this, and the main hypothesis we infer (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵, which in conjunction with the 
fact that 𝑊𝐹 = 𝑊𝐺 gives (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵, by Lemma 4.4. Therefore, we finally conclude that 
∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝐺(𝑗 ≲𝑖
𝐺 𝑘 ⟶ (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵), by conditional proof.  
 
This completes the proof.                        □ 
 
                                               
157 Lewis (1981, pp.226-227) has proven a similar result. His result is more general than Proposition 4.5 in one 
sense, and less general in another. Whereas Proposition 4.5 holds only for a class of frames based on total 
preorderings, Lewis has proven a similar result for ordering frames based on partial orderings (where only 
refinements are required to be based on total preorderings). On the other hand, whereas Lewis has proven this 
only for (strongly) centered ordering frames, Proposition 4.5 holds for weakly centered orderings frames, i.e. 
satisfying (CS3), so a fortiori it holds for ordering frames satisfying the (stronger) centering restriction (CS3.1). 
Also, the employment of frame dilutions and Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. makes the proof of Proposition 4.5 
substantially simper than Lewis’ proof. 
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We have a dual result for dilutions, which are falsity-preserving in the following sense: 
 
Corollary 4.5.1: For all frames 𝐹, 𝐺 ∈ CS and for all 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , and 𝜌: 
      (𝐺, 𝐹) ∈ 𝒟 ⟶ (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝐺)((𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊮ 𝐴 > 𝐵 ⟶ (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊮ 𝐴 > 𝐵) 
Proof : We have the following from Proposition 4.5, for all 𝐹, 𝐺 ∈ CS, 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , and 𝜌: 
    1.  (𝐹, 𝐺) ∈ ℛ ⟶ (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝐹)((𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 ⟶ (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵) 
Contraposing the consequent yields: 
  2. (𝐹, 𝐺) ∈ ℛ ⟶ (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝐹)((𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊮ 𝐴 > 𝐵 ⟶ (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊮ 𝐴 > 𝐵) 
Finally, we obtain 3 by substituting an equivalent term in the antecedent of 2, by Lemma 4.3,  
  3.  (𝐺, 𝐹) ∈ 𝒟 ⟶ (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝐺)((𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊮ 𝐴 > 𝐵 ⟶ (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊮ 𝐴 > 𝐵) 
and note that whenever the antecedents of 2 and 3 are true, then 𝑊𝐹 = 𝑊𝐺 is true, and the 
consequents of 2 and 3 are identical. If the antecedents of 2 and 3 are false, then both 2 and 3 
are vacuously true, so the quantifier change is justified.             □ 
 
4.4 Contextualized counterfactuals 
4.4.1 Context representation 
In order to account for contextualized counterfactuals, the formal language will be modified 
to include a family of connectives indexed by contexts. For that purpose, we need to posit the 
existence of an appropriate context (index) set. To sketch the background of the motivation 
for this approach, consider Lewis’ (1981, p.218, my emphasis) view on the role of ordering 
frames: 
 
The ordering that gives the factual background depends on the facts about the 
world, known or unknown; how it depends on them is determined – or 
underdetermined – by our linguistic practice and by context. We may separate 
the contribution of practice and context from the contribution of the world, 
evaluating counterfactuals as true or false at a world, and according to a 'frame' 
determined somehow by practice and context. 
 
In some sense what I am proposing is a little bit of a cheat, because prior to defining what 
contexts are I have already intended ordering frames to be the corresponding context-
representations. That is, I have decided on a very precise character of representations of 
objects whose existence I merely stipulate. However, this correspondence is not only intuitive 
but also partly justified, since we have already shown that ordering frames can be 
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meaningfully interpreted as carriers of contextual information.158 So, at least for our purpose 
of the minimal role of offering a means of distinguishing the truth of counterfactuals by 
explicit appeal to context in the object language – ordering frames serve as adequate model-
theoretic candidates.  
 
For an intuitive characterization of the proposed analysis and its capacity, let us proceed by 
examining some paradigmatic cases. Consider the following pairs of counterfactuals: 
 
1. If Caesar had been in command, he would have used the atom bomb. 
2. If Caesar had been in command, he would have used catapults. 
 
3. If Everest was in New Zealand, Everest would be in the Southern Hemisphere.  
4. If Everest was in New Zealand, New Zealand would be in the Northern Hemisphere. 
 
Each counterfactual in the first pair can be true in some context, but rarely would we think of 
them both true in a single context (although that may be possible), and likewise not all 
contexts that make (1) true would make (2) true. That is, intuitively, each counterfactual can 
be true by virtue of distinct contextual assumptions. So, for instance (1) can be true in a 
context (call it context a) where Caesar’s knowledge of weaponry is assumed to be that of a 
20th century military general, and moreover that he would resort – the strategic and ruthless 
genius that he undoubtedly was – to the most effective means (available to him) of defeating 
the enemy. However (1) would hardly be true in a context (call it context b) where Caesar’s 
knowledge of weaponry is restricted to that which he actually had in the 1st century BCE. 
 
The current proposal meets this challenge and allows distinctions between the truth of 
counterfactuals with the same antecedent and consequent on any single occasion, by explicit 
appeal to contingent contextual considerations. For example, we could have (1) evaluated as 
true and false on the same occasion of utterance, since the object language (developed in the 
next section) allows for explicit reference to distinct contexts that influence the truth of (1), 
e.g. so (1.a) may be true, and (1.b) may be false, in particular if they’re explicitly indexed by 
contexts a and b, characterized in the previous paragraph. 
 
  (1.a)   In context a : If Caesar had been in command, he would have used the atom bomb. 
  (1.b) In context b : If Caesar had been in command, he would have used the atom bomb. 
                                               
158 Following Lewis (1973, §2.3; 1981, §2) in that regard. 
117 
 
 
By extension, the proposal accommodates truth differences and coincidences of 
counterfactuals with the same antecedent, but different consequents.159 So, continuing our 
example, we could have (1) and (2) come apart in truth by appeal to a single context, i.e. have 
(1.b) remain false whilst having (2.b) correctly analysed as true. 
 
  (1.b)   In context b : If Caesar had been in command, he would have used the atom bomb. 
  (2.b) In context b : If Caesar had been in command, he would have used catapults. 
 
There may even be a single, peculiar context c where both (1) and (2) are true, however 
arguably there is no single context where both (3) and (4) are true, since once the 
enthymematic content is accounted for (all the relevant information is imported into the 
relevant antecedent worlds) we end up with inconsistency.160 Now we turn to defining the 
contextualized language. 
 
4.4.2 Modified languages  
 Each modified language is just like ℒ given in Definition 4.1.1 that generates 𝐹𝑜𝑟, but instead 
of the single connective >, each contains a family of indexed connectives. 
 
Definition 4.4.1: Let ℒ𝒞 ∶= {~, □,.◊, .∧, .∨, ⊃} ∪ {>𝑐 : 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞}, where 𝒞 is a set, regarded as a set 
of contexts.  
 
Here are some noteworthy special cases. Note that when 𝒞 = ∅, then ℒ𝒞 is just the basic 
propositional modal language, and when 𝒞 is a singleton, ℒ𝒞 resembles ℒ from Definition 
4.1.1 in the sense of being the basic propositional modal language expanded by a single 
additional dyadic modal connective.  
 
Well-formed formulae will reflect the intended analysis, so context-indices will not vary 
across nested >𝑐-formulae. I propose that the context-index of the main conditional 
connective >𝑐 of a nested conditional, e.g. 𝐴 >𝑐 (𝐵 >𝑐 𝐶) should settle the matter of what 
information is imported into counterfactual worlds when evaluating its subformulae. I do this 
                                               
159 Gabbay’s (1972) account allows for this, but not for distinguishing in truth value counterfactuals with the 
same antecedent and consequent. Nute (1980, p.76) also makes this observation. 
160 This is because the consequents are not formulated in a manner as to suggest partial containment by either 
hemisphere, and the hemispheres are disjoint. I return to this example in §4.4.5 and give formal arguments 
demonstrating that we end up with inconsistency by granting the truth of both (3) and (4) in claims 4.5.2 and 
4.5.3. 
118 
 
 
in Definition 4.4.6 by stipulating that nested indexed-conditionals inherit the context-index of 
the outermost indexed conditional. This proposed approach goes some way of meeting the 
challenge posed by Priest’s (2018, §3.1, f.14) question regarding what information from the 
world where the counterfactual is evaluated should be imported into counterfactual worlds, 
when evaluating nested conditionals (counterfactuals). 
 
An interesting question in this context is as follows. Consider a conditional with 
an embedded conditional, such as 𝐴 > (𝐵 > 𝐶). Is the information imported in 
evaluating the outer conditional the same as that imported in evaluating the inner 
conditional? […] Nothing said in this essay settles this matter. 
 Priest (2018, §3.1, f.14) 
 
The thought is that the information imported in evaluating the inner conditional is 
contextually the same, i.e. restricted by what information is imported in evaluating the outer 
conditional. The information is not the same, since the inner conditional need not have the 
same antecedent as the outer conditional, and its truth may not be evaluated at the same world 
as the outer conditional – both highly relevant factors that contribute to determining what 
information should be imported. The model theory given in §4.4.3 goes in detail how such 
contextual determination (of what information is imported) is established. 
 
To define the set of well-formed formulae of interest, it will be easier to first define a larger 
set, and subsequently apply the required restrictions. 
 
Definition 4.4.2: Let 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞 be the smallest set closed under the following well-formed 
formula formation rules: 
B:      All propositional variables are wffs, i.e. 𝑃𝑉 ⊆ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞. 
R1: If 𝐴 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞 then {~𝐴, □𝐴,.◊𝐴} ⊆ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞. 
R2: If {𝐴, 𝐵} ⊆ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞 then {𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵, 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵} ⊆ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞. 
R3: If {𝐴, 𝐵} ⊆ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞 and 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞, then  𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝒞  
 
Definition 4.4.3: Let 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ be the subset of 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞, closed only under B, R1, and R2.  
In other words, 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ denotes the set of wffs of the basic modal language, i.e. it doesn’t 
contain any instances of  >𝑐 for any 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞. 
 
Note that 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞′̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ for any two context sets 𝒞 and 𝒞′. 
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Definition 4.4.4: The set of subformulae of 𝐴 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞 is the smallest set 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) satisfying the 
following conditions:  
1. 𝐴 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) 
2. For each ∗ ∈ {~, □,.◊. } if ∗ 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴), then 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴). 
3. For each ∘ ∈ {∧,∨, ⊃} if 𝐵 ∘ 𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴), then 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) and 𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴). 
4. For each ∘ ∈ {>𝑐 : 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞} if 𝐵 ∘ 𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴), then 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) and 𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴). 
 
Definition 4.4.5: Let 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ) be the set of context-indices appearing in Σ ⊆ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞.  
𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ) = {𝑐 ∈ 𝒞: ∃𝐴 ∈ Σ ∧ [∃𝐵, 𝐶 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞((𝐵 >𝑐 𝐶) ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴))]} 
 
Example: 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝑝 >𝑎 (𝑞 >𝑑 𝑟), (𝑝 >𝑏 𝑟) ∨ (𝑝 >𝑐 𝑞)}) = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑}.  
 
Indexed conditionals embedded (nested) within other indexed conditionals inherit the indices 
of the outermost indexed conditional. It just doesn’t make sense in this picture to speak of 
embedded conditionals whose indices vary. Below is the restriction on 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞 that reflects this.  
 
Definition 4.4.6: Let 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞 ≔ {𝐴 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝒞: ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝒞 ((𝐶 >𝑐 𝐷 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴)) ⟶ 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐶, 𝐷}) ⊆ {𝑐})}. 
 
Example: Formulae such as 𝑝 >𝑎 (𝑞 >𝑏 𝑟) or (𝑞 >𝑏 𝑟) >𝑎 𝑝, where 𝑎 ≠ 𝑏, are not elements of 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞. However, the following are:  𝑝 >𝑎 (𝑞 >𝑎 𝑟), (𝑞 >𝑏 𝑟) >𝑏 𝑝, (𝑝 >𝑎 𝑞) ∨ (𝑟 >𝑏 𝑠). 
 
Definition 4.4.7: Let 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 ∶= {𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞: 𝐵 >𝑐 𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) ⟶  𝐵, 𝐶 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ }.  
 
Example: ~(𝑝 >𝑎 (𝑞 ⊃ 𝑟)) ∧ (((𝑝 ∧ ~𝑞) >𝑏 𝑟) ∨ (𝑞 >𝑐 𝑟)) ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞   but  𝑝 >𝑐 (𝑝 >𝑐 𝑝) ∉
𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞  for any 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞. 
 
Definition 4.4.8: Define 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞(>) ≔ {𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵: 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟
𝒞 , 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞 }. That is, 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞(>) is just the 
set of 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞 formulae whose main connective is >𝑐, for some 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞. 
  
The following definition will play a key role in the definition of truth conditions for indexed 
counterfactuals, i.e. for truth conditions formulae like 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵.  
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Definition 4.4.9: Let __: 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞 ⟶ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 be the function that transforms all formulae with 
indexed connectives >𝑐 for any 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞 into unindexed ones >, in all subformulae of a formula. 
That is, it “strips” any 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞 formula of its indices leaving its index-less 𝐹𝑜𝑟 counterpart. 
 
B:      𝑝 = 𝑝  for all  𝑐 ∈ 𝑃𝑉. 
R1: ∗ 𝐴 = ∗ 𝐴  for each ∗ ∈ {~, □,.◊. } and 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞. 
R2: 𝐴 ∘ 𝐵 =  𝐴 ∘ 𝐵  for each ∘ ∈ {∧,∨, ⊃} and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞. 
R3: 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 = 𝐴 > 𝐵  for each 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞 and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟
𝒞. 
 
Example: ~𝑝 >𝑐 (𝑞 ∨ 𝑟) = ~𝑝 > (𝑞 ∨ 𝑟). 
 
It will be useful to extend the above definition to sets of formulae. No ambiguity should arise 
whether the argument is a formula or a set of formulae. 
 
Definition 4.4.10: For any Σ ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞, let Σ ≔ {𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 𝐴 ∈ Σ}. 
 
4.4.3 Modified model theory 
The formula 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 is intended to be read as explicitly contextualized version of 𝐴 > 𝐵. That 
is, the model theory in this section provides an analysis of 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵, which is to be read as: 
 
‘In context c: If it were the case that 𝐴, then it would be the case that 𝐵.’ 
 
For the purposes of the modified model theory, we will need sets containing CS frames with 
some particular domain 𝑊 (our models make use of CS models with the same domain). 
 
Definition 4.4.11 : Let ℱ𝑊 ∶= {(𝑈, ≲) ∈ 𝐂𝐒: 𝑈 = 𝑊}. 
 
Definition 4.4.12: A CS+ frame of the modified language is the triple: 
(𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟) 
where 𝑊 ≠ ∅ and 𝒞 are sets, 𝑟: 𝒞 ⟶ ℱ𝑊 is a function, and ℱ𝑊 is as defined in 4.4.11. 
Informally, 𝒞 is regarded as a set of contexts and 𝑟𝑐 ∈ 𝑟[𝒞] ⊆ ℱ𝑊 is regarded as representing 
context c. Reflecting the earlier quote from Lewis 𝑟𝑐 is the “ordering frame determined 
somehow by practice and context c”. 
 
Additional restrictions, such as surjectivity and/or injectivity may be placed on r, to suit the 
preferred intended properties that a context representation function should have.  
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Definition 4.4.13.1: A CS+ model of the modified language is the quadruple: 
(𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌) 
Where (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟) is a CS+ frame and 𝜌 is as in Definition 4.2.5. 
 
Definition 4.4.13.2: Truth in CS+ models is defined in terms the satisfiability relation ⊩𝒞  ⊆
𝑊 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞. We read 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 as ‘𝐴 is true at 𝑖’.  
When we want to explicitly refer to truth at a world in a particular CS+ model 𝔄, we shall 
employ the following notation: 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 and  𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 Σ, as we have done for ⊩. 
Given a CS+ model (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌) any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, and any 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞 define ⊩𝒞 as follows:  
   (1) 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝑝    iff    𝑝𝜌𝑖1 
   (2) 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 ~𝐴 iff    not  𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 
   (3) 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  iff    𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴  and  𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐵 
   (4) 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵  iff    𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴  or  𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐵 
   (5) 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵  iff    𝑖 ⊩𝒞 ~𝐴  or  𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐵 
   (6) 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 □𝐴  iff    ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑗 ⊩𝒞 𝐴. 
   (7) 𝑖 ⊩𝒞  ◊𝐴  iff    ∃𝑗 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑗 ⊩𝒞 𝐴. 
   (8) 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵    iff    (𝑟𝑐 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 
 
What’s going on in (8)? The truth conditions for a formula (𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵), i.e. with an indexed 
connective as the main connective, in a CS+ model are defined in terms of truth conditions 
for the corresponding non-indexed formula (𝐴 > 𝐵) in a CS model – a model based on the 
ordering frame that is the image of c under 𝑟 i.e. the ordering frame that is said to represent 
the context corresponding to the index of the indexed formula. This is how we formally 
capture the idea of indexed formulae being evaluated in contexts (represented by ordering 
frames) corresponding to the context index. Note that reference to a CS model is not required 
in any of the other clauses (1)-(8), since there are no formulae with an indexed connective as 
the main connective contained in the definienda of clauses (1)-(7).161 
                                               
161 An alternative, and semantically equivalent formulation of the truth conditions for the contextualized language 
would be to have 𝑟 assigning comparative similarity assignments to worlds directly, relative to some context, i.e. 
to have 𝑟: 𝑊 × 𝒞 ⟶ ℘(𝑊) × ℘(𝑊 × 𝑊) be the function such that 𝑟(𝑤, 𝑐) is a comparative similarity 
assignment to world 𝑤, in context 𝑐. If we recall, this approach is closely aligned with Nolan’s suggestion, 
highlighted at the end of chapter 1. But I chose not to go this way, since we can accommodate the contextual 
variability in CS+ models by recycling the formalism already present in CS ordering frames. Recall from the 
definition of CS ordering frames, that we already have defined a function ≲: 𝑊 ⟶ ℘(𝑊) × ℘(𝑊 × 𝑊), which 
uniquely characterizes each ordering frame and whose image, for each world, consists of comparative similarity 
assignments being defined on ℘(𝑊) × ℘(𝑊 × 𝑊).  
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• As in the case of CS models, let’s introduce the following notation for convenience: 
𝑖 ⊩𝒞 Σ    iff     𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴  for all 𝐴 ∈ Σ 
 
 
• Also denote with 𝔄 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 when 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝔄. 
Note that it follows from the above definition that formulae whose index set ranges over 
more than one index may be evaluated on more than one CS model, e.g. 
 (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 (𝐴 >𝑎 𝐵) ∨ (𝐶 >𝑏 𝐷)  
iff (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 (𝐴 >𝑎 𝐵)     or    (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩
𝒞 (𝐵 >𝑏 𝐶) 
iff (𝑟𝑎, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 >𝑎 𝐵       or    (𝑟𝑏 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐶 >𝑏 𝐷 
 
That is, (𝑟𝑎, 𝜌) and (𝑟𝑎, 𝜌) are CS models, by definition, and they need not be the same.  
 
Just as we have relativized formula validity to a model 𝔄 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 it will be of use to define valid 
inference relativized to a model. 
 
Definition 4.4.13.3: Let ⊨𝔄
𝒞  ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞, and given a CS+ model 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌) write 
• ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴  iff   𝔄 ⊩𝒞 𝐴  
• Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴  iff  for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: if 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 Σ, then 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴. 
 
Since each context set 𝒞 gives rise to a distinct language ℒ𝒞, and consequently a distinct set 
of wffs 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞, we need a semantic consequence relation for each language. The definition 
below is of semantic consequence for each ℒ𝒞. In most cases however, I’ll omit the 
superscript 𝒞 unless the discussion will hinge on some specific property of the context set. 
 
Definition 4.4.14: Given a set 𝒞 let ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞  ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞, and define: 
Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴  iff  for all CS+ models 𝔄 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: if 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴. 
 
We say an inference from Σ to 𝐴 is CS+ valid iff Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴. That is, valid inference is defined 
as truth preservation at all worlds in all CS+ models. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞 is said to be CS+ 
valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴. Call this logic (schema) CS+. 
 
I use the term ‘logic schema’ since if 𝒞 ≠ 𝒞′, in particular if |𝒞| ≠ |𝒞′|, then ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞  ≠ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞′  by 
definition. For example, see Corollaries 4.9.1 and 4.9.2. 
 
Note that it is immediate from the above definitions that ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞  ⊆ ⊨𝔄
𝒞  , for any CS+ model 𝔄. 
 
With the aid of the notation from Definition 4.4.13.3 we can express CS+ semantic 
consequence definition more succinctly: Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴  iff  for all CS+ models 𝔄: Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴.   
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Note that since the truth conditions for □ and ◊ formulae are defined in terms of unrestricted 
quantification over possible worlds, i.e. only >𝑐-formulae truth conditions depend on 𝒞 and r, 
the above validity conditions give the modal logic S5 for the basic modal language. This 
allows us to formulate a more precise statement about a special case, when 𝒞 is empty. 
 
Corollary 4.9.1: If 𝒞 = ∅, then Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴 iff  Σ ⊨𝐒𝟓 𝐴. 
 Proof : This follows immediately from the fact that if 𝒞 = ∅, then by Definition 4.4.1 ℒ𝒞 
becomes {~, □,.◊, .∧, .∨, ⊃} ∪ {>𝑐 : 𝑐 ∈ ∅} = {~, □,.◊, .∧, .∨, ⊃}, i.e. the basic modal language.     □ 
 
There is another special case with interesting properties, when 𝒞 is a singleton, which is 
expressed in Corollary 4.9.2 at the beginning of the next section, shortly after Theorem 4.9. 
 
The part of the basic modal language is indistinguishable between the two classes of models 
in the following sense. 
 
Lemma 4.6: For any CS+ model 𝔐 = (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌) and any 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝐹 ∈ ℱ𝑊, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: 
 
𝔐, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴   iff   (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 
 
Proof : It suffices to note that elements of 𝐹𝑜𝑟>̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  depend only on 𝑊 and 𝜌, which are the same 
for 𝔐 and (𝐹, 𝜌), by definition.            □ 
 
Theorem 4.7: If  Σ ∪ {𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅: then Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴  iff  Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+ 𝐴. 
Proof : Immediate from Lemma 4.6.                        □ 
 
Definition 4.4.15: Call frame 𝐻 ∈ 𝐂𝐒 a mutual refinement of frames 𝐹 and 𝐺 iff (𝐹, 𝐻) ∈ ℛ 
and (𝐺, 𝐻) ∈ ℛ. Note that 𝐻 is a mutual refinement of 𝐹 and 𝐺 iff 𝐻 ∈ ℛ[𝐹] ∩ ℛ[𝐺].162  
 
It will be worthwhile (useful later) emphasizing a relatively obvious, yet important fact. 
 
Lemma 4.8: If (𝑊, ≲) = 𝐹 ∈ 𝐂𝐒, then ℛ[𝐹] ⊆ ℱ𝑊. 
Proof : Immediate from definition of ℱ𝑊 and the fact that refinements preserve domains.      □ 
 
 
                                               
162 For a reminder of the meaning of ℛ and ℛ[𝐹], see definitions 4.3.1 and 4.3.1.2, respectively. 
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4.4.4 Results 
Much of Lewis’ analysis is preserved on this account. This occurs when the premises and 
conclusion of an inference are confined to a single context. This makes sense intuitively, and 
the semantics manages to align with our intuition in this regard.  
 
Theorem 4.9: For all Σ ∪ {𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞:  
If (1) Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴 and  
  (2) |𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ ∪ {𝐴})| ≤ 1,  
then Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+ 𝐴. 
 
In other words, (1) if the unindexed inference is CS valid, and (2) if the premises and 
conclusion range over at most one context-index, then the inference is CS+ valid. 
Before we proceed, note that if 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ ∪ {𝐴}) = ∅, then the result follows from Theorem 4.7. 
 
Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌) ∈ CS+, such that 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ. We need to show that 
𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴. Now, there is a 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞 such that for each 𝐵 ∈ Σ, either 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐵}) = {𝑐}, or 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐵}) =
∅, from (ii). If 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐵}) = {𝑐}, then (𝑟𝑐 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵, by Definition 4.4.13.2. Otherwise, if 
𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐵}) = ∅, then (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵, for all 𝐹 ∈ ℱ𝑊, by Lemma 4.6, and we note that 𝑟𝑐 ∈ ℱ𝑊. 
Hence, (𝑟𝑐 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ. Hence (𝑟𝑐 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴, by (i). Hence, 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩
𝒞 𝐴, by Definition 
4.4.13.2, as required.                 □ 
 
Recalling how 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞 has been defined, i.e. that all nested counterfactuals inherit the index of 
the outermost counterfactual, Theorem 4.9 sanctions a number of important inference 
patterns.  
 
Example: For all 𝒞 ≠ ∅, 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞, and all 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞: 
   ⊨𝐂𝐒+ 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐴 
   𝐴, 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 ⊨𝐂𝐒+ 𝐵 
   ~𝐵, 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵, ⊨𝐂𝐒+ ~𝐴 
   𝐴, 𝐵 ⊭𝐂𝐒+ 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 
   ⊨𝐂𝐒+ (𝐴 ∧ ~𝐴) >𝑐 𝐵 
   □(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵) ⊨𝐂𝐒+ 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 
    
The results follow directly from Theorem 4.9 and the definition of 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞. Clearly, CS+ 
inherits the vacuous treatment of counterpossibles from CS (as will all the systems based on 
CS models). 
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We have looked earlier at the special case of CS+, when 𝒞 = ∅, and shown in Corollary 4.9.1 
that CS+ reduces to S5, i.e. ⊨𝐂𝐒+
∅ = ⊨𝐒𝟓. There is another important special case, when 𝒞 is a 
singleton, and a corresponding result, of CS+ reducing to CS, i.e. essentially ⊨𝐂𝐒+
{∅} = ⊨𝐂𝐒.  
 
Corollary 4.9.2: If |𝒞| = 1, then: Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴  iff  Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴   
Proof : (⟶) Is just Theorem 4.9 because if 𝒞 is a singleton then condition (2) is always 
satisfied. (⟵) It suffices to observe that since r is a function, the image of 𝒞 under r for each 
CS+ frame is also a singleton, i.e. 𝑟[𝒞] = {𝐹} for each CS+ frame (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟), where 𝐹 is a CS 
frame by definition of r. Suppose for contradiction that Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴  and  Σ ⊭𝐂𝐒 𝐴. From Σ ⊭𝐂𝐒 𝐴 
we infer that there’s a CS model 𝔄 = (𝐹, 𝜌𝔄) and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝔄 such that (𝐹, 𝜌𝔄), 𝑖 ⊩ Σ  and 
(𝐹, 𝜌𝔄), 𝑖 ⊮ 𝐴. But consider the CS+ model 𝔅 = (𝔉, 𝜌𝔅) such that 𝑊𝔄 = 𝑊𝔅, 𝜌𝔄 = 𝜌𝔅, and 
𝑟𝔅[𝒞] = {𝐹}, i.e. in 𝔅 all indexed formulae are evaluated on (𝐹, 𝜌𝔄) = 𝔄. But (𝐹, 𝜌𝔄), 𝑖 ⊩ Σ 
implies (𝔉, 𝜌𝔅) ⊩𝒞 Σ, by definition of ⊩𝒞. But then (𝔉, 𝜌) ⊩𝒞 𝐴 by hypothesis Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴, which 
implies (𝐹, 𝜌𝔄), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 by definition of ⊩𝒞, which contradicts (𝐹, 𝜌𝔄), 𝑖 ⊮ 𝐴.               □ 
 
Naturally, the advantages of CS+ appear when |𝒞| > 1. 
 
The main application of our key result, about frame refinements, i.e. Proposition 4.5, is in 
condition (2) of the following theorem. The theorem is the second major step in developing a 
notion of contextualized inference in the form of systems CS1+ and CS2+, defined in the 
next section. In particular it establishes  an important relationship between the contextual 
information carried by the premises and the conclusion.  
Note that the restriction of 𝐹𝑜𝑟> to 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 ∩ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞(>) stems from the fact that ordering frame 
refinements are only truth preserving, and that’s the part of 𝐹𝑜𝑟> to which Proposition 4.5 
applies. Just to be clear, if 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 ∩ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞(>) ≠ ∅, it contains only formulae 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵 such that 
𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. That is 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 ∩ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞(>) iff |𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴})| = 1. In other words, this result apples 
to a language restricted to the basic propositional modal language with indexed conditionals 
appearing only as the main connectives to formulae (i.e. that are not a proper subformula of 
any formula) that don’t contain any other indexed conditionals as proper subformulae.  
 
Theorem 4.10: For all Σ ∪ {𝐴} ⊆ (𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 ∩ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞(>)) ∪ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅: 
If (1)      Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴 and  
         (2) for each CS+ model: 
   (i)  if 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴}) = ∅, then ⋂{ℛ[𝑟𝑏]: 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ)} ≠ ∅, and 
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   (ii) if |𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴})| = 1, then 𝑟𝑎 ∈ ⋂{ℛ[𝑟𝑏]: 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ)} for {𝑎} = 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴}), 
then Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+ 𝐴. 
 
In other words, (1) if the unindexed inference is CS valid, and (2) if the frame representation 
of the conclusion context-index is a mutual refinement of frame representations of context 
indices over which the premises range, then the inference is CS+ valid. We interpret 
condition (2) as saying that the context on which the conclusion is evaluated is not 
independent of the contexts on which the premises are evaluated, i.e. the conclusion is 
evaluated on an ordering frame that preserves the contextual information carried by ordering 
frames on which the premises are evaluated. Before we proceed with the proof, note that if 
𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ ∪ {𝐴}) = ∅, then the result follows from Theorem 4.7.  
 
Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌) ∈ CS+, such that 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ. We need to show that 
𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴. Now, for each 𝐵 ∈ Σ, and any 𝑏 ∈ 𝒞, if 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐵}) = {𝑏}, then (𝑟𝑏 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵, by 
Definition 4.4.13.2. Else if 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐵}) = ∅, then (𝐹, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐹 ∈ ℱ𝑊, by Lemma 4.6, and 
we note that ⋃{ℛ[𝑟𝑏]: 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ)} ⊆ ℱ𝑊. Suppose |𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴})| ≤ 1. First, suppose |𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴})| =
0, and infer from (2.i) that there is a CS frame 𝐺 ∈ ℱ𝑊 such that 𝐺 ∈ ⋂{ℛ[𝑟𝑏]: 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ)}. 
Next, we have (𝑟𝑏 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵  ⟹ (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for each 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 ∩ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞(>), 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐵}), 
from Proposition 4.5. Hence, (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ such that 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐵}) ≠ ∅. From Lemma 
4.6 and 𝐺 ∈ ℱ𝑊 we infer (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for each 𝐵 ∈ Σ such that 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐵}) = ∅. Hence, (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩
𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ. Hence (𝐺, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴, by (1). Hence 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴, by Lemma 4.6. Next, suppose 
|𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴})| = 1. From (2.ii) we have 𝑟𝑎 ∈ ⋂{ℛ[𝑟𝑏]: 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ)} for any 𝑎 ∈ 𝒞 such that 
𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴}) = {𝑎}. By letting 𝑟𝑎 = 𝐺, the reminder of the proof continues by the same reasoning 
as in the previous case, to the point where we conclude that (𝑟𝑎, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴. From there, we 
conclude 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴, by Definition 4.4.13.2, as required.         □ 
 
In particular, the CS-validity of Adjunction of Consequents is preserved. This inference form 
will serve as a guiding example in the next section, motivating the reformulation of the 
current definition of CS+ valid inference. 
 
Corollary 4.10.1: For all 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, and all 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞:  
If 𝑟𝑐 ∈ ℛ[𝑟𝑎] ∩ ℛ[𝑟𝑏] for all CS+ models, then 𝐴 >𝑎 𝐵, 𝐴 >𝑏 𝐶 ⊨𝐂𝐒+ 𝐴 >𝑐 (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶). 
 
Proof : The result follows directly from Theorem 4.10.          □ 
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Corollary 4.10.2: For all 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, and all 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 ∈ 𝒞:  
If 𝑟𝑑 ∈ ℛ[𝑟𝑎] ∩ ℛ[𝑟𝑏] ∩ ℛ[𝑟𝑐] for all CS+ models, then 𝐴 >𝑎 𝐵, 𝐵 >𝑏 𝐴, 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐶 ⊨𝐂𝐒+ 𝐵 >𝑑 𝐶. 
 
Proof : The result follows directly from Theorem 4.10.          □ 
 
4.4.5 Contextualized validity: discussion 
CS+ is very weak since on the current definition 4.4.14 of CS+ valid inference there are no 
additional conditions placed on the relationship between context-indices appearing in the 
premises and the conclusion. But this is inadequate if we wish to fashion a logic that is 
sensitive to explicit contextual content. That is, we have developed an analysis of the 
contextualized language but have only included truth preserving conditions for validity in 
that definition – naturally, we also want a notion of contextual information preserving 
conditions on the new, contextualized notion of valid inference.  
 
That is, currently, by Definition 4.4.14 we have the following condition for CS+ valid 
inference:  
Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴   iff Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴  for all CS+ models 𝔄. 
Where Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴  is: Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴 iff  for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: if 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 Σ, then 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴, as in Def. 4.4.13.3. 
 
Clearly, these validity conditions are no different from those for CS. Such conditions make 
CS+ much weaker than CS, because for every CS valid inference there will be a 
counterexample by choice of indices for the premises and conclusion such that the premises 
are true, and the conclusion is false.  
 
4.4.5.1  Contextualized validity: system CS1+ 
Theorem 4.10 captures some of the contextual information preserving features that hint at 
how contextual constraints could be fashioned.  The theorem tells us that if we restrict the 
language in a way that Proposition 4.5 can be implemented, then CS validity and valid 
inference is preserved if additional conditions on the relationship between the premises index 
set and conclusion index are satisfied, i.e. conditions that correspond to what we mean by 
contextual information preservation. This opens a possibility of defining a notion of valid 
inference that those conditions underlie. That is, as our initial attempt, we could fashion a 
notion of contextualized inference by adding condition (2) of Theorem 4.10 to the current 
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definition CS+ validity and valid inference. The key definition that requires change is of 
Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴, since Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒+
𝒞 𝐴 is defined in terms of it.  
 
Definitions 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 establish a proper logic of contextualized counterfactuals. That is, 
a logic where valid inference is not defined merely in terms of truth preservation but also in 
terms of contextual information preservation. Let us introduce some useful shorthand 
notation first. 
 
Definition 4.5.1: Denote 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 ∩ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝒞(>) with 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 (>). 
 
Definition 4.5.2: Given a set 𝒞 let ⊨𝔄
𝒞  ⊆ ℘ (𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 (>) ∪ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) × (𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 (>) ∪ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) and 
define for a CS+ model 𝔄, Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴 iff for all Σ ∪ {𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 (>) ∪ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅:  
 
     If for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊:  (i)    𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 Σ, and  
       (ii)   if 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴}) = ∅, then ⋂{ℛ[𝑟𝑏]: 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ)} ≠ ∅, and 
   if |𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴})| = 1, then 𝑟𝑎 ∈ ⋂{ℛ[𝑟𝑏]: 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ)} for {𝑎} = 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴}), 
     then 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴. 
 
For formula validity, write ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴  iff  𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝔄, as given in Definition 4.4.13.2. 
 
Now (model) validity is additionally conditioned on (ii) which intends to capture the idea that 
we evaluate the conclusion on a context that preserves contextual information of the contexts 
over which the premises range. Cases where (ii) is not satisfied will go through vacuously, 
thus disabling many counterexamples that would have been possible on Definition 4.4.13.3 of 
⊨𝔄
𝒞 , which underlies CS+ validity. That is, it is no longer possible on the above definition to 
pick arbitrary indices for the premises and conclusion to generate counterexamples. Call the 
logic that satisfies this additional contextual information preservation constraint CS1+. It 
certainly is a step in the right direction, but one a little too far – the logic is too strong. As I’ll 
shortly argue, it requires further finetuning, else it would give an incorrect analysis of a 
family of paradigmatic inference forms, i.e. by formally validating inference forms that are 
intuitively invalid.163 
 
                                               
163 By paradigmatic here I mean inference forms that can be said to emphasize the character of contextualized 
inference. That is, I have in mind the simplest inference forms whose validity turns on contextual considerations. 
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Definition 4.5.3: For all Σ ∪ {𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 (>) ∪ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅: write Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒𝟏+
𝒞 𝐴 iff Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴 for all CS+ 
models 𝔄, where Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴  is as defined in 4.5.2. Also write ⊨𝐂𝐒𝟏+
𝒞 𝐴 iff ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴 for all CS+ 
models 𝔄. Call this logic (schema) CS1+. 
 
4.4.5.2  Properties of CS1+ 
It should not be a surprise that CS+ validity and valid inference based on the above definition 
of Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴, in conjunction with Theorem 4.10 yields the following. 
 
Corollary 4.11: For all Σ ∪ {𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 (>) ∪ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅:  
 
If Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴, then Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒𝟏+
𝒞 𝐴. 
 
Proof :  The proof proceeds much like the proof of Theorem 4.10. We assume the antecedent 
(which is just condition (1) in Theorem 4.10), and for arbitrary CS+ model 𝔄 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝔄 we 
assume (i) 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 Σ and (ii) from Definition 4.5.2 (where (ii) is just a special case of 
condition (2) in Theorem 4.10, relativized to 𝔄, and (i) is the starting hypothesis in the proof 
of Theorem 4.10) and then we proceed to show that 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴, which is exactly what is to be 
shown in the proof of Theorem 4.10.            □ 
 
4.4.5.3  CS1+ is too strong 
As mentioned earlier CS1+ is too strong for the contextualized language, because it validates  
contextualized Adjunction of Consequents, despite some obvious counterexamples. In other 
words, by Corollary 4.11, we have 𝐴 >𝑎 𝐵, 𝐴 >𝑏 𝐶 ⊨𝐂𝐒𝟏+
𝒞 𝐴 >𝑐 (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶) for all 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 
and 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞, but as I’ll argue we want it to fail. That is, we want to transform a family of 
instances of Adjunction of Consequents that go through vacuously on CS1+ (because of (ii) 
not being satisfied) into counterexamples. Since Adjunction of Consequents is CS valid, it is 
also CS1+ valid (by Corollary 4.11) but is seems clearly invalid for contextualized 
counterfactuals. I will now discuss instances of contextualized Adjunction of Consequents 
that I believe should be analysed as counterexamples but currently go through on CS1+ 
because of the absence of a mutual refinement of ordering frames corresponding to the 
premise context indices, and so a fortiori the ordering frame corresponding to the conclusion 
context index can’t be such a mutual refinement. Consequently (ii) is rendered false and the 
questionable instance goes through vacuously. To outline the culminating point of the 
following discussion, let me just say at this point that the corresponding fix will be to 
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strengthen the validity conditions by adding a second condition that demands the existence of 
a mutual refinement of ordering frames corresponding to premise context indices, which 
itself corresponds to the conclusion context index. 
 
Consider the following counterexample to Adjunction of Consequents, which is a limit case 
of the extent to which context can diverge, i.e. when the contextual information carried by 
ordering frames corresponding to the premise context-indices is incompatible. 
 
Example 4.5.1: Counterexample to Adjunction of Consequents 
 
(1)  If Mt. Everest was in New Zealand, Everest would be in the Southern Hemisphere.  
 
(2)  If Mt. Everest was in New Zealand, New Zealand would be in the Northern 
Hemisphere. 
 
(3) Therefore, if Mt. Everest was in New Zealand, then Mt. Everest would be in the 
Southern Hemisphere and New Zealand would be in the Northern Hemisphere. 
 
The premises seem fine if taken separately – each in its own context (which the 
contextualized account allows), much like Quine’s example with Caesar – but the conclusion 
is not only false, but absurd.164 It should be regarded as a counterexample schema, since there 
are infinitely many examples like it, all of which speak against the validity of this inference 
form. Unfortunately, examples like 4.5.1 go through vacuously on of CS1+, because although 
CS+ models allow for the mutual truth of both premises, there is no mutual refinement of 
ordering frames corresponding to the context-indices of both premises (claim 4.5.3). There’s 
no such refinement, since that would imply the existence of a CS model where both premises 
are true, which is impossible (claim 4.5.2). Both claims 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 are proven once the 
counterexample is sufficiently formalized, and the imported information highlighted. 
Let us make the example formally precise and reveal all the imported information and 
relevant enthymemes. 𝐴 translates to 𝐸 in 𝑍 (Everest is in NZ), 𝐵 translates to 𝐸 in 𝑆 (Everest 
is in the Southern Hemisphere), and 𝐶 translates to 𝑍 in 𝑁 (NZ is in the Northern Hemisphere. 
The enthymemes are: 𝑁 ∩ 𝑆 = ∅ and ‘none of 𝐸, 𝑁, 𝑆, 𝑍 is empty’, i.e. the Northern and 
Southern hemispheres are disjoint, and all objects referred to explicitly have a nonzero spatial 
extension. Here we need to import in both cases, it seems, the information that 𝑁 ∩ 𝑆 = ∅, i.e. 
                                               
164 Or as Priest (2017) would say ‘both can be heard as true, but different information is imported in each case’. 
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it’s part of the ceteris paribus clause (worlds where the hemispheres are disjoint are more 
similar to the actual world than worlds where they’re not disjoint). 
 
Counterexample with explicated details. 
 
P.1 (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝐸 in 𝑆)   (imported factual information: 𝑍 ⊆ 𝑆) 
 [true] 
P.2 (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝑍 in 𝑁)   (imported factual information: 𝐸 ⊆ 𝑁) 
 [true] 
E.1 𝑁 ∩ 𝑆 = ∅   (relevant enthymeme)    
 [true] 
E.2 None of 𝐸, 𝑁, 𝑆, 𝑍 is empty. (intended enthymeme)   
 [true] 
_______________________ 
 
∴ 𝐸 in 𝑍 > (𝐸 in 𝑆 ∧ 𝑍 in 𝑁)       
 [false] 
 
It should be noted that the notion of information importation, as described by Priest 
(2018,§2.1), and presented as Definition 1.15 in chapter 1, is robust enough to be 
incorporated to our semantics – it is just the information that we import into the most similar 
antecedent worlds. It offers another way of talking about the worlds relevant to evaluating the 
corresponding material conditional when evaluating 𝐴 >𝑐 𝐵.
165 The counterexample goes 
through, as mentioned earlier, because both premises can never be true, once we account for 
the relevant factual information imported into the antecedent worlds.166 
 
4.4.5.4  Adjunction of Consequents – a comparative analysis 
The differences in analyses are the following: On C, C+, and CS example 4.5.1 goes through 
vacuously, because both premises can’t be true.167 That is, such examples go through because 
once the relevant information is imported into the antecedent worlds the combined truth of 
both counterfactual premises, at some world implies inconsistent situations (at the relevant 
                                               
165 See Definition 4.2.5, and non-vacuous CS truth conditions for 𝐴 > 𝐵 , i.e. (8), (ii). 
166 It turns out that this example is a lot like Bennett’s “East Gate, West Gate” formulation of an example given 
by Gibbard (1981). Priest (2017) gives an interesting analysis of this scenario. The scenario resembles example 
4.5.1 in the sense that both premises are true in distinct contexts, but once the information required to make 
each premise true is jointly imported we get inconsistency, or implicit inconsistency. 
167 For definitions of C and C+ see §2.1.3 on ceteris paribus conditionals. 
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antecedent worlds). So, if the analysis is restricted to possible worlds, the premises can’t be 
jointly true (since inconsistent situations can’t be accommodated on possible worlds 
semantics), thus allowing the conclusion to follow vacuously. But it seems they can be jointly 
true, when taken in their appropriate (albeit distinct) contexts, which CS+ models permit. 
Note that if there is no CS model where both premises can be jointly true means that there is 
no CS+ model such that there would exist a mutual refinement of the ordering frames 
corresponding to premise context indices, since that would imply the existence of a CS model 
where the premises can be true, which is impossible (I’ll return to this matter shortly). 
  
NOTATION: for the purpose of the next few proofs, let us introduce some useful notation. 
 
Definition 4.5.4: Let (𝑆, ≲) be a preordered set and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 Define ↓.𝑥(𝑆,≲) ∶= {𝑦 ∈ 𝑆: 𝑦 ≲ 𝑥}. 
When there is no ambiguity regarding the preordered set in question, I’ll omit the subscript. 
 
The above definition lets us reformulate more succinctly the non-vacuous case of CS truth 
conditions for formulae expressing counterfactuals, i.e. we can rewrite (8).(ii) of Definition 
4.2.5: 
 
   (8*) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵  iff    (i)  ~∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖: 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴, or 
       (ii)    ∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴  and  ↓.𝑘𝑖 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵]. 
Where ↓.𝑘𝑖 is just shorthand for ↓.𝑘(𝑊,≲𝑖). In contexts where the subscript is constant, I’ll omit 
it altogether and just write ↓.𝑘 for brevity. 
 
Presently I show that the inference 𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐶 ⊨ 𝐴 > (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶), viz. Adjunction of 
Consequents is valid on  conditional logic C, and therefore on its extensions (notably C+), 
and CS and its extensions.  
 
Proposition 4.12: 𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐶 ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴 > (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶)  
Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, ≲, 𝜌) be a CS model, and let 𝑖 ⊩ {𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐶} for an arbitrary world 𝑖 ∈
𝑊. Then ∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴 such that ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵], and ∃𝑘′ ∈ 𝑊: 𝑘′ ⊩ 𝐴 such that ↓.𝑘′ ∩ [𝐴] ⊆
[𝐶]. Now, either 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑘′ or 𝑘′ ≲𝑖 𝑘, by totality of ≲𝑖. If 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑘′, then clearly ↓.𝑘 ⊆ ↓.𝑘′, which in 
conjunction with the hypothesis implies that ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐶]. Hence, we have both ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆
[𝐵] and ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐶], which jointly imply ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵] ∩ [𝐶]. Hence 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶), as 
required. A very similar argument holds for the case when 𝑘′ ≲𝑖 𝑘.        □ 
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It’s easy to show that Adjunction of Consequents is also valid on conditional logic C.168 
 
Claim 4.5.2: Given Example 4.5.1, there’s no CS model where both premises can be true. 
Proof : We have the key enthymeme [𝐴 in 𝑆] ∩ [𝐴 in 𝑁] = ∅ for any extended area 𝐴 on the 
surface of the Earth. Let’s start with the first counterfactual. For 𝑖 ⊩ (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝐸 in 𝑆) we 
require that ∃𝑘 ∈ [𝐸 in 𝑍] and ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐸 in 𝑍] ⊆ [𝐸 in 𝑆], and accounting for imported 
information yields ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐸 in 𝑍] ⊆ [𝐸 in 𝑆] ∩ [𝑍 in 𝑆], which implies (*) ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐸 in 𝑍] ⊈
[𝑍 in 𝑁]. Next, for the second premise 𝑖 ⊩ (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝑍 in 𝑁) we require ∃𝑘′ ∈ [𝐸 in 𝑍] and 
↓.𝑘′ ∩ [𝐸 in 𝑍] ⊆ [𝑍 in 𝑁], which implies (**) ↓.𝑘′ ∩ [𝐸 in 𝑍] ⊈ [𝑍 in 𝑆]. Given totality, either 
𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑘′ or 𝑘′ ≲𝑖 𝑘. Hence, either ↓.𝑘 ⊆ ↓.𝑘′ or ↓.𝑘′ ⊆ ↓.𝑘. First suppose ↓.𝑘 ⊆ ↓.𝑘′. Then, given that 
↓.𝑘′ ∩ [𝐸 in 𝑍] ⊆ [𝑍 in 𝑁] it follows that ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐸 in 𝑍] ⊆ [𝑍 in 𝑁], which contradicts (*). Next, 
suppose ↓.𝑘′ ⊆ ↓.𝑘. Then given that we have ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐸 in 𝑍] ⊆ [𝑍 in 𝑆] it follows that ↓.𝑘′ ∩
[𝐸 in 𝑍] ⊆ [𝑍 in 𝑆], which contradicts (**). So, if the first premise is true, the second premise 
can’t be true. A very similar argument shows that if we assume the truth of the second 
premise, the first premise can’t be true.                    □ 
 
It is easy to show that an analogous claim holds for logic C (and its extensions).169 
 
A more intuitive way of seeing this, is to note that for 𝑖 ⊩ (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝐸 in 𝑆) we require that 
all antecedent worlds where both Mt. Everest and NZ are in the Southern Hemisphere are 
more similar than worlds where both those objects are in the Northern Hemisphere, but for 
𝑖 ⊩ (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝑍 in 𝑁) we require (the opposite) that all antecedent worlds where both Mt. 
Everest and NZ are in the Northern Hemisphere are more similar than worlds where both 
those objects are in the Southern Hemisphere. Both orderings are clearly incompatible. That 
is, for the first premise to be true there will be an antecedent world 𝑘0 where both objects are 
in the Southern Hemisphere and all worlds 𝑗𝑁𝐻 where both objects are in the Northern 
Hemisphere satisfy (i): ∀𝑗(𝑘0 <𝑖 𝑗𝑁𝐻), whereas for the second premise to be true there will be 
                                               
168 𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐶 ⊨C 𝐴 > (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶). Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑅, 𝑉) be a C model and let 𝑖 ⊩ {𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐶} for 
arbitrary world 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊. Then we have both 𝑓𝐴(𝑖) ⊆ [𝐵] and 𝑓𝐴(𝑖) ⊆ [𝐶], which implies that 𝑓𝐴(𝑖) ⊆ [𝐵] ∩ [𝐶] =
[𝐵 ∧ 𝐶]. Therefore, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶), as required. 
169 Given Example 4.5.1, there is no C model where both premises can be true. Proof : First it needs to be 
granted that 𝑓𝐸 in 𝑍(@) ≠ ∅. Moreover, we have the key enthymematic fact [𝐴 in 𝑆] ∩ [𝐴 in 𝑁] = ∅ for any 
area 𝐴 on the surface of the Earth. Let’s start with P.1. It’s true at the actual world iff 𝑓𝐸 in 𝑍(@) ⊆ [𝐸 in 𝑆], 
which implies that 𝑓𝐸 in 𝑍(@) ⊆ [𝐸 in 𝑆] ∩ [𝑍 in 𝑆], once we account for the imported information into 
𝑓𝐸 in 𝑍(@), which implies 𝑓𝐸 in 𝑍(@) ⊆ [𝑍 in 𝑆], which implies 𝑓𝐸 in 𝑍(@) ⊈ [𝑍 in 𝑁]. But 𝑓𝐸 in 𝑍(@) ⊆ [𝑍 in 𝑁] 
is necessary for the truth of P.2. So, if the first premise is true, the second premise can’t be true. A very similar 
argument shows that if we assume the truth of the second premise, the first premise can’t be true. 
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an antecedent world 𝑗0 where both objects are in the Northern Hemisphere and all worlds 𝑘𝑆𝐻 
where both objects are in the Southern Hemisphere satisfy (ii): ∀𝑘(𝑗0 <𝑖 𝑘𝑆𝐻). Now, 
∀𝑗(𝑘0 <𝑖 𝑗𝑁𝐻) implies 𝑘0 <𝑖 𝑗0, and ∀𝑘(𝑗0 <𝑖 𝑘𝑆𝐻) implies 𝑗0 <𝑖 𝑘0, jointly yielding 𝑘0 <𝑖 𝑗0 
and 𝑗0 <𝑖 𝑘0, which is impossible. 
 
Claim 4.5.3: Given Example 4.5.1, it follows that for any CS+ model where both premises 
are true there is no mutual refinement of the ordering frames corresponding to the premise 
context indices.  
Informal proof : This is clear when we consider this as a corollary of Claim 4.5.2. That is, 
since (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝐸 in 𝑆 ) and (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝑍 in 𝑁) can’t be both true on any CS model, as we 
have established in Claim 4.5.2,  then, in particular, for any CS+ model where the premises 
are both true, there is no mutual refinement of the ordering frames corresponding to the 
premise indices, since that would imply that both premises are true on some CS model (recall 
that refinements are truth preserving), which we have established in Claim 4.5.2 as 
impossible. Below is a formal proof. 
 
Proof : For any CS+ model 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝒞, 𝑟, 𝜌), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, and 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝒞, if 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 (𝐸 in 𝑍) >𝑎 (𝐸 in 𝑆) 
and 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 (𝐸 in 𝑍) >𝑏 (𝑍 in 𝑁), then by definition there are CS models (𝑟𝑎 , 𝜌) and (𝑟𝑏 , 𝜌), 
such that (𝑟𝑎 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝐸 in 𝑆)and (𝑟𝑏 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ (𝐸 in 𝑍) > (𝑍 in 𝑁). But there is no 
mutual refinement of 𝑟𝑎 and 𝑟𝑏, i.e. there is no 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞 such that 𝑟𝑐 ∈ ℛ[𝑟𝑎] ∩ ℛ[𝑟𝑏], for the 
simple reason that refinements are >-truth preserving, by Proposition 4.5. If there was such a 
mutual refinement 𝑟𝑐, then (𝑟𝑐 , 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ {(𝐸 in 𝑍) >𝑎 (𝐸 in 𝑆), (𝐸 in 𝑍) >𝑏 (𝑍 in 𝑁)}, which we 
have established in Claim 4.5.2 to be impossible, since (𝑟𝑐 , 𝜌) is a CS model, by definition.   □ 
 
Explanation: contextual information incompatibility (contextual orthogonality) 
Although on the contextualized analysis there are now contexts a and b such that both 
premises 𝐴 >𝑎 𝐵 and 𝐴 >𝑏 𝐶 can be true at some possible world i, according to 𝑟𝑎 and 𝑟𝑏 
respectively (in contrast with the case of C and its extensions and with the case of CS and its 
extensions), but there is no context c such that 𝑟𝑐 is a mutual refinement of 𝑟𝑎 and 𝑟𝑏. In other 
words, it is not possible to integrate the contextual information of contexts a and b, carried by 
ordering assignments of ordering frames 𝑟𝑎 and 𝑟𝑏 to any world 𝑖 in a manner that corresponds 
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to some possible context c whose information would be carried by the ordering assignment of 
ordering frame 𝑟𝑐 to world 𝑖.
170 
 
For the same reasons the following instance of Adjunction of Consequents goes through, 
where the implicit inconsistency is a little more obvious than in the ‘Everest in NZ’ example. 
Here the consequents of the premises form an inconsistent set, whereas in the other example 
the addition of the antecedent (and obvious enthymemes) to the consequent pair resulted in 
inconsistency. 
 
Example 4.5.4: 𝐴 >𝑎 𝐵, 𝐴 >𝑏 ~𝐵 ⊨𝐂𝐒𝟏+
𝒞 𝐴 >𝑐 (𝐵 ∧ ~𝐵)  
 
4.4.5.5  Fine-tuning CS1+ and the system CS2+ 
This motivates the following reformulation of valid inference conditions, which do away with 
(i.e. block) cases when the ordering frames corresponding to contexts that make all the 
premises true fail to have a mutual refinement. 
 
Definition 4.5.5: Let 𝔄 be a CS+ model. For all Σ ∪ {𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 (>) ∪ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅:  
Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴    iff  
    (1)  ∃𝔉 ∈ 𝐂𝐒, and 
    (2)   If for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊:    
(i) 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 Σ, and  
(ii)  if 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴}) = ∅, then 𝔉 ∈ ⋂{ℛ[𝑟𝑏]: 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ)}, and 
if |𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴})| = 1 , then 𝔉 = 𝑟𝑎 ∈ ⋂{ℛ[𝑟𝑏]: 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(Σ)} for {𝑎} = 𝐼𝑛𝑑({𝐴}), 
then 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩𝒞 𝐴. 
 
Note that adding condition (1), which requires the existence of a mutual refinement of 
ordering frames that represent the context-indices over which the premises range will make 
Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴 false, for each CS+ model 𝔄, if no such refinement exists. Precisely what is required 
to invalidate Adjunction of Consequents, by paralleling our intuitions in the treatment of the 
                                               
170 Contrast example 4.5.1 with the following one, based on an example from Quine, where the contexts 
required to make the premises true need not be incompatible as is the case with ones that make the premises 
of 4.5.1 true. 
(1)  If Caesar had been in command, he would have used the atom bomb. 
(2)  If Caesar had been in command, he would have used catapults. 
(3) Therefore, if Caesar had been in command, he would have used catapults and the atom 
bomb. 
Both premises can be true on a single, albeit rather eccentric, context and the conclusion is also naturally true in 
that context. This doesn’t change the fact that the inference form is invalid. 
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running counterexample.  
(Observation: condition (1) resembles in its form the syntactic, propositional variable 
sharing condition for valid relevant conditionals, i.e. Definition 1.7.) 
 
Definition 4.5.6: For all Σ ∪ {𝐴} ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>0
𝒞 (>) ∪ 𝐹𝑜𝑟>
𝒞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅: write Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒𝟐+
𝒞 𝐴 iff Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴 for all CS+ 
models 𝔄, where Σ ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴  is as defined in 4.5.5. Also write ⊨𝐂𝐒𝟐+
𝒞 𝐴 iff ⊨𝔄
𝒞 𝐴 for all CS+ 
models 𝔄. Call this logic (schema) CS2+. 
 
What is paradigmatic about such inference forms is that they highlight what is really at play 
in contextualized validity when we explore limit cases, i.e. premises being true in radically 
different contexts. That is, we can have possibility expressing premises true for any contexts, 
but the inference is valid if the conclusion can always be true in a contextually meaningful 
way – one that is not independent of the contextual information by virtue of which the 
premises are true. If there is no mutual refinement of ordering frames representing context-
indices over which the premises range, that means there is no single context on which all the 
premises are true, and consequently no contextually meaningful way of speaking of the 
conclusion following from those premises. Therefore, the inference is contextually invalid. It 
should be noted that the inference fails in limit cases as exemplified in 4.5.1 but may very 
well go through on some CS+ models (if not all) if the divergence of contexts over which the 
premises range isn’t extreme. 
 
It could be argued that such contextual incompatibility of premises – all true but on contexts 
that do not have a mutual refinement – should be treated in the manner that inconsistent sets 
of premises are treated, i.e. the conclusion should follow vacuously. Perhaps this needs some 
more thought, but examples such as 4.5.1 – which appear to be legitimate counterexamples to 
Adjunction of Consequents – seem to speak against such an approach. The inference is 
invalid, and it is only the contextualized account that gives the corresponding correct 
analysis, allowing for the premises to be jointly (and meaningfully) true.  
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Chapter 5 
 
A non-vacuist account of counterpossibles 
 
 
Everyone knows that dragons don't exist. But 
while this simplistic formulation may satisfy the 
layman, it does not suffice for the scientific mind. 
[...] Indeed, the banality of existence has been so 
amply demonstrated, there is no need for us to 
discuss it any further here. The brilliant Cerebron, 
attacking the problem analytically, discovered 
three distinct kinds of dragon: the mythical, the 
chimerical, and the purely hypothetical. They 
were all, one might say, non-existent, but each 
non-existed in an entirely different way. 
 
Stanisław Lem, The Cyberiad, 1965.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I develop a non-vacuist account of counterpossibles, by building on the 
ordering semantics given for the system CS in chapter 4. That is, I modify CS in a manner 
that results in an analysis of counterpossibles that meets our intuitions, i.e. as sometimes 
being non-vacuously true and sometimes non-vacuously false. As we saw in chapter 2, one of 
the major drawbacks of Lewis’ account of the counterfactual is that it evaluates all 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents (viz. counterpossibles) as true, including 
intuitively false ones like: 
 
  (i)   If Alice had squared the circle and Bob had doubled the cube, then Alice would be Bob. 
  (ii)  If paraconsistent logic were correct, ex contradictione quodlibet would still be valid. 
 
This stems from the fact that Lewis’ (1973, 1981) analysis of counterfactuals is restricted to 
possible worlds, which results in all counterpossibles satisfying the truth conditions 
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vacuously.171 The inadequacy of vacuism, as such analyses have come to be known in the 
context of discussions of counterpossibles, has already been identified and challenged by a 
number of authors.172 I join this critical front, and drawing on existing proposals for non-
vacuism, show that there is a sense in which we can preserve all of Lewis’ analysis of mere 
counterfactuals, whilst avoiding the vacuous truth of counterpossibles, by admitting 
impossible worlds as worlds where the impossible is true.173  
 
In §5.1 I present a family of logics and their ordering semantics, based on partial preorderings 
of worlds, i.e. systems based on ordering frames, much like the CS ordering frames of 
chapter 4, but where we allow our universal quantifier in the truth conditions for > to range 
over impossible worlds, and where a new set of conditions on the ordering (comparative 
similarity) of worlds is introduced in order to accommodate for this domain extension. In 
section §5.2 I demonstrate that all the systems characterized in §5.1 meet the non-vacuity 
criterion, i.e. they are systems in which some counterpossibles are false. §5.3 is devoted to a 
critical discussion of the counterpart to Nolan’s (1997) Strangeness of Similarity Condition 
(SIC), where I argue in SIC’s favour based on the evaluation of the benefits and costs of its 
implementation. In §5.4 I discuss the matter of comparability of worlds on the extended 
account. Most of that discussion has the character of a reply to Weiss’ (2017) objection to the 
general idea underlying similarity semantics, i.e. comparability of worlds, which he thinks to 
be a sufficiently fundamental hindrance to question the tenability of a similarity approach to 
analyzing counterpossibles. He sets his objection in terms of an alleged counterexample to an 
inference form that is valid on all similarity systems that satisfy comparability of worlds. My 
reply shows that the challenged inference is invalid on some weaker systems, proposed in 
§5.1 – namely, those satisfying a weaker ordering condition, whereby comparability is only 
lifted from impossible worlds. I also argue that an apparent lack of clarity – in the 
formulation of Weiss’ counterexample – regarding the permissible extent of contextual shift 
between the reading (as true) of the different pertinent premises, could be used to invalidate 
more than he has intended. I close §5.4 by showing that the weaker systems invalidate 
Adjunction of Consequents even for mere counterfactuals.  
 
                                               
171 See definition 2.19 (4) and definition 4.2.5. (8). 
172 Nolan (1997), Mares (1997), Lander Laan (2004), Brogaard and Salerno (2008), Priest (2008), Bjerring (2014), 
Weiss (2017), Berto & Jago (2019, §12). 
173 The earliest use of the term ‘non-vacuism’ in this context appears in Brogaard and Salerno (2014).  
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5.1 Ordering semantics for counterpossibles 
The formal language of the analysis is propositional modal logic with an additional dyadic 
modal connective >. That is, the definition of the formal language ℒ and the set 𝐹𝑜𝑟 of well-
formed formulae is as defined in §4.1. 
 
To simplify the  discussion in this chapter we will work with a restricted class of ordering 
frames, where all worlds are accessible, i.e. recalling CS ordering frames of the previous 
chapter, in this chapter we let 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑊 for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊 for each ordering, so all talk of 
accessibility is set aside, while we focus on pertinent features of ordering frames that are 
most relevant to counterpossibles.174 I will be considering a weaker foundational ordering 
condition than (CS1) of CS ordering frames as the basis for modelling comparative similarity 
over the extended domain (impossible worlds), with optional conditions that allow 
strengthening it for possible worlds. That is, the additional conditions allow some worlds to 
be incomparable in terms of their similarity to the actual world (or any world of evaluation) – 
a property of comparative similarity ruled out by Lewis (1971, 1973, 1981) and Stalnaker 
(1968, 1970). 
 
Definition 5.1: An ordering frame is a triple (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}), where 𝑊 is a nonempty set, 
∅ ≠ 𝑁 ⊆ 𝑊 and ≲𝑖 ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝑊 satisfies the following conditions, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: 
 
(CS1.1)  ≲𝑖 is a preorder on 𝑊 
 
On the intended interpretation, elements of 𝑁 are possible (or normal) worlds, 𝑊 ∖ 𝑁 are 
impossible (or non-normal) worlds, and ≲𝑖 is regarded as the ordering of worlds in respect of 
their comparative similarity to 𝑖, with the following intended meaning: 
 
𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 :  𝑗 is at least as similar to 𝑖 as 𝑘 is. 
𝑗 <𝑖 𝑘 :  𝑗 is more similar to 𝑖 than 𝑘 is. 
𝑗 ∼𝑖 𝑘 :  𝑗 and 𝑘 are equally similar to 𝑖. 
 
Only possible worlds are given a comparative similarity assignment (comparative similarity 
neighbourhood), since on this picture truth at impossible worlds will be independent of any 
similarity considerations.  
                                               
174 In this section and the next I simplify the formulation by borrowing some layout and presentation features of 
the model theory from Sillari (2008, §2.3), which draws on Hintikka and Rantala’s work, Priest (2008, §9.4.7), 
Weiss (2017) and Berto & Jago (2019). 
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Definition 5.1.1: Denote the class of ordering frames from Definition 5.1 with CS*. 
 
I’d like to highlight a property of sets that play a key role in our semantics, one which allows 
me to introduce a short-hand notation that will aid most formal arguments in this chapter.175 
 
Definition 5.2: Given a preordered set (𝑆, ≲). Call 𝐼 ⊆ 𝑆 an ideal in (𝑆, ≲) iff 
(i) 𝐼 ≠ ∅ 
(ii) 𝐼 is a lower set: (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐼)(∀𝑦 ∈ 𝑆)(𝑦 ≲ 𝑥 ⟶ 𝑦 ∈ 𝐼 ). 
(iii) 𝐼 is a directed set: (∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐼)(∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐼)(𝑥 ≲ 𝑧 ∧ 𝑦 ≲ 𝑧). 
 
Definition 5.2.1: Let (𝑆, ≲) be a preordered set and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆. Define ↓.𝑥(𝑆,≲) ∶= {𝑦 ∈ 𝑆: 𝑦 ≲ 𝑥}. 
When there is no ambiguity regarding the preordered set in question, I’ll omit the subscript. 
 
Proposition 5.1: Let (𝑆, ≲) be a preordered set such that 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆. ↓.𝑥 is an ideal in (𝑆, ≲). 
Proof : Condition (i) is immediate, since 𝑥 ∈ ↓.𝑥 , as is (ii) from the definition of ↓.𝑥, and (iii) 
follows from the fact that 𝑥 ∈ ↓.𝑥  and 𝑦 ≲ 𝑥 for all 𝑦 ∈ ↓.𝑥.                      □ 
 
The formulation of the model theory is relatively common, and can be traced back as far as 
Kripke’s semantics for C.I. Lewis’ systems that are weaker than S4, which we looked at in 
§1.3, with the additional feature borrowed from Rantala’s models, which we looked at in 
§1.3.4, of assigning arbitrary values to formulae at non-normal worlds – a method that has 
been widely applied in impossible world semantics for doxastic and epistemic logics that 
model non-ideal agents, i.e. that avoid logical omnidoxasticity and omniscience.176 
 
Definition 5.3: A model based on ordering frames is the quadruple 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌) 
where (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}) is an ordering frame and 𝜌 = {𝜌𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊} is defined as follows: 
(1)   For 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: 𝜌𝑖 ⊆ 𝑃𝑉 × {0,1} is a relation satisfying the following constraints: 
(i) For no 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, both 𝑝𝜌𝑖0 and 𝑝𝜌𝑖1 (exclusion) 
(ii) For all 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, either 𝑝𝜌𝑖0 or 𝑝𝜌𝑖1  (exhaustion) 
 
(2)   For 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊 ∖ 𝑁:  𝜌𝑖 ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 × {0,1}.  
                                               
175 Ideals also appear in the truth conditions for 𝐴 > 𝐵 in CS models, defined in chapter 4. 
176 E.g. see Sillari (2008, §2.3) who draws on the earlier work of Hintikka and Rantala. 
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That is, (2) tells us that truth values are related (assigned) directly to any formula at each non-
normal world. Also note that the manner in which 𝜌𝑖’s are restricted in (1) effectively renders 
them as functions 𝜌𝑖: 𝑃𝑉 ⟶ {0,1} for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. 
 
Definition 5.3.1: Truth in a model is defined in terms of the relation ⊩  ⊆ 𝑁 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, defined as 
follows: given a model (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌) and any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊 ∖ 𝑁, and 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 
 
   (1) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴     iff      𝐴𝜌𝑖1 
 
And for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑉, and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 
 
   (2) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝑝     iff      𝑝𝜌𝑖1 
   (3) 𝑖 ⊩ ~𝐴  iff      not  𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 
   (4) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  iff      𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴  and  𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 
   (5) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵  iff      𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴  or  𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 
   (6) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵  iff      𝑖 ⊩ ~𝐴  or  𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 
   (7) 𝑖 ⊩ □𝐴  iff      ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁: 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴. 
   (8) 𝑖 ⊩ ◊𝐴   iff      ∃𝑗 ∈ 𝑁: 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴. 
   (9) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵  iff      ∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴   and   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊(𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 ⟶ (𝑗 ⊩ 𝐴 ⟶ 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐵)) 
 
The intended meaning of 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 is ‘𝐴 is true at 𝑖’. For each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊 ∖ 𝑁, 𝜌𝑖 ⊆ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 × {0,1} is a 
relation, as specified in (1), between any formula and {0,1}. That is, truth conditions for 
complex formulae are not defined recursively, but related by 𝜌𝑖 to complex formulae directly. 
This allows for the inclusion of closed worlds, where the laws of logic are different (e.g. the 
worlds may be closed under paraconsistent or paracomplete consequence), and open worlds, 
where even extensional formulas fail to conform to any rules of compositionality. 
 
Definition 5.4: It will also be convenient to define [𝐴]𝔄 ∶= {𝑖 ∈ 𝑊: 𝔄, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴} for any model 𝔄 
with domain 𝑊. The superscript will be omitted when its absence will not lead to ambiguity. 
 
Notation: with the help of definition 5.4 let us formulate the second conjunct of (9) of 
definition 5.3.1 more succinctly – the main reason for defining the notation ↓.𝑘, in the first 
place. 
 
   (9’) 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵  iff      ∃𝑘 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑘 ⊩ 𝐴  and  ↓.𝑘𝑖 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵]. 
 
Where ↓.𝑘𝑖 is just shorthand for ↓.𝑘(𝑊,≲𝑖). In contexts where the subscript is constant, I’ll omit 
it altogether and just write ↓.𝑘 for brevity. 
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Logical truth is defined as truth at all possible worlds in each model, and valid inference is 
truth preservation at all possible worlds in each model. This follows an approach that can be 
traced at least back to Kripke’s semantics for non-normal modal logics (see §1.2) and is a 
common approach to defining validity and valid inference in semantics that include non-
normal or impossible worlds. The motivation for this definition of logical truth and validity is 
justified if we characterize impossible worlds to be those where the laws of logic are different 
or where the laws of logic fail. Then when we define validity and valid inference, i.e. the 
laws and rules of logic, we should not consider worlds where the laws of logic are different or 
where they fail.177 
 
Definition 5.5: Let ⊨𝐂𝐒∗ ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟. Write Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒∗ 𝐴 if and only if for all models 
(𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌), and all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, if 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴. We say an inference 
from Σ to 𝐴 is valid iff Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒∗ 𝐴. That is, valid inference is defined as truth preservation at all 
possible worlds in all 𝐂𝐒∗ models. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐂𝐒∗ 𝐴. Call this 
logic 𝐂𝐒∗. 
 
Note that since the truth conditions for □ and ◊ formulae are defined in terms of unrestricted 
quantification over possible worlds, the above validity conditions give the modal logic S5 for 
the basic modal language. 
 
There are a number of additional, well-motivated conditions that one could impose on 
ordering frames, thereby generating a whole family of logics.  
 
Definition 5.6: Given a CS* ordering frame 𝔉 = (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}) define the following 
conditions on 𝔉, for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊:  
 
(WC)       𝑖 is ≲𝑖-minimal: ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊(𝑖 ≲𝑖 𝑗 ). 
(SC)  𝑖 is <𝑖-minimal: ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊(𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 ⟶ 𝑖 <𝑖 𝑗 ). 
(T1)  ≲𝑖 is total over 𝑁: ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑁(𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 ∨ 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑗). 
(T2)  ≲𝑖 is total: ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊(𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 ∨ 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑗). 
(SI1)       Possible worlds are ≲𝑖-minimal: ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊(𝑘 ∉ 𝑁 ⟶ 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘). 
(SI2)     Possible worlds are <𝑖-minimal: ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊((𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∧ 𝑘 ∉ 𝑁) ⟶ 𝑗 <𝑖 𝑘). 
 
                                               
177 Berto & Jago (2019, §4.2) 
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If a CS* frame 𝔉 satisfies some condition (C), we will say ‘𝔉 satisfies (C)’.  
 
Definition 5.7: Let (C) be a condition predicable of an ordering frame (e.g. like the 
conditions in definition 5.6). Denote the restricted class of frames {𝔉 ∈ 𝐂𝐒∗: 𝔉 satisfies (C)} 
with 𝐂𝐒(C)
∗ . 
 
Definition 5.5.1: Let ⊨𝐂𝐒∗+(C) be defined as follows: let (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}) ∈ 𝐂𝐒(C)
∗ , and write 
Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒∗+(C) 𝐴 iff for all models (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌) and all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, if 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 
𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴. We say an inference from Σ to 𝐴 is valid iff Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒∗+(C) 𝐴. That is, valid inference is 
defined as truth preservation at all possible worlds in all 𝐂𝐒∗ + (C) models. A formula 𝐴 ∈
𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐂𝐒∗+(C) 𝐴. Call this logic 𝐂𝐒
∗ + (C). 
 
Note that the basic (CS1) condition of total preorderhood over the entire domain, used in the 
previous chapter is equivalent to the conjunction of the weaker condition of mere 
preorderhood and unrestricted totality, i.e. (CS1.1)+(T2). Conditions (SI2) and (SI1) 
correspond to Nolan’s (1997, p.566) conditions, i.e. Strangeness of Impossibility condition 
(SIC) and Lesser Strangeness of Impossibility condition (LSIC), respectively. (SI1) is the 
weaker of the two, as it only demands that no impossible world is more similar to the world 
of evaluation than some possible world, whereas (SI2) stipulates that all possible worlds are 
more similar to the world of evaluation than any impossible world. Aside from its intuitive 
appeal (SI2) has also important formal advantages, and it is not entirely free of criticism, all 
of which I’ll address in §5.3. 
 
As I will argue in §5.4 there may be good reasons to think that the notion of comparative 
similarity modelled by total preorders may be too strong when it comes to impossible worlds, 
so we could weaken the orderings from being total preorders of the entire domain 
(CS1.1)+(T1), which are jointly equivalent to (CS1), to only being totally preordered over 
possible worlds (CS1.1)+(T2) thereby allowing incomparabilities between impossible worlds. 
The intuition here is that impossible worlds are so strange that it would seem a little strong to 
demand that even in relevant respects their conceptual impossibility (logical, mathematical, 
metaphysical, etc.) should always be comparable by ≲𝑖. That is, for any two impossible 
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worlds, it need not always be correct to say that one is more/less/equally similar than the 
other to the actual world (or any world of valuation), even in relevant respects. 
 
The primary aim of the discussion in this chapter is to focus on weighing up the pros and 
cons of the following extensions (with convenient denotations indicated) of 𝐂𝐒∗.  
 
𝐂𝐒1
∗: 𝐂𝐒∗ + (WC) 
𝐂𝐒2
∗ : 𝐂𝐒∗ + (T1) + (WC) 
𝐂𝐒3
∗ : 𝐂𝐒∗ + (T1) + (WC) + (SI2)  
𝐂𝐒4
∗ : 𝐂𝐒∗ + (T2) + (WC) + (SI2) 
 
Note that ⊨𝐂𝐒1∗  ⊆ ⊨𝐂𝐒2∗  ⊆ ⊨𝐂𝐒3∗  ⊆ ⊨𝐂𝐒4∗  by definition. The system 𝐂𝐒2
∗ is a lot like 𝐂𝐒, introduced 
in the previous chapter, with the only difference that 𝐂𝐒2
∗ models admit impossible worlds 
with a weaker condition modelling comparative similarity between them. Its extension 𝐂𝐒3
∗ 
adds the Strangeness of Impossibility Condition (SI1) – which offers a number of advantages 
(discussed in §5.3) – and as I argue in §5.4, may be a better option than 𝐂𝐒4
∗. In other words, I 
will argue that 𝐂𝐒3
∗ is the optimal system, relative to the ones considered here. 
 
5.2 Adequacy for non-vacuism of the weakest 𝐂𝐒∗ systems 
It’s easy to check that 𝐂𝐒∗ validates the law of identity: 
(5.1) ⊨ 𝐴 > 𝐴 
And the addition of (WC) to 𝐂𝐒∗ validates modus ponens and modus tollens: 
(5.2) 𝐴, 𝐴 > 𝐵 ⊨ 𝐵 
(5.3)    ~𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐵 ⊨ ~𝐴  
 
CS* and its extensions are non-vacuist, which is the first indication of their adequacy. That is, 
both of the following no longer hold in 𝐂𝐒1
∗ and its extensions: 
(5.4) ~◊𝐴 ⊨ 𝐴 > 𝐵   e.g.   ~◊(~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) ⊭𝐂𝐒∗ (~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) > 𝑞 
Which as a consequence results in the invalidation of: 
(5.5) □(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵) ⊨ 𝐴 > 𝐵  e.g.   ((~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) ⊃ 𝑞) ⊭𝐂𝐒∗ (~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) > 𝑞 
 
Proposition 5.2: ⊭𝐂𝐒∗ (~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) > 𝑞 
Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌), be a CS* model such that 𝑊 = {𝑖, 𝑗}, 𝑁 = {𝑖}, 𝑖 ≲𝑖 𝑗, and 
(~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝, 1) ∈ 𝜌𝑗 and (𝑞, 1) ∉ 𝜌𝑗. So, 𝑖 ⊮ (~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) > 𝑞, since 𝑗 ⊩ ~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝 and 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑗, but 𝑗 ⊮ 𝑞.  □ 
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Corollary 5.2.1: □((~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) ⊃ 𝑞) ⊭𝐂𝐒∗ (~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) > 𝑞 
Proof : Follows immediately from proposition 5.2, since ⊨𝐂𝐒∗ (~𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) ⊃ 𝑞.      □ 
 
5.3 Strangeness of Impossibility Condition 
When evaluating at a possible world the truth of a counterfactual whose antecedent doesn’t 
express an impossibility, impossible worlds are irrelevant, much like worlds where kangaroos 
walk upright using crutches are irrelevant in evaluating the counterfactual ‘If kangaroos had 
no tails, they would topple over’. So, the condition (SI2) is very much Lewisean in spirit.178 
There’s an obvious parallel between the centering conditions (SC) and (WC) and strangeness 
of impossibility conditions (SI1) and (SI2). Just as (SC) stipulates that the actual world (or 
any world of evaluation) is more similar to itself than all other worlds, (SI2) stipulates that all 
possible worlds are more similar to the actual world (or any world of evaluation) than any 
impossible world is. Both (WC) and (SI1) weaken those conditions by allowing ties in 
comparative similarity between the world of evaluation and other possible worlds and by 
allowing ties in comparative similarity between possible worlds and impossible worlds, 
respectively.179 Perhaps unsurprisingly, to that analogue in comparative similarity restrictions 
there corresponds a pair of characteristic inference forms that hinge on them.180  
 
(5.6) 𝐴, 𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴 > 𝐵 
(5.7) □𝐴, □𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴 > 𝐵 
 
That is, (5.6) is invalidated on all 𝐂𝐒∗systems that do not satisfy (SC), so on the current 
proposal that means all systems 𝐂𝐒1
∗ through 𝐂𝐒4
∗. Also, systems that satisfy (SI2), validate 
(5.7), which I prove shortly in Proposition 5.3, so on the current proposal only systems 𝐂𝐒3
∗ 
and 𝐂𝐒4
∗ validate it. In §5.3.2.2 I will address what looks like a counterexample to (5.7) given 
by Weiss (2017), and which arms his objection to (SI2). 
 
5.3.1 Benefits 
The main appeal of (SI2) is that it allows us to effectively preserve all of Lewis’ analysis of 
mere counterfactuals, whilst correcting the analysis of counterpossibles. Adding the stronger 
strangeness of impossibility condition (SI2) validates (5.7) and: 
 
(5.8) ◊𝐴, 𝐴 > 𝐵 ⊨ ◊𝐵 
                                               
178 Mares (1997) and Jago (2014) also endorse (SIC). 
179 We could think of (SI1) as “weak centering on 𝑁” and (SI2) as “strict centering on 𝑁”. 
180 Weiss (2017, §2.2) also makes an analogous observation. 
146 
 
 
 
Proposition 5.3: □𝐴, □𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴 > 𝐵 
Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌) be a CS* model that satisfies (SI2), and let 𝑖 ⊩ {□𝐴, □𝐵} 
for arbitrary 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Then it follows that there is a 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ⊆ [𝐴] and ↓.𝑗 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵] since ↓.𝑗 ∩
[𝐴] ⊆ 𝑁 by hypothesis and (SI2), and 𝑁 ⊆ [𝐵] by hypothesis. So, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵, as required.     □ 
 
Proposition 5.4: ◊𝐴, 𝐴 > 𝐵 ⊨ ◊𝐵   
Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌) be a CS* model that satisfies (SI2), and assume 𝑖 ⊩ ◊𝐴 
and 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 for arbitrary 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Now, since 𝑁 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅, then 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 and (SI2) imply 
that there exists a world 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∩ [𝐴] such that ↓.𝑗 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ 𝑁 and ↓.𝑗 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵]. Hence, 𝑗 ⊩ 𝐵, 
which implies that 𝑖 ⊩ ◊𝐵, as required.           □ 
 
As a matter of fact (SI2) does a lot more. It allows us to salvage most of the CS valid 
inferences, as long as the antecedents of the modal conditional > are restricted to expressing 
possible propositions. This can be done by adding suppressed premises in the form ◊𝐴 to the 
premise set, for every 𝐴 > 𝐵 appearing anywhere in the inference, which would ensure that 
when evaluating a conditional > we would never “look beyond” possible worlds. That is, 
given a CS valid inference Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴, we can preserve its validity on CS* systems if we add ◊𝐵 
to the premise set for each 𝐵 > 𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐴) ∪ {𝐷 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐸): 𝐸 ∈ Σ}.181 In order words, with 
(SI2) in place we preserve all of Lewis’ analysis of mere counterfactuals (i.e. possible-
antecedent part of CS), whilst correcting the analysis of counterpossibles. That is, by 
introducing impossible worlds we lose nothing of the original analysis, and we gain by 
amending its drawbacks.  
To be sure (SI2) is not entirely unobjectionable. Nolan (1997) having introduced (SI2)  not so 
much as a logical principle, but a tentative heuristic, explores a few insightful examples that 
could be said to violate it. Berto and Jago (2019) reply to those examples by defending (SI2). 
I will not reiterate that exchange here but instead focus on a couple of other objections, in the 
next section. 
 
5.3.2 Criticisms 
5.3.2.1   The problem of the trivial world 
A number of authors have observed an internal tension between two provisional principles 
that have gathered wide acceptance by those working with similarity semantics for 
                                               
181 In agreement with (Berto & Jago, 2019). 
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counterpossibles based on classical logic.182  
 
Definition 5.8: Given any CS* model call a world 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 closed under L-consequence if and 
only if Σ ⊨L 𝐴 and 𝑤 ⊩ Σ implies 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴, where L is some logic.  
We could then say that a world w is governed by logic L iff w is L-closed. 
 
The first of the aforementioned principles is (SI2) and the second is the suggestion that the 
world 𝜆, where everything is true, i.e. a world 𝜆 ∈ 𝑊\𝑁 such that (∀𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟)[𝜆 ⊩ 𝐴], also 
referred to in the literature as the trivial world (aka explosion world, absurd world) should be 
relegated to be among the most dissimilar impossible worlds (or at least no less dissimilar 
than any other impossible world), which I’ll denote with (ST) for strangeness of the trivial 
world.183 The aforementioned tension stems from the fact that some of the reasons that speak 
in support of (SI2) simultaneously – it could be argued – speak against (ST). Namely, closure 
under classical consequence is part of the justification for (SI2), but the trivial world is also 
closed under classical consequence – in particular, unlike other LNC-violating worlds, it 
satisfies ECQ.184  So, if we were to attribute principal weight (although we don’t) to logical 
closure in determining the similarity of worlds – which is part of the justification for (SI2) – 
then that would not only speak against (ST), but strongly in favour of the trivial world being 
the most similar impossible world. But this would result in trivializing the analysis once 
more, since the consequent of any counterpossible would be true at the closest antecedent-
admitting world, namely 𝜆.185 So, closure under classical consequence can’t be the only 
criterion for determining the comparative similarity of impossible worlds. On the current 
proposal the formalism to avoid such trivialization is in place, since the trivial world need not 
be present in every model, and even when it is present, ties between impossible worlds are 
allowed. The obvious justification for a variation of such orderings is that we don’t always 
attribute priority to logical closure in determining the similarity of impossible worlds. That is, 
                                               
182 (Sendłak, 2016, 2017), (Weiss, 2017). 
183 See (Stalnaker 1968, p.103), (Nolan 1997,p.544), (Berto 2013), and (Brogaard & Salerno, 2014, p.652). 
Stalnaker (1968) denotes the absurd world with 𝜆. Note that on the relational semantics approach presently 
chosen for CS* models, there is a whole class {𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ∖ 𝑁: (∀𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟)[𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴]} of impossible worlds that are 
closed under classical consequence, since if 𝐴 is a truth value glut at some world 𝑖, i.e. 𝐴𝜌𝑖1 and 𝐴𝜌𝑖0, then ⊩
𝐴, by definition. 
184 LNC stands for the law of non-contradiction, i.e. ⊨ ~(𝐴 ∧ ~𝐴) for any 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 (a proposition and its 
negation can’t both be true), and ECQ stands for ex contradictione quodlibet, i.e. 𝐴, ~𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 for any 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 
(anything follows from a contradiction). 
185 It would be equivalent to the vacuous analysis given by Lewis, but resemble in its formalism Stalnaker’s 
approach, who stipulated the absurd world 𝜆 to account for counterpossibles. 
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it is not the case that in each context in which we entertain an impossible scenario, we always 
import logical closure as the information relevant to the evaluation of the counterpossible. In 
the next couple of paragraphs, I argue that closure under classical consequence is insufficient 
to justify deeming 𝜆 the closest impossible world.  
 
There are many reasons that speak against treating 𝜆 as the closest impossible world. First, 
although it is closed under classical consequence, it also is “maximally inconsistent”, in the 
sense that 𝜆 ⊩ {𝐴, ~𝐴} for all 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. Surely the degree to which a world is LNC-violating 
should factor in to its similarity. Another way of looking at this is to consider what doesn’t 
hold at a world – surely this is not entirely irrelevant and should also feature as a similarity 
parameter. When we take into account what fails to be true at any given world, then 𝜆 departs 
in the greatest possible way from any possible world 𝑤, because 𝜆 ⊩ 𝐴 for any 𝑤 ⊮ 𝐴.186 
 
Next, 𝜆 isn’t only closed under classical consequence – it is closed under any truth preserving 
consequence. So, it’s unclear why 𝜆 should be strictly closer to (classically) possible worlds 
than other LNC-violating worlds that are closed under any other truth preserving 
consequence. Deeming such worlds to be at least as similar to any possible world as 𝜆 is, 
seems like a perfectly natural comparative similarity ordering.  
 
Therefore, it’s not entirely clear that logical closure justification for (SI2) speaks in favour of 
𝜆 being the closest impossible world. (SI2) is a statement regarding the difference in 
similarity between possible and impossible worlds. The fact that 𝜆 happens to be closed under 
classical consequence (given that it’s closed under all truth preserving consequences) at best 
speaks in favour of it having a similarity advantage over open worlds, i.e. worlds a lot like 𝜆, 
where things hold for no reason, and which have been designed to violate all closures. That 
is, the claim that in all contexts 𝜆 should be the deemed as the most similar impossible world 
appears to be false. 
  
5.3.2.2   Other objections 
Weiss (2017) gives an example that questions the validity of (5.7), which is effectively an 
objection to (SI2), which is sufficient to validate (5.7). The counterexample goes as follows: 
                                               
186 This does become highly relevant on some informational interpretations of states of affairs (on some ersatz 
views of worlds), where the distinction – absent in classical possible worlds – between negative information and 
absence of information is key, e.g. see Mares (1997, §3). 
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let the first premise be ‘there either is a counterexample to LEM187 or there is no 
counterexample to LEM’ and let the second premise be ‘there is no counterexample to LEM’. 
Both are necessarily true, but the conclusion ‘if it were the case that there either is a 
counterexample to LEM or there isn’t a counterexample to LEM, then there would be no 
counterexample to LEM’ doesn’t seem to follow.  
I’ve hinted earlier at parallels between (SI2) and (SC), which become salient in the 
similarities between (5.6) and (5.7). Apparently both inferences also raise analogous concerns 
– just as in the case of (5.6) we agree that the truth of the counterfactual doesn’t depend on 
the mere (coincidental) truth of the antecedent and consequent (and indeed many 
counterexamples support that judgement), so in the case of (5.7) it appears that the truth of 
the counterfactual doesn’t depend on the mere (necessary) truth of the antecedent and 
consequent, and the above example appears to support that judgement. In fact, the example 
given by Weiss can be viewed as a variation of Hájek’s example aimed at challenging (5.6), 
which we have looked at in §2.2.7.188 
Likewise, whereas abandoning (SC) in favor for (WC) can be motivated by an interpretation 
of similarity as similarity in relevant respects (where other worlds may be equally similar in 
relevant respects to  the world of evaluation as it is to itself), it seems that an analogous 
motivation could speak in favor of (SI1) – which would suffice to invalidate (5.7) and which 
the offered formalism allows – but at the risk losing much of the mere counterfactual analysis 
(i.e. the possible-antecedent part of CS).  
 
Note that (5.7) doesn’t contain any counterpossibles, so it’s not exactly a problem of the 
current proposal, but of the original analysis due to Lewis which validates it. The current 
proposal intends to heal the vacuous analysis of counterpossibles of Lewis’ original account 
and employing (SI2) has proven sufficient for meeting that challenge, whilst offering a way 
to preserve most of the original analysis of mere counterfactuals. The matter of dealing with 
general relevance-failure issues, which (5.7) is a symptom of – although a matter certainly 
worth addressing – is sufficiently independent from the intended task of this chapter to be set 
aside for another time. 
                                               
187 LEM stands for law of excluded middle, i.e. ⊨ 𝐴 ∨ ~𝐴 for any 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟. 
188 See (§2.2.7, p.73). In the coin scenario we have a suppressed premise, which is an instance of LEM regarding 
all physical possible outcomes of the coin toss, and the second premise pertains to a fact, i.e. the coin having 
landed heads. In the example given by Weiss, the first premise is an instance of LEM regarding the existence of 
counterexamples of LEM, and the second premise is a statement of “logical fact” (we’re assuming classical 
logic). Both conclusions seem wrong due to the ampliative character of the consequent. 
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5.4 The question of comparability of impossible worlds 
Although its explicit form varies, depending on the particular semantic apparatus – be it 
sphere systems, selection functions, or ordering frames – comparability is the fundamental 
feature of similarity accounts of counterfactuals. Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973, 1981), 
both agree that the orderings of worlds fitting the analysis of counterfactuals admit no 
incomparabilities – a condition that has been shown not to be necessary in general, but its 
appeal on a comparative similarity interpretation of orderings has some intuitive force.189 I 
will not join that debate here, which is restricted to possible world semantics, but focus on 
reasons for lifting comparability from impossible worlds.  
Such a move is partly motivated by a rebuttal to a general objection to comparative similarity 
semantics for counterfactuals, and other reasons that align with more general features of non-
vacuism. I begin the section with a critical analysis and a reply to an objection by Weiss 
(2017) to the similarity account that takes aim at comparability, which lies at the heart of 
Lewis-Stalnaker comparative similarity semantics for counterfactuals.190 I conclude the 
section by highlighting an additional aspect of CS* systems that proves beneficial to the 
analysis of mere counterfactuals, and which is gained from weakening the comparability 
conditions. That is, such systems are weak enough to correctly invalidate inference forms, 
which are nevertheless formally valid on a number of popular accounts of conditional logics, 
despite the existence of intuitive counterexamples.  
 
5.4.1 Weiss’ objection 
First, I’ll outline Weiss (2017) objection and show that (5.10) is valid on the strongest system 
𝐂𝐒4
∗, characterized by ordering frames that satisfy the stronger totality condition (T2) whereby 
all worlds are totally preordered. Then I’ll give a detailed account and critical analysis of 
Weiss’ alleged counterexample to (5.10), and finally I’ll show that (5.10) is invalidated on 
systems where (T2) is replaced by (T1). 
 
Weiss (2017) objects to the inference rule (5.10), which holds for all CS logics characterized 
by ordering frames based on preorderings that are total.  
 
                                               
189 Notably Pollock (1976) and Kratzer (1981) effectively argue in favour of what would correspond to partial 
orderings on ordering semantics. For a good discussion of the various approaches see Lewis (1981, §3-5). 
190 Comparability is the basic assumption about comparative similarity of worlds that states: any two worlds x 
and y are comparable to each other in terms of their similarity relative to the world of evaluation z. Totality of 
preorders captures comparability for ordering frames, and nesting captures this for systems of spheres.  
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(5.10) 𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐵 > 𝐴 ⊨ (𝐴 > 𝐶) ≡ (𝐵 > 𝐶).191  
 
To be exact, the objection is actually addressed to systems of spheres candidate semantics for 
a non-vacuist account of counterpossibles, and Weiss correctly identifies the nesting 
condition (see §2.2.3), fundamental for those systems, as responsible for the rule’s validity.192 
Indeed (5.10) is characteristic of systems of spheres that are nested, and therefore all systems 
of spheres as defined by Lewis (1973). I’ll mirror the discussion in terms of CS* models, 
noting that (5.10) is characteristic of ordering frames based on preorderings that are total, and 
therefore all CS models.193  That is, comparability takes the form of nesting on systems of 
spheres and the form of totality on ordering frames based on preorders. 
 
The objection is set up via what Weiss takes to be a counterexample to (5.10), formulated in 
terms of counterpossibles, and – the argument goes – because all systems of spheres satisfy 
nesting, a successful counterexample to (5.10) amounts a counterexample to sphere semantics 
in general. This objection extends to all other formulations that encode the intuitions about 
comparative similarity in terms of conditions corresponding to comparability – the basic 
intuition regarding comparative similarity of worlds. Therefore, in particular it is also an 
objection to ordering semantics based on total preorderings. However, Weiss’ conclusion is 
too strong. Surely the alleged counterexample alone, even if correct, doesn’t justify 
abandoning comparability altogether, but rather at most justifies lifting the nesting condition 
for spheres containing impossible worlds, or correspondingly in ordering semantics, lifting 
the totality condition from impossible worlds. And such a much weaker conclusion is not as 
damaging to similarity semantics.194 
 
Proposition 5.2: 𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐵 > 𝐴 ⊨𝐂𝐒4∗ (𝐴 > 𝐶) ≡ (𝐵 > 𝐶) 
                                               
191 The axiomatic counterpart of (5.10) is CSO: [(𝐴 > 𝐵) ∧ (𝐵 > 𝐴)] ⊃ [(𝐴 > 𝐶) ≡ (𝐵 > 𝐶)], see Nute (1980, 
§3.1). 
192 Weiss’ (2017) sphere models for non-vacuism are based on sphere models equivalent to S models (see 
chapter 2), whose domains are extended to include non-normal worlds and the truth conditions at non-normal 
worlds are extended much in the same manner as I have modified CS models to yield CS* models (definition 5.4 
and 5.4). 
193 Nesting and totality are each other’s counterparts on S frames and CS frames, respectively. For a formal 
proof of that correspondence see lemmas A.1.0.1 and A.1.0.2 in the Appendix. 
194 An axiom, characteristic of all Lewis-Stalnaker logics of counterfactuals and closely related to (5.10), has 
been objected to before by Gabbay (1972) more generally, i.e. even in cases where the antecedent of the 
counterfactual doesn’t express an impossibility. Gabbay objects to ((𝐴 > 𝐵) ∧ (𝐵 > 𝐴) ∧ (𝐴 > 𝐶)) ⊃ (𝐵 > 𝐶), 
by providing an insightful counterexample to what he believes as illustrating some relevance violating features 
of that inference. Note that its failure implies the failure of (5.10). 
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Proof : First, I’ll prove that if 𝑖 ⊩ {𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐵 > 𝐴} for any 𝐂𝐒4
∗ model (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌), 𝑖 ∈
𝑊, and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟, then ∃𝑘 ∈ [𝐴] ∩ [𝐵] such that ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] = ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐵]. Assuming 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 
implies ∃𝑘 ∈ [𝐴] such that ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵], and 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 > 𝐴 implies ∃𝑘′ ∈ [𝐵] such that ↓.𝑘′ ∩
[𝐵] ⊆ [𝐴]. Note that in both cases 𝑘, 𝑘′ ∈ [𝐴] ∩ [𝐵]. Either 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑘′ or 𝑘′ ≲𝑖 𝑘, by (T2). Suppose 
𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑘′. Hence ↓.𝑘 ⊆ ↓.𝑘′. Now, ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵] implies ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐵] ⊆ ↓.𝑘′ ∩ [𝐵] ⊆ [𝐴]. Hence, ↓.𝑘 ∩
[𝐵] ⊆ [𝐴]. Hence finally, 𝑘 ∈ [𝐴] ∩ [𝐵] and ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] = ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐵]. A similar argument shows 
that ↓.𝑘′ ∩ [𝐴] = ↓.𝑘′ ∩ [𝐵] when 𝑘′ ≲𝑖 𝑘. Let us denote such a world, which is guaranteed by 
𝑖 ⊩ {𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐵 > 𝐴} with 𝑘*. Now we will show that 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐶 implies 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 > 𝐶, for any 𝐶 ∈
𝐹𝑜𝑟. Assuming 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐶 implies ∃𝑘 ∈ [𝐴] such that ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐶]. Next, by totality, 
either 𝑘* ≲𝑖 𝑘 or 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑘*. Now, suppose 𝑘* ≲𝑖 𝑘. Hence ↓.𝑘* ⊆ ↓.𝑘, and we note that ↓.𝑘*∩
[𝐵] = ↓.𝑘*∩ [𝐴] ⊆ ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐶]. Hence, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 > 𝐶. Next, suppose 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑘*. Therefore ↓.𝑘 ⊆
 ↓.𝑘*, which implies ↓.𝑘 ∩ ↓.𝑘*∩ [𝐴] = ↓.𝑘 ∩ ↓.𝑘*∩ [𝐵]. In conjunction with the hypothesis this 
implies ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐵] = ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐶]. Hence, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 > 𝐶. The proof in the other direction is 
similar. So, 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐶  iff  𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 > 𝐶, as required.           □ 
 
Now I’ll focus on the alleged counterexample itself given by Weiss (2017), which arms the 
aforementioned general objection to most similarity accounts of counterfactuals and 
counterpossibles. Weiss (2017) formulates it as a variation on Williamson’s (Hempel 
Lectures 2006, and Williamson 2007) objection to a non-vacuist account of counterpossibles, 
presented and discussed earlier in Brogaard and Salerno (2013, pp.649-50). I’ll argue that the 
context-shift resulting from allowing (as true) certain premises opens the door to formulating 
other counterexamples that undermine inferences that are valid on all systems Weiss (2017) 
endorses as alternatives to similarity accounts to counterpossible analysis. But those premises 
are required for the counterexample to work.  
 
The argument against (5.10) goes as follows: 
 
Fred asks George what 5+7 is, and George mistakenly responds 13. Fred snidely 
remarks, “if 5 + 7 were 13, you would have answered correctly.” This is true. 
What else might be the case if 5 + 7 = 13? Plausibly, 5 + 6 = 12. Conversely, if 5 
+ 6 = 12, it would seem reasonable to expect that 5+7 = 13. From [5.10] and the 
truth of Fred's initial remark, we can infer “if 5+6=12, George would have 
answered correctly,” which is not obviously true. (Weiss 2017, p.390) 
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Let us denote the relevant counterpossibles. 
 
  (1)  If 5+7 were 13, then George would have answered correctly. 
    (2) If 5+7 = 13, then 5+6 = 12. 
    (3)  If 5+6 = 12, then 5+6 = 13. 
   (4) If 5+6 were 12, then George would have answered correctly. 
 
Both (2) and (3) seem true enough, although not as obviously as (1) does. Weiss discounts all 
potential objections attacking the soundness of the argument as question begging on the basis 
of the intuitive truth of (2) and (3). This riposte has some merit but seems a little too quick, 
and as such introduces problems of its own. One way of arguing against their truth is to say 
that contexts where we want (1) to be true, need not always be ones where we’d be also 
willing to admit (2) and (3) as true. Indeed, there seem to be many ways of arguing against 
the truth of (2) and (3) in contexts where (1) is true, however I agree that it doesn’t seem 
obvious that there should be no context at all where we would allow all three to be true, 
thereby admitting the counterexample as legitimate. 
 
However, caution should be exercised when accepting a general strategy for generating 
counterexamples that admits the truth of premises whose relevance to the pertinent context 
can be questioned, because this may pave the way to invalidating more than one has 
bargained for. Finally, Weiss discounts all potential counter-objections that would defend the 
truth of (4), by asserting that it is intuitively false. But to me it doesn’t seem all that much 
less acceptable than what is already taken on-board when admitting both (2) and (3) as true. 
As a matter of fact, by admitting those additional premises, (4) doesn’t seem as odd as it 
would be in their absence.195  
 
The first thing to note is that (1) bares very close resemblance to a statement of 
counterpossible identity, and as such is intuitively true. That is, it appears to mean no more 
and no less than:  
 
(1.a)  If 5+7 were 13, then George answering ‘13’ to the question what ‘5+7’ is, 
would have answered correctly.  
                                               
195 Weiss uses a Sorites kind of reasoning, which employs numerous applications of (5.10), to amplify the 
salience of the falsehood of (4) further (or rather, diminish any intuitive claim to truth that (4) may have) and 
derive an arguably much less plausible version (4’). But a similar objection can be set against it, i.e. that the 
amplified conclusion (4’) is no less obvious than the assumed stability of reasoning involved in deriving it and the 
truth of all the intermediate steps required to arrive at (4’). 
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Or even more explicitly:  
 
(1.b) ‘If 5+7 were 13, then George saying ‘5+7 is 13’ would be telling the truth’ 
 
We’re dealing with a counterpossible whose consequent’s impossible content is not 
ampliative relative to the antecedent, i.e. no greater than the content of (1)’s antecedent. The 
consequent can be said to very naturally follow from the antecedent. Or, yet to put it another 
way, which (1.b) intends to highlight, (1) is closely related to a relatively safe counter-
factual/possible:  
 
    (1.c) If A were true, then saying ‘A’ would be to speak truly.  
 
Therefore, worlds where the consequent is true would certainly seem like scenarios no 
stranger than those corresponding to whatever (impossibility) is expressed in the antecedent 
alone. However, this doesn’t seem to be the case for the admission of the truth of (2), which, 
on top of the impossibility expressed in the antecedent requires us to accept additional 
assumptions about arithmetic in such impossible situations, which feels stranger than the 
scenario envisaged in (1). That would speak in support of an argument that the context has 
indeed shifted – but we’re allowing for that, so let’s continue. In other words, granting the 
truth of (2), and then (3) would seem to be stretching the strangeness of a world w that 
suffices to make (1) true. So, the antecedent world or worlds required to make (2) and (3) 
true, should at least be distinct from the antecedent world w that makes (1) true and certainly 
no more similar to the actual world than w. Those would seem to be the correct and weakest 
comparative similarity requirements fitting this scenario. With these assumptions about 
comparative similarity in place, the task is to salvage the truth of (1), (2), and (3) without 
committing to the truth of (4). This is impossible on a notion of comparative similarity of 
worlds with unrestricted comparability of worlds, i.e. characterized by total preorders. But 
perhaps it could be argued that the antecedent world (or worlds) required for the non-vacuous 
truth of (2) and (3) is not so much stranger than the antecedent world(s) required for the non-
vacuous truth of (1) but strange in a different way. This interpretation of comparative 
similarity/dissimilarity of worlds could potentially serve as intuitive motivation for 
abandoning comparability over impossible worlds. 
 
5.4.2 Weaker totality condition (T1) 
Totality of ≲𝑖 need not be abandoned altogether to avoid commitment to (5.10). It suffices to 
lift totality from impossible worlds only, i.e. by replacing the stronger comparability 
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condition (T2) with a weaker one (T1). Note that systems that invalidate (5.10), by virtue of 
satisfying the weaker comparability condition (T1) aren’t somehow particularly contrived. At 
least, they are not any more contrived than some aspects of the model theory that are already 
in place. That is, we’ve already distinguished the elements of 𝑁 and 𝑊\𝑁 at the level of 
models, by stipulating distinct conditions for 𝜌 (and consequently ⊩). So, it doesn’t seem all 
that more contrived to distinguish the elements of 𝑁 and 𝑊\𝑁 at level of ordering frames, by 
allowing distinct conditions for ≲.  
 
Proposition 5.2.1: 𝑝 > 𝑞, 𝑞 > 𝑝 ⊭𝐂𝐒3∗ (𝑝 > 𝑟) ≡ (𝑞 > 𝑟) 
Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌), be a 𝐂𝐒3
∗ model such that 𝑊 = {𝑖, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧}, 𝑁 = {𝑖}, the 
following ordering assignment ≲𝑖 = {(𝑖, 𝑥), (𝑖, 𝑦), (𝑖, 𝑧), (𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑦, 𝑥), (𝑖, 𝑖), (𝑥, 𝑥), (𝑦, 𝑦), (𝑧, 𝑧)}, 
and ⊩ = {(𝑖, ~𝑝), (𝑖, ~𝑞), (𝑖, ~𝑟), (𝑥, 𝑝), (𝑥, 𝑞), (𝑥, 𝑟), (𝑦, 𝑞), (𝑧, 𝑝), (𝑧, 𝑞)}. See diagram below 
(indication of reflexivity has been omitted for better readability).     
Now, 𝑧 ∈ [𝑝] ∩ [𝑞] = {𝑥, 𝑧}, and ↓.𝑧 ∩ [𝑝] = {𝑧} ⊆ [𝑞] = {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧}, and ↓.𝑧 ∩ [𝑞] = {𝑧} ⊆ [𝑝] =
{𝑥, 𝑧}. Hence 𝑖 ⊩ {𝑝 > 𝑞, 𝑞 > 𝑝}. Also 𝑥 ∈ [𝑝] = {𝑥, 𝑧} and ↓.𝑥 ∩ [𝑝] = {𝑥} ⊆ [𝑟] = {𝑥}, therefore 
𝑖 ⊩ 𝑝 > 𝑟. But, ↓.𝑤 ∩ [𝑞] ⊈ [𝑟], for all 𝑤 ∈ [𝑞], i.e. ↓.𝑥 ∩ [𝑞] = ↓.𝑦 ∩ [𝑞] = {𝑥, 𝑦} ⊈ [𝑟] = {𝑥}, and 
↓.𝑧 ∩ [𝑞] = {𝑧} ⊈ [𝑟] = {𝑥}. Hence 𝑖 ⊮ 𝑞 > 𝑟, as required.                     □ 
 
5.4.3 (T1) and Adjunction of Consequents 
Now we turn to another motivation for (T1). Lifting unrestricted comparability over 
impossible worlds is a way of invalidating inferences that have at least one pair of 
counterpossible premises with the same antecedent, and whose validity hinges on all 
counterpossibles with the same antecedents being evaluated on the same relevant set of 
worlds. So, for example, inferences like (5.11) – namely, Adjunction of Consequents, 
discussed extensively in §4 – will be valid in all conditional logics where the antecedent is 
the only parameter that determines the range of the accessibility relation.  
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(5.11) 𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐶 ⊨ 𝐴 > (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶) 
 
This is formally valid on any labelled transition system model (𝑊, 𝑁, {𝑅𝐴: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟}, 𝜌) where 
𝜌 and ⊩ are defined exactly the same as in definition 5.3, where (𝑊, {𝑅𝐴: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟}), 𝑅𝐴, and 
𝑓𝐴(𝑤) are as in §2.1.3, and the truth conditions for > are: 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵  iff  𝑓𝐴(𝑤) ⊆ [𝐵].
196  
 
But consider the following instance (which appears to be a clear counterexample) containing 
Goodman-inspired counteridenticals:197 
 
   (1)  If the number 2 was Sherlock Holmes, then 2 would be a detective. 
   (2)  If Sherlock Holmes was the number 2, then Sherlock Holmes wouldn’t be a detective. 
   (3) Therefore, if 2 was S. Holmes, then 2 would be a detective and S. Holmes wouldn’t 
be a detective. 
 
Both premises are non-vacuously true counterpossibles, however the conclusion (3) is clearly 
not true.198 CS* systems with (T1) instead of (T2) give a correct analysis of this 
counterexample and ones like it, i.e. there are countermodels to (5.11) in each system weaker 
than 𝐂𝐒4
∗, and I explicitly give one in Proposition 5.3, below. One may object to admitting 
both premises, on account of apparent radical context-shift required for that, but then one 
would have to decide how much of a context shift between premises is allowed. At least it’s 
not obviously clear that the freedom of context-shift employed in the counterexample to 
(5.10), discussed earlier, would not justify the context shifts in the invalidation of (5.11). And 
(5.11) is formally valid in all the alternative non-vacuist systems that Weiss (2017) 
endorses.199  
 
The inference is still valid for systems with the stronger comparability condition (T2). 
 
Proposition 5.3: 𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐶 ⊨𝐂𝐒4∗ 𝐴 > (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶) 
Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁, 𝜌), be a 𝐂𝐒4
∗ model and let 𝑖 ⊩ {𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐶} for arbitrary 𝑖 ∈
𝑊. Then ∃𝑘 ∈ [𝐴] such that ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵], and ∃𝑘′ ∈ [𝐴] such that ↓.𝑘′ ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐶]. Now, 
                                               
196 This follows from Proposition 4.12, (and footnote 168) which shows that (5.11) is valid for CS and C. 
197 Goodman (1983, p.6). Note that (1) and (2) are equivalent – the order has been inverted only for emphasis. 
198 I’m assuming that being a detective is an essential property of Sherlock Holmes (i.e. Holmes has it in all 
possible worlds), and the number 2 is not a detective in any possible world, hence the identity is a 
counterpossible identity. 
199 Although Weiss builds the alternative non-vacuist proposal on conditional logics like C and C+ (i.e. labelled 
transition systems that take only the antecedent as a parameter in the accessibility relation), he does entertain 
similar systems, which also include the consequent as a parameter in characterizing the accessibility relation, 
drawing on Gabbay’s (1972) proposal – an approach that would allow for the invalidation of (5.11). 
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either 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑘′ or 𝑘′ ≲𝑖 𝑘 by (T2). If 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑘′, then clearly ↓.𝑘 ⊆ ↓.𝑘′, which in conjunction with 
the hypothesis implies ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐶]. So, we have both ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵] and ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐶], 
which jointly imply ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝐴] ⊆ [𝐵] ∩ [𝐶]. Hence 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶), as required. A very similar 
argument holds for the case when 𝑘′ ≲𝑖 𝑘.           □ 
 
However, it fails once we weaken the comparability condition to (T1). 
 
Proposition 5.3.1: 𝑝 > 𝑞, 𝑝 > 𝑟 ⊭𝐂𝐒3∗ 𝑝 > (𝑞 ∧ 𝑟) 
Proof : Let 𝔄 = (𝑊, 𝑁, {≲𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}, 𝜌), be a 𝐂𝐒3
∗ model such that 𝑊 = {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}, 𝑁 = {𝑖}, letting 
≲𝑖 = {(𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖, 𝑘), (𝑖, 𝑖), (𝑗, 𝑗), (𝑘, 𝑘), }, and ⊩ = {(𝑖, ~𝑝), (𝑖, ~𝑞), (𝑖, ~𝑟), (𝑗, 𝑝), (𝑗, 𝑞), (𝑘, 𝑝), (𝑘, 𝑟)}.  
See diagram below (indication of reflexivity has been omitted for better readability).     
Now, 𝑗 ∈ [𝑝] and ↓.𝑗 ∩ [𝑝] = {𝑗} ⊆ [𝑞] = {𝑗}, and also 𝑘 ∈ [𝑝] and ↓.𝑘 ∩ [𝑝] = {𝑘} ⊆ [𝑟] = {𝑘}. 
Hence, 𝑖 ⊩ {𝑝 > 𝑞, 𝑝 > 𝑟}. But ↓.𝑤 ∩ [𝑝] ⊈ [𝑞 ∧ 𝑟] = ∅, for all 𝑤 ∈ [𝑝]. So, 𝑖 ⊮ 𝑝 > (𝑞 ∧ 𝑟), as 
required.               □ 
 
5.4.4 (T1) and mere counterfactuals 
The benefits of (T1) are not confined to counterpossibles. That is, all CS* systems weaker 
than 𝐂𝐒4
∗ invalidate (5.11) even when it is confined to counterfactuals. As exemplified in §4.5 
there exist intuitive counterexamples to (5.11) confined to mere counterfactuals, which 
nevertheless go through in C and CS because the premises can never be jointly true at any 
possible world (see claim 4.5.2 and f.21 in §4.5). That is, and this is a crucial point (reiterated 
from §4.5), the counterexamples go through vacuously because the combined truth of both 
counterfactual premises at some world – particularly in cases of said counterexamples – 
implies inconsistent situations, once the imported information is accounted for, and so if the 
analysis is restricted to possible worlds, the premises can’t be jointly true (since inconsistent 
situations can’t be accommodated). But on CS* systems with the weaker comparability 
condition (T1), there is a way of preserving all the intuitive scope of (5.11)’s applicability (it 
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only fails in cases when the truth of the premises depends on radical context shifts), and at the 
same time allow it to fail by giving an accurate analysis of the counterexamples. This is 
achieved by:  
 
(i) Accommodating the implied inconsistent situations – necessitated by the truth of 
both premises – by allowing them to hold at impossible worlds. 
 
(ii) Lifting comparability from impossible worlds to block the truth of the conclusion. 
 
That is, the inference is analysed as invalid for counterfactuals, as it should be, for the same 
general reasons that motivate non-vacuism. Therefore, returning to the counterexample 
discussed at length in §4.5, there is a CS* model where (1) and (2) are true at the actual 
world, and (3) is false, as required – just take Proposition 5.3.1 as the corresponding 
countermodel. 
 
(1)  If Everest was in New Zealand, Everest would be in the Southern Hemisphere.  
 
(2)  If Everest was in New Zealand, New Zealand would be in the Northern Hemisphere. 
 
(3) Therefore, if Everest was in New Zealand, then Everest would be in the Southern 
Hemisphere and New Zealand would be in the Northern Hemisphere. 
 
Lifting totality does seem like a substantial change, even if restricted to impossible worlds, 
and some more reflection is required. Nevertheless (5.12), which is a (SI2) salvaged version 
of (5.10) is valid in 𝐂𝐒3
∗. A similar solution will not work for (5.11), since the antecedent in 
cases where the inference fails need not express an impossibility, e.g. Mount Everest being in 
New Zealand is a perfectly possible scenario. 
 
(5.12) ◊𝐴,.◊𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐵 > 𝐴 ⊨ (𝐴 > 𝐶) ≡ (𝐵 > 𝐶) 
 
Proposition 5.4: ◊𝐴,.◊𝐵, 𝐴 > 𝐵, 𝐵 > 𝐴 ⊨𝐂𝐒3∗ (𝐴 > 𝐶) ≡ (𝐵 > 𝐶) 
Proof : It suffices to observe that the premises, if true, in conjunction with (SI2) will not 
require the evaluation of > formulae to access any impossible worlds. Only possible worlds 
will be accessed – and those are totally preordered by (T1). So, the inference goes through, 
since we need failure of comparability for a counterexample, by proposition 5.2.1, but with 
(T1) in place only impossible worlds can be incomparable.         □ 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
In the culminating chapters (4 and 5) of this thesis I have shown that there are accessible 
modifications of Lewis’ (1981) ordering semantics for analyses of counterfactuals that resolve 
some persistent issues regarding contextual ambiguity, and avoid the inadequacy of treating all 
counterpossibles as vacuously true or false. Moreover, in each case it has been indicated to 
what extent each modification preserves the logic that serves as its basis. 
 
The account of context-indexed counterfactuals, proposed in chapter 4, not only addresses the 
context related concerns identified by Goodman (1954) and Quine (1966), but also offers a 
meaningful notion of semantic consequence based on the idea of contextual information 
preservation. Although the approach chosen may not be optimal, given that it also modifies the 
object language, nevertheless there is some evidence that it appears to be a natural move. But 
even if the offered account is vulnerable to the charge of not providing a direct solution to the 
pertinent contextual issues – as it departs from the analysis of a single conditional – at least it 
offers a framework of thinking about those issues, which can be viewed as going some way 
toward providing such a solution.  
 
The account of counterfactuals, proposed in chapter 5, avoids a vacuist account of 
counterpossibles, whilst preserving much of Lewis’ analysis of mere counterfactuals. The 
application of an impossible world semantics in this case has been partly motivated and 
justified by the redeeming roles that such semantics have played in other areas of philosophical 
analysis and logic. However, although I have replied to Lewis’ defense of vacuism and his 
objection to impossible worlds, I admit that I have not given a comprehensive defense to all 
the existing objections. I have defended the feasibility of the comparative similarity of worlds 
interpretation of impossible world ordering semantics for counterfactuals against some recent 
objections, by showing that counterexamples arming such objections can be invalidated on 
systems where impossible worlds satisfy a weaker comparability condition, i.e. partial 
preorderhood. However, there do remain other questions regarding some key ordering 
conditions, underlying the extended domain that could be addressed in the future. 
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A natural step would be to combine the results from chapters 4 and 5, and fashion a system that 
gives both an adequate analysis of counterpossibles, whilst accounting for contextual 
distinctions. That is, we can employ the benefits of the system CS2+ and modify its definition 
so it is based on CS* models instead of (vacuism-burdened) CS models, noting that 𝐂𝐒3
∗ has 
been argued to be the optimal CS* system. This way we would have a system that inherits the 
advantages of both CS2+ and 𝐂𝐒3
∗. This and a more comprehensive participation in the defense 
of impossible world semantics in general would constitute a well-motivated inclusion to future 
research. 
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Appendix 
  
The following appendix contains the proof of the equivalence of the class of CS models and 
the class of S models. That is, these classes validate the same sets of formulae and inferences. 
This proof is based on a proof sketch given by Lewis (1973, p.49). First, let us recall the 
relevant definitions, so the formulation of the theorem is clear. 
 
Definition 2.15: Let ⊨𝐒 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝐒 𝐴 iff for all models (𝑊, $, [. ]), and 
all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, if 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝑤 ⊩ 𝐴. That is, valid inference is defined as truth 
preservation at all worlds in all systems of spheres models. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be 
valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐒 𝐴. Call this logic S.
200  
 
Definition 4.2.7: Let ⊨𝐂𝐒 ⊆ ℘(𝐹𝑜𝑟) × 𝐹𝑜𝑟, and define Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴 iff for all models (𝑊, ≲, 𝜌), and 
all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, if 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ Σ, then 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴. We say an inference from Σ to 𝐴 is valid iff 
Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴. That is, valid inference is defined as truth preservation at all worlds in all CS-
models. A formula 𝐴 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 is said to be valid iff ∅ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴. Call this logic CS. 
 
Theorem A.1.1:    Σ ⊨𝐒 𝐴   iff    Σ ⊨𝐂𝐒 𝐴 
 
Proof : First construct injective maps 𝑓: 𝐂𝐒 ⟶ 𝐒  and 𝑔: 𝐒 ⟶ 𝐂𝐒 between the class of CS 
frames and S frames (definitions A.4.1, A.4.2), such that (i) for each CS frame 𝔉, 𝑓(𝔉) is an S 
frame (lemma A.1.0.1) and (ii) for any S frame 𝔉, 𝑔(𝔉) is a CS frame (lemma A.1.0.2).201 
 
Then, show both 𝑓 and 𝑔 to be truth preserving in the following sense (lemmas A.1.0.4, 
A.1.0.4):  
For any CS frame 𝔉 = (𝑊, ≲), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜌, and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 
 
       (𝔉, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 iff       (𝑓(𝔉), 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 
 
For any S frame 𝔉 = (𝑊, $), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜌, and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 
 
      (𝔉, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 iff       (𝑔(𝔉), 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 
 
Since the above also hold for the basic modal language, the result follows. 
                                               
200 For clarity of presentation I should redefine S models in terms of S frames and 𝜌 rather than [. ]. Keeping 
track of that irrelevant, yet nontrivial difference would be an unnecessary distraction. 
201 I follow Lewis’ (1973, p.49) proof idea here – in particular, the definitions of the injections f and g. 
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For the purposes of the following, let’s recall the (relevant) precise definition of the general 
notion of arbitrary unions and arbitrary intersections. Given a collection of sets 𝓢: 
𝑥 ∈ ⋃ 𝓢    ⟺   ∃𝐴 ∈ 𝓢, 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴.              𝑥 ∈ ⋂ 𝓢    ⟺   ∀𝐴 ∈ 𝓢, 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴. 
 
Definition A.1.1: Define the following map: 𝑓: 𝐂𝐒 ⟶ 𝐒 as follows: 
𝑓(𝑊) = 𝑊. 
𝑓((𝑆𝑖, ≲𝑖)) ∶= $𝑖
≲ = {𝑆 ∈ ℘(𝑆𝑖): (∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊)((𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ∧ 𝑘 ∉ 𝑆) ⟶ 𝑗 <𝑖 𝑘)} 
 
It may be helpful to think of elements of $𝑖
≲ as downward ≲𝑖-closed sets. That is, 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖
≲ iff 
(𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ∧ 𝑘 ≲𝑖 𝑗) ⟶ 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 for any ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊.   
 
Definition A.1.2: Define the following map: 𝑔: 𝐒 ⟶ 𝐂𝐒 as follows: 
𝑔(𝑊) = 𝑊. 
𝑔($𝑖) ∶= (≲𝑖
$, 𝑆𝑖
$)  
   -   ≲𝑖
$ = {(𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ 𝑊 × 𝑊: (∀𝑆 ∈ $𝑖)(𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆)} 
   -   𝑆𝑖
$ = ⋃ $𝑖 
 
Lemma A.1.0.1: For each CS frame 𝔉 = (𝑊, ≲), 𝑓(𝔉) = (𝑊, $≲) is an S frame. 
Proof : Let (𝑊, ≲) be CS frame (as per definition 4.22). We want to show that each  (𝑊, $≲) 
is an S frame, i.e. that $𝑖
≲ satisfies nesting and weak centering, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊. 
 
Nesting: for all 𝑆, 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖
≲  either 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇 or 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇. This follows from totality of ≲. For the trivial 
case, suppose 𝑆, 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖
≲, and let 𝑆 = ∅. Hence, 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇. Now, suppose for contradiction that 
there are nonempty sets 𝑆, 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖
≲ such that neither 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇 nor 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆. First, suppose that it’s not 
the case that 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇. So, there is some 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 such that 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 but 𝑥 ∉ 𝑇. Next, also assume that 
it’s not the case that 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆. So, there is some 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 such that 𝑧 ∈ 𝑇 but 𝑧 ∉ 𝑆. Hence, from 𝑥 ∈
𝑆, 𝑧 ∉ 𝑆, and the definition of $𝑖
≲ we infer 𝑥 <𝑖 𝑧, and from 𝑧 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑥 ∉ 𝑇, and the definition of 
$𝑖
≲ and we also infer 𝑧 <𝑖 𝑥. But this is impossible, since 𝑥 <𝑖 𝑧 and 𝑧 <𝑖 𝑥 means (𝑧, 𝑥) ∉ ≲ 
and (𝑥, 𝑧) ∉ ≲, by definition of <𝑖, which contradicts totality of ≲. 
 
Weak Centering: ∃𝑆 ∈ $𝑖
≲(𝑆 ≠ ∅) and 𝑖 ∈ ⋂($𝑖
≲ ∖ ∅). First to show ∃𝑆 ∈ $𝑖
≲(𝑆 ≠ ∅). It suffices 
to observe that, by definition, ≲𝑖 satisfies CS5: ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊((𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ∧ 𝑘 ∉ 𝑆𝑖) ⟶ 𝑗 <𝑖 𝑘). So, 𝑆𝑖 ∈
$𝑖
≲. Also 𝑆𝑖 ≠ ∅, since 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, by CS2. Next, suppose for contradiction that there is some 
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nonempty sphere 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖
≲ such that 𝑖 ∉ 𝑆. Now 𝑆 ≠ ∅ implies that there is some 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊 such that 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. Hence, in particular (𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ∧ 𝑖 ∉ 𝑆) ⟶ 𝑗 <𝑖 𝑖 is true, by $𝑖
≲ membership. But since the 
antecedent is true by hypothesis, it follows that 𝑗 <𝑖 𝑖 for some 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. But this is impossible, 
since it contradicts CS3, i.e. the ≲𝑖-minimality of 𝑖. This completes the proof.               □ 
 
Lemma A.1.0.2: For each S frame 𝔉 = (𝑊, $), 𝑔(𝔉) = (𝑊, ≲$) is a CS frame. 
Proof : Let (𝑊, $) be an S frame (as per definition 2.17). We want to show that (𝑊, ≲$) is a 
CS frame. First, to show that each (𝑆𝑖
$, ≲𝑖
$) is a total preorder for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, i.e. it satisfies 
CS1. 
 
Transitivity: ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑊 ((𝑥 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑧) ⟶ 𝑥 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑧). Suppose (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ≲𝑖
$ and (𝑦, 𝑧) ∈ ≲𝑖
$ 
for any 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
$. From the definition of  ≲𝑖
$, this implies 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 
for all 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖. Hence, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 for all 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖, by hypothetical syllogism, and (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ≲𝑖
$ 
by definition of ≲𝑖
$. 
 
Totality: ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑊 (𝑥 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑥). Suppose for contradiction that there are 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
$ such 
that (𝑥, 𝑦) ∉ ≲𝑖
$ and (𝑥, 𝑦) ∉ ≲𝑖
$. From the definition of ≲𝑖
$, this implies that there exist spheres 
𝑆, 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖 such that 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 ∧ 𝑥 ∉ 𝑆 and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇 ∧ 𝑦 ∉ 𝑇. Now, 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇 is impossible, because 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 
but 𝑦 ∉ 𝑇. By nesting, the only other possibility is 𝑇 ⊊ 𝑆. Suppose 𝑇 ⊊ 𝑆, but that’s also 
impossible because 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇 but 𝑥 ∉ 𝑆.  
 
Next, to show that each ≲𝑖
$ satisfies the remaining conditions CS2-CS5. 
(CS2)  The world 𝑖 is self-accessible: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖. To show 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
$. Since $𝑖 is weakly centered, 
there is a sphere ∅ ≠ 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖, such that 𝑆 = ⋂$𝑖 and 𝑖 ∈ ⋂$𝑖 ⊆ ⋃ $𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖
$, as required. 
(CS3)  The element 𝑖 is ≲𝑖-minimal: ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊(𝑖 ≲𝑖 𝑗 ). Suppose for contradiction that there 
exists 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
$ such that (𝑖, 𝑗) ∉ ≲𝑖
$. So, by definition of ≲𝑖
$ there’s a 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖 such that 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇 ∧
𝑖 ∉ 𝑇. This contradicts weak centering, which requires that 𝑖 is included in every nonempty 
sphere in $𝑖. 
  
(CS4)  Inaccessible worlds are ≲𝑖
$-maximal: ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊(𝑘 ∉ 𝑆𝑖
$ ⟶ 𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘). It suffices to 
observe that each inaccessible world 𝑘 ∉ ⋃ $𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖
$ satisfies the above condition, by definition 
of ≲𝑖
$. That is, (𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ ≲𝑖
$ for each 𝑘 ∉ 𝑆𝑖
$ and any 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, since (∀𝑆 ∈ $𝑖)(𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆) is 
satisfied vacuously for all inaccessible worlds (worlds outside of ⋃ $𝑖), i.e. the antecedent is 
always false. 
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(CS5)  Accessible worlds are more similar to 𝑖 than inaccessible worlds: 
∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑊 ((𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
$ ∧ 𝑘 ∉ 𝑆𝑖
$) ⟶ 𝑗 <𝑖
$ 𝑘) 
Suppose for contradiction that 𝑘 ∉ 𝑆𝑖
$ but (𝑘, 𝑗) ∈ ≲𝑖
$ for some 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
$. This means that 𝑘 ∉ 𝑆 
for all 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖 and that there is some 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖 such that 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇. Now, (𝑘, 𝑗) ∈ ≲𝑖
$ implies 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶
𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 for all 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖, by definition of ≲𝑖
$. In particular 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇 ⟶ 𝑘 ∈ 𝑇, implying 𝑘 ∈ 𝑇, which is 
impossible. 
This completes the proof.              □ 
 
Lemma A.1.0.3: Functions 𝑓 and 𝑔, as given in definitions A.1.1 and A.1.2, are injections. 
Proof : It is immediate from definitions.            □ 
 
There’s a pattern to all the proof directions in lemmas A.1.0.4 and A.1.0.5. 
Regarding the non-trivial cases, we’re dealing with two kinds of conditions (ii) and (II), that 
vary slightly, but have the same general form. Hence the proofs follow a similar pattern. 
Below I give formulations that aims to emphasize the similarity of the forms of the non-
vacuous conditions. 
 
Ordering frames (**):  (∃𝑥) (𝑃(𝑥) ∧ (∀𝑦)(𝑅(𝑦, 𝑥) ⟶ 𝑄(𝑦))) 
Similarity spheres (##): (∃𝑋) (𝑃′(𝑋) ∧ (∀𝑦)(𝑅′(𝑦, 𝑋) ⟶ 𝑄(𝑦))) 
 
All the proofs (with some variation) follow a general pattern: 
(**) ⟶ (##):  
(1) First, I show that (∃𝑥)𝑃(𝑥) gives (∃𝑋)𝑃′(𝑋).  
(2) Next, I show that (∀𝑦)(𝑅′(𝑦, 𝑋) ⟶ 𝑅(𝑦, 𝑥)).  
Steps (1) and (2) generally require the most work, and I use various methods. 
(3) I use (2) in conjunction with the second conjunct of the hypothesis (∀𝑦)(𝑅(𝑦, 𝑥) ⟶ 𝑄(𝑦)) 
to show that (∀𝑦)𝑄(𝑦), by hypothetical syllogism, thus proving (∀𝑦)(𝑅′(𝑦, 𝑋) ⟶ 𝑄(𝑦)), by 
conditional proof.  
For the (##) ⟶ (**) direction, I use the same proof pattern as for (**) ⟶ (##). 
 
Lemma A.1.0.4: For any CS frame 𝔉 = (𝑊, ≲), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜌, and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 
 
(𝔉, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵     iff     (𝑓(𝔉), 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 
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Proof : Suppose ((𝑊, ≲), 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 for arbitrary (𝑊, ≲) ∈ 𝐂𝐒, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜌, and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 
Then by definition, either  
(i) 𝑆𝑖 ∩ [𝐴] = ∅, or 
(ii) (∃𝑘)(𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ∩ [𝐴]  ∧  (∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊)(𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵])) 
We need to show that either 
(I) ⋃ $𝑖
≲ ∩ [𝐴] = ∅, or  
(II) (∃𝑆 ∈ $𝑖
≲)(𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅ ∧ (∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊)(𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵])) 
That is, we need to show that (i or ii) iff (I or II). The entire argument applies for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊. 
 
(i ⟷ I) The vacuous case: ⋃ $𝑖
≲ ∩ [𝐴] = ∅  iff  𝑆𝑖 ∩ [𝐴] = ∅, since ⋃ $𝑖
≲ ⊆ 𝑆𝑖, by definition of 
$𝑖
≲, and 𝑆𝑖 ∈ $𝑖
≲, by definition of ≲𝑖 and $𝑖
≲, i.e. CS5 implies 𝑆𝑖 ∈ $𝑖
≲. 
 
(ii ⟶ II) Assume there is a 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ∩ [𝐴]. I’ll now define a subset of 𝐾 ⊆ 𝑊, such that 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 
and show that 𝐾 ∈ $𝑖
≲. In other words, I’ll define a set 𝐾 ⊆ 𝑊 whose existence is implied by 
the existence of 𝑘. Let 𝐾 ∶= {𝑗 ∈ 𝑊: 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘}. Observe that 𝐾 ⊆ 𝑆𝑖, since 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 
jointly imply 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊 (𝑆𝑖 is downward ≲𝑖-closed). Denying this would contradict 
CS5, i.e. suppose there’s some 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊 such that 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 yet 𝑗 ∉ 𝑆𝑖. But 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑆𝑖 implies 
𝑘 <𝑖 𝑗, by CS5, contradicting 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘. Now I’ll show that 𝐾 ∈ $𝑖
≲. It suffices to note that 𝐾 ∈ $𝑖
≲ 
follows from 𝐾 being downward ≲𝑖-closed, i.e. for any 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑊, if 𝑥 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑦 ≲𝑖 𝑥, then 𝑦 ∈
𝐾, which can be easily checked as being equivalent to (𝑥 ∈ 𝐾 ∧ 𝑦 ∉ 𝐾) ⟶ 𝑥 <𝑖 𝑦 for any 
𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑊. Hence, 𝐾 ∈ $𝑖
≲, by definition of $𝑖
≲. Now I’ll show that 𝑗 ∈ 𝐾 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵] for all 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. Suppose 𝑗 ∈ 𝐾 for arbitrary 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. Hence, 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘, by construction of 𝐾. Next, from 
hypothesis 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵] for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, we conclude 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵]. Hence, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐾 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈
[𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵] for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by conditional proof, as required. 
 
(II ⟶ ii) Assume that there is a sphere 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖
≲ such that 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅, i.e. there’s some 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 ∩
[𝐴]. So, there is a 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ∩ [𝐴], since ⋃ $𝑖
≲ ⊆ 𝑆𝑖, by definition of $𝑖
≲. Now I’ll show that 
𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. To that end it suffices to note that 𝑥 ≲𝑖 𝑦 ⟶ (𝑦 ∈ 𝑇 ⟶ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇) for 
any 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑊 and 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖
≲ is the contraposed condition for $𝑖
≲ membership. Now, assume 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 
for arbitrary 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. Hence, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑇 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇 for any 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖
≲ and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. In particular 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈
𝑆 for any 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by hypothesis 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖
≲. Therefore 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊 that satisfy 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘, by 
hypothesis 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆. Hence, 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by conditional proof. This, in 
conjunction with the main hypothesis (∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊)(𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵]) in (II) gives 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵] 
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for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by hypothetical syllogism. Hence, finally 𝑗 ≲𝑖 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵] for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by 
conditional proof, as required.                     □ 
 
Lemma A.1.0.5: For any S frame 𝔊 = (𝑊, $), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜌, and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 
 
(𝔉, 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵     iff     (𝑔(𝔉), 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 
 
Proof : Suppose ((𝑊, $), 𝜌), 𝑖 ⊩ 𝐴 > 𝐵 for arbitrary (𝑊, $) ∈ 𝐒, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜌, and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 
Then by definition, either  
(i) ⋃ $𝑖 ∩ [𝐴] = ∅, or 
(ii) (∃𝑆 ∈ $𝑖)(𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅ ∧  (∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊)(𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵])) 
We need to show that either 
(I) 𝑆𝑖
$ ∩ [𝐴] = ∅, or 
(II) (∃𝑘) (𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
$ ∩ [𝐴]  ∧  (∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊)(𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵])) 
That is, we need to show that (i or ii) iff (I or II). The entire argument applies for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊. 
 
(i ⟷ II) The vacuous case is immediate, since 𝑆𝑖
$ = ⋃ $𝑖 by definition of 𝑔. 
 
(ii ⟶ II) Assume that there is a 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖 such that 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅, i.e. there is a 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴]. So, 
there’s a 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
$ ∩ [𝐴], since 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑆𝑖
$ = ⋃ $𝑖 by definition of 𝑔. Now I’ll show that 𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈
𝑆 for any 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. Suppose 𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘 for arbitrary 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. Hence, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑇 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇 for any and 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖 
and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by definition of ≲𝑖
$, so in particular 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 for any 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by hypothesis 
𝑆 ∈ $𝑖. So, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊 that satisfy 𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘, by hypothesis 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆. Hence, 𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈
𝑆 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by conditional proof. This, in conjunction with main hypothesis 
(∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊)(𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵]) in (ii) gives 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵] for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by hypothetical 
syllogism. Hence 𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵] for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by conditional proof, as required. 
 
(ii ⟵ II) Assume there is a 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
$ ∩ [𝐴], so ⋃ $𝑖 ∩ [𝐴] ≠ ∅, by definition of 𝑔, and there is a 
sphere 𝑆 ∈ $𝑖, such that 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 ∩ [𝐴], by definition of set union. Now we need to show that if 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑆, then 𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘 for any 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. By definition of 𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑇 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇 for all 𝑇 ∈ $𝑖, so in 
particular 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. Hence 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. Hence 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘, for any 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊, by conditional 
proof. Finally, in conjunction with (∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊)(𝑗 ≲𝑖
$ 𝑘 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵]) from main hypothesis 
(II), we conclude that 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵] for any 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊. Hence (∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑊)(𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 ⟶ 𝑗 ∈ [𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵]), by 
conditional proof.                    □  
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